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Political Leadership in the EU and the New Normal

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Future Research Recommendations

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TransCrisis: a research agenda for developing understanding of transboundary crisis management in Europe

The TransCrisis project focused on transboundary crisis management capacities in the EU and its member states, focusing on how EU-level institutions, European political leaders and national governments develop and utilise these capacities in a diversity of domains. At the EU level, TransCrisis diagnosed a growing presence of decision-making processes and institutional crisis management procedures at a time of growing political debate about the legitimacy of the European Union. ¹

Building on TransCrisis

The TransCrisis consortium is unique in that it brought together scholars from the fields of political science, public administration and international relations with diverse interests in crisis management, regulation and comparative politics. This allowed TransCrisis to focus on different aspects of transboundary crisis management in the EU and to draw synergies across them.

In particular, TransCrisis focused on transboundary crises in three areas that had previously not been engaged with in an integrated fashion:

- The traditional domains of civil protection, public health and security;
- The domains broadly defined by the Single Market, namely issues arising in particular from growing market integration and interdependence;
- The importance of constitutional politics in particular member states.

TransCrisis highlights the importance of taking a holistic view of transboundary crisis management that incorporates both immediate ‘fire-fighting’ and long-term crisis management approaches that seek to build resilience.

¹ See www.transcrisis.eu
Above all, the value of TransCrisis research has been to integrate research traditionally associated with civil protection and ‘societal security’ domains with domains that are also characterised by transboundary crises, namely constitutional politics and integrated European markets. The tight connectedness between these three areas of transboundary crises has been a prominent feature emerging from TransCrisis research. The political aftermath of the financial and the refugee crises have affected all aspects of EU capacity to address transboundary crises, whether it is in dealing with the formal (and growing) transnational decision-making structures, member state motivation and capacity to meaningfully address potential transboundary crises, or in allowing political parties and national governments to campaign on the basis of explicit opposition to central EU norms.

Any further EU research into transboundary crises should therefore avoid the tendency to solely concentrate on single areas or technological fixes in the domain of ‘security’ but maintain the focus on interdependence across policy issues and domains. It might appear attractive to channel financial resources into promises of quick technical fixes to deal with questions of security, but such fixes and applications will prove worthless without advancing our understanding of the critical political and social underpinnings that shape transboundary crisis management in the context of the EU and its member states.

This particular document develops proposals for future research. To avoid the inevitable ‘why haven’t you done it already’ criticism, this document concentrates on themes and questions that develop TransCrisis research in qualitative new directions. It does so by focusing on three perspectives for future research. The first is to focus on conceptual issues whose significance has emerged as part of the TransCrisis work. The second perspective is to focus on conceptual and thematic cross-cutting issues whose salience and/or significance has increased since the start of the TransCrisis project in ways that could not be fully anticipated. The third perspective is to focus on questions that draw on research findings arising from TransCrisis research. These three ways of considering future research avenues are not mutually exclusive and therefore some of the suggested questions and interests overlap. The rest of this document sets out these three perspectives of looking at future research recommendations. It then considers how such
research might inform our theoretical understanding of European Integration and EU politics and governance.²

1. Developing concepts and analytical themes in transboundary crisis management

As noted, one of the central puzzles relating to TransCrisis work is that we observe a growth of EU-level transboundary crisis management mechanisms at a time when there is increasing member state hostility towards EU transboundary crisis management in some sectors. Such resistance can, in part, be associated with the redistributive costs of increased interdependence and market integration. In part, however, this resistance stems from competing understandings regarding central norms governing liberal democracy. Building on TransCrisis work, four central avenues for further research on transboundary crisis emerge:

Crisisification. TransCrisis has established not just a growth in issues that are identified as EU-level transboundary crises, but also an increase in instruments associated with crisis management functions. The rise of technologies of crisis management, whether it is in terms of the existence of crisis rooms, detection and ‘early warning’ systems or the creation of particular emergency powers raises a number of avenues for future research. One is that the presence of ‘crisis solutions’ will lead to a ‘hunting around’ effect for issues that can be identified as ‘crisis’ (a pattern contributing to ‘garbage can decision-making’, as defined by Cohen et al 1972): the availability of tools and instruments will shape, if not determine the selection of crises that one seeks to manage.

In addition, beyond the study of how issues are identified, there are also important research questions in terms of decision-making style. Once decision-making takes place in ‘crisis mode’, the style of decision-making is likely to be influenced by ‘crisis conditions’, namely threat, urgency and uncertainty. Identifying situations as ‘crises’ might therefore stand in the way of more deliberative or reflective decision-making processes.

² This document is based on the work of TransCrisis across its different work packages, discussed with members of the research consortium during a consortium meeting (9/10 November in London) and in conversations about drafts of this paper.
More generally, ‘crisisfication’ can encourage a number of research avenues that reflect on wider theoretical and conceptual traditions. In the following four overlapping (and by no means fully exhaustive) research areas relating to ‘crisisfication’ can be highlighted:

a) One research trajectory in ‘crisisfication’ is to explore further the context of transboundary crisis management in the context of the ‘(global) risk society’ (Beck 1992, 1999, 2009). Transboundary crises highlight the cross-national proximity of European populations: this is, however, not a community of ‘choice’ but a community united by ‘threat’ (or ‘danger’). Accordingly, such a research agenda would deepen its focus on the qualitative impact of issues defined as ‘risk’ (and the relationship between risk and crisis) and on questions about how the future is imagined with resultant consequences on tactics of prevention and anticipation. This research would have to acknowledge a context of global risks that existing institutions are incapable of processing, where there is a disconnect between involuntary ‘consumers’ of risks and those ‘risk-defining’ decision-makers and where we might be diagnosing a ‘politicisation’ of transnational decision-making that undermines traditional modes of transboundary governance. Such discussions do exist in some scholarly disciplines, but require application in the context of the EU. In a recent argument, Jonathan White (2015) has developed the wider implications of an ‘emergency Europe’. The link between a ‘global risk society’ and an ‘emergency Europe’ requires further discussion. It raises questions as to the consequences of a European society that is encountering crises that are experienced as a result of European integration in particular (and modernity more generally). The dispersion of responsibility in the context of the EU highlights the distinct characteristics of the EU when making crisis-related decisions, but raises the concern about the nature of decision-making (and accusations that fragmented decision-making establishes islands of ‘dictatorial order’). Further research into leadership, especially speeches, the emergence of ‘emergency orders’ and the agenda-setting in different domains can offer further insights with regards to this legitimacy challenge to the EU. Indeed, studies of ‘politicisation’, such as accountability-related venues, can offer potential counter-arguments to those who suggest that the financial and refugee crises offer scope to talk about the rise of ‘dictatorial’ emergency orders.
b) Another (related) research avenue path is to explore crisisification in the context of the rise of the ‘audit society’ (Power 1997), namely the growth of rituals of verification that are supposed to offer reassurance but that are based not just on questionable technologies of assessing, detecting, let alone managing risks, but also on technologies that are stretched into inappropriate contexts, leading to an overall reduction in capacity to respond to crisis due to placation effects. On the one hand, we should therefore expect a ritualisation effect in terms of transboundary crisis management practices. On the other hand, we should expect the spread of particular technologies of ‘crisis management’ to ever more domains whose appropriateness is, at best, questionable. An interest in unintended consequences of crisis management approaches should reveal the biases and ‘blind spots’ of the rise of crisis detection tools in European institutions. Such a (Science and Technology Studies-influenced) agenda would focus in particular on the technologies and instruments of crisis management (e.g., artefacts, information systems and such like).

c) A further way of developing a ‘crisisification’-related agenda is to explore in more detail how technical systems of detection, early warning and horizon scanning (rather than deliberative or advocative processes) shape decision-making and therefore reinforce rather than challenge dominant understandings of security (see Borg and Rhinard, forthcoming). The emergence of ‘pre-emptive’ crisis frameworks has a performative effect in shaping what is on the European crisis agenda and in seeking to anticipate uncertain events. Establishing the existence of such effects will require careful empirical work inside organisational processes. Similarly, more organisational approaches would suggest that tools of crisis detection are largely shaped by institutions’ ability to ‘do something about them’. The study of risk-based regulation has established that organisations will focus primarily on risks that are within their jurisdiction and that they think they can manage. Related to transboundary crisis management and the presence of a ‘crisis warning architecture’, this means that future research needs to consider processes of issue selection and learning.
d) Crisisification work may also wish to consider the aftermath of crisis-related decision-making in different domains. Such work would focus on the ‘crisis debris’ in affected populations once they have encountered EU transboundary crisis management. This kind of social anthropological work would focus on those populations directly affected by crises and, more critically, by crisis management. In addition, this work would take into consideration the way in which these immediate experiences are fed back into ‘learning’ processes.

‘Backsliding’: TransCrisis research has highlighted the growing scope of backsliding across member states during a period when this issue has become increasingly salient for EU politics. A future agenda should therefore focus on the constitutional implications of such backsliding for the European Union and its member states and how backsliding represents challenges to fundamental constitutional norms. Backsliding, therefore, points to sources of potential qualitative change and also to questions how constitutional norms are established, maintained and/or renegotiated, also in the context of third countries (which might also include an interest in package deals with third countries over certain transboundary crises, such as in the case of migration). Developing the research agenda on the transboundary crises resultant from member state backsliding requires drawing on established and developing literatures on populism, Euroscepticism and constitutional politics as well as on legal scholarship. It points to debates as to whether the traditional theories of European integration are suitable for the study of such phenomena (and whether these phenomena already constitute an indicator of ‘disintegration’).

Crisis management, core state powers and the regulatory state in Europe. Nearly 25 years ago, Giandomenico Majone (1994) suggested that the European Union represented a ‘regulatory state’: it governed via policy content while member states and private organisations had to bear the compliance cost, given the absence of an extensive discretionary budget. The ‘cost’ of the regulatory state were therefore dispersed and ‘hidden’. Transboundary crises highlight the limits of the regulatory state argument: regulatory strategies to address crises allocate clearly identifiable winners and losers. Crisis management therefore is fundamentally about the welfare state and the redistributive functions of the state. As regulatory and welfare functions coincide in transboundary crisis management, the presence of resistance from ‘losers’ (and ‘losing’ member states) is therefore likely. In addition, EU transboundary crisis
management capacities also suggest that the EU is building core state powers, thereby raising important questions about political power, sovereignty and legitimacy that deserve further exploration. This constellation gives rise to a number of avenues for further research.

First, as asymmetric costs and benefits become apparent during crisis situations, the limits of the regulatory state become also increasingly apparent as they collide with core state powers associated with member states (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016). Member states are less likely to accept the visible transfer of authority over core state powers to the European level. This assumed reluctance presents a further challenge for legitimate transboundary crisis management at the EU level: even if citizens might be accepting EU-level decision-making framework that allocates winners and losers during a crisis, are member state governments as likely to accept such governance arrangements? And if so, are these arrangements credible? Research is required to explore the interaction between transboundary crisis and core state powers. Dealing with shared problems, such as ash clouds, e.coli or ebola, might not trigger similar sensitivities as dealing with tensions that emerge in the context of the Single Market, namely the existence of liberalised and integrated transboundary markets and the presence of significant national political and administrative decision-making power. For example, a ‘home bias’ in national supervision has been identified as critical in the area of banking regulation, but further research is required to understand the presence (or not) of ‘home bias’ in other policy domains and to what extent such a home bias represents a factor in transboundary crisis itself. It also points to important questions as to the appropriate level of ‘closeness’ between national and local administrations and sources of transboundary crisis. More generally, this constellation highlights the tensions that exist in the context of ‘open economies’ (i.e. liberalised European markets) and national sovereignty.

Second, and related, these trends need to be explored in the context of the somewhat countervailing trend of the increasing significance of EU-level agencies in dealing with transboundary crisis management. It has been suggested that ‘agencification’ at the European level has presented a significant reconfiguration of EU executive power (Egeberg and Trondal 2009) and questions of agency design in terms of governance structures (for example, are representatives defined as representing national regulators or as ‘national experts?) require further research as does the way in which agencies develop their jurisdictions in the context of
transboundary crises. Furthermore, this raises questions as to how agencies are able (or not) to develop their reputation at times of crisis.

**Crisis of crisis management.** In the 1970s, it was fashionable to declare the end of (late) capitalism and liberal democracy by highlighting the inherent and irresolvable contradictions between capitalism and democracy. Similar themes have emerged in the context of the financial crisis and the Brexit vote. Whatever the basis for these claims, contemporary transboundary crisis management is associated with a range of factors that suggest that we are not just witnessing an expansion of crisis frameworks at the EU levels across institutions and domains, but that this expansion, paradoxically, takes place at a time when such transboundary crisis management is in a state of crisis.

TransCrisis research, and related literatures, has highlighted a range of factors that can explain this state of ‘crisis of crisis management’ (Offe 1976): One factor is ‘ politicisation’, as increasing publicity and polarisation about EU policy-making challenges the ‘efficient’ secret of EU policy-making, namely the dominance of executive technocratic decision-making (de Wilde et al 2016). Such politicisation has been evident not just in the case of high profile crises (such as the refugee crisis), but also in ‘less visible’ cases (such as banking regulation and invasive alien species). A second factor is that first order national electoral contests have increasingly turned to the ‘EU dimension’, but not in economic left/right ways. Instead, conflicts over EU membership and future direction of EU have become part of the widely diagnosed shift towards a dominance of ‘identity politics’. As the EU is becoming increasing associated with contested political positions, the EU is less able to appear as a ‘neutral referee’, thereby potentially undermining its position in handling transboundary crises.

Furthermore, the rise of territorial conflict (the ‘territorialisation of crisis management’) also highlights that despite existing conventions, the European Union becomes part and parcel of domestic conflicts. As transboundary crises across domains multiply, it can be suggested that the EU will increasingly face questions of overload and accusations of bias, further undermining its legitimacy in dealing with transboundary crisis management. One way of pursuing such research is to build on the methodologies used in TransCrisis to explore political leaders’ speeches and the way they responded to expert and public views. This line of research
calls for a long-term and broad study of the ways in which the EU, with its various transboundary crisis management institutions and mechanisms, seeks to deal with crises.

2. New and changing issues and themes in transboundary crises management

The previous section developed recommendations for future research in terms of analytical themes that emerged from the on-going TransCrisis research. In this section, attention turns to themes and cross-cutting topics whose salience and significance had not been fully foreseen at the time of the formal start of TransCrisis. In other words, this section highlights questions that require deepened research that can build on TransCrisis research, but that takes into consideration changing conditions and novel themes.³

Underpinning these themes and topics are long-standing political trends that were diagnosed by TransCrisis research, but also deepened cleavages among member states. Whether these deepened cleavages represent a decline of solidarity among EU member states, or simply the manifestation of a long-existing lack of solidarity in view of the perceived visibility of the redistributive effects of EU integration, offers an important question for future research.

**Backsliding:** Backsliding, the intentional rejection by a member state government of constitutional norms associated with liberal democracy and EU membership, has become one of the most critical issues in contemporary EU politics. When the TransCrisis project was initially drafted, the notion of ‘backsliding’ already featured in some literatures, but had not gained the kind of prominence that it enjoys today, as illustrated, for example, by the European Commission’s proposed action against Poland under Article 7 of the Treaty. It was also not imaginable that one of the research partners in TransCrisis (CEU) would be directly targeted by its own government’s legislative backsliding actions (or that this particular country would be taken to the ECJ by the European Commission over its Higher Education Law⁴). Our research into ‘backsliding’ therefore expanded into one of our institutions being a site of ‘backsliding’.

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³ The ‘new’ here does not necessarily imply that these issues did not exist before, but rather that these topics have witnessed significant change – in their salience and their significance – that they deserve particular focus and give rise to distinct research interests.
Given the high political salience of ‘backsliding’, further research is necessary and pertinent. Backsliding has moved from a phenomenon that might have been regarded as low-key, subversive three years ago to one that enjoys high political attention and threatens to further divide EU member states. Future research should focus on the ways in which the EU as a political system is developing indicators of backsliding, how such indicators are being updated and informed and acted upon. In doing so, the indicator sets developed by TransCrisis offer a basis for the development of a dashboard of indicators that can inform the worlds of research and practice about backsliding dynamics among member states and accession candidates. More generally, future research needs to consider the implications of the open endorsement of ideas of ‘illiberal democracy’ in some member states and third countries given the EU’s normative commitments to constitutional liberal democracy.

**Brexit:** When TransCrisis was initially conceived, the possibility of a member state electing to leave the European Union seemed remote. The Brexit referendum and the subsequent triggering of Article 50 by the UK government illustrated one of the key trends underpinning the initial interest of TransCrisis: the diagnosed re-nationalisation of national electoral politics. Whatever shape Brexit will eventually take (if at all), some important research questions in the context of transboundary crisis management are becoming more pertinent. These questions relate in particular to the ways in which third countries co-operate with the EU in ‘transboundary’ constellations and under what conditions. Future research should establish further how third countries engage with the EU over (potential and actual) transboundary crises and under what terms, and to what extent alternative venues (outside of the EU) are utilised to address the challenges of transboundary crisis management between the EU and third countries. In addition, Brexit will also have an effect on existing transboundary crisis management systems, especially in the area of banking where the separation between ‘banking union’ (and Eurozone) and the ‘Single Market’ will become increasingly blurred.

**Constitutional crises:** At the time of its inception, TransCrisis did not consider constitutional conflicts within member states as a central transboundary crisis. Although the referendum in Scotland had already illustrated potential implications for the EU of some regions seeking constitutional independence, the concern about the role of the EU in the context of such constitutional conflicts has become more prominent in the context of the Spanish constitutional crisis over the status of Catalonia (which also centrally affected one of our consortium
partners). Domestic constitutional crises have become a distinct type of transboundary crisis for the EU. Future research into domestic constitutional conflicts will need to explore the role of the EU in these conflicts, how the EU is utilised by domestic actors and how these conflicts are being ‘transported’ to the EU level, even in a context where EU leaders seek to maintain the constitutional convention that the European Union does not engage in domestic constitutional conflicts.

**Refugee crisis:** The initial consortium meeting of the TransCrisis project took place in view of the tragic discovery that approximately 800 refugees had perished in the Mediterranean. At a subsequent consortium meeting in the autumn of 2015 a leading policy maker suggested that the refugee flows did not represent a crisis as mechanisms for managing these transboundary flows existed within the EU (including utilising the Solidarity clause (Art 222)). Such views were controversial at the time, but were proven even more problematic during subsequent months. Such discussions highlight the ways in which certain issues become identified as ‘crisis’ at particular points rather than others.

TransCrisis research has considered on-going responses by EU leaders to the refugee crises. However, further research into different aspects of this on-going transboundary crisis is required. Partly this relates to the on-going search among EU political leaders to establish a common policy response towards the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ management of refugee flows among member states, partly it relates to integration-related questions of how different member states seek to support refugees in settling in their respective locations, and it partly relates to security-related questions about how member state authorities co-operate in information exchange.

More generally, the refugee crisis represents, just like the financial crisis, a transboundary crisis whose long-term effects on EU and member state politics are still emerging. The consequences of the refugee crisis will require sustained research in order to understand and explain policy responses, changes in the party political landscape, shifting popular perceptions and the ability of political leadership to shape public debate. One central question is how the refugee and

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financial crises have, in potentially complementary ways, affected co-operation among member states by deepening cleavages and reducing willingness by member states to delegate decision-making authority to the EU-level.

**Cyber-security and network integrity:** The issue of cyber-security has gained increasing currency and questions about how to protect networks and individuals from negative consequences has become a critical issue that has encouraged increased discussion as to how best to organise cyber-security across EU member states. However, the particular significance of the debate regarding cyber-security is twofold and relates to questions regarding critical infrastructure on the one hand, and questions regarding constitutional norms on the other. One interest is related to privacy- and competition-related issues, such as the (market) power of private operators in shaping individual choices through algorithmic processes. The other is the exploitation of social media through political actors interested in undermining the integrity of democratic processes. In part this relates to the growing temptation of political actors to endorse ‘fake news’ as part of their campaign strategies. In general, cyber-security raises therefore a number of related questions for transboundary crisis-interested research, ranging from attempts to organise cyber-security of infrastructures (especially in terms of their interdependence with other critical infrastructures) to attempts to mitigate attempts at undermining the integrity of political processes. In other words, electoral processes have to be understood as critical infrastructures themselves. Protecting electoral processes in the sense of critical infrastructures is central to transboundary crisis management (if the EU wishes to maintain its core ideal of supporting liberal democracy).

**Changing understandings of crisis:** In part as a response to geopolitical changes, there has also been a shift in understanding as to what ‘civil protection’ constituted. Following the supposed end of the Cold War, increasingly attention moved from the military aspects of crisis management towards the identification of new threats, such as those emerging from environmental crises and disasters. Towards the end of TransCrisis research, there were remarkable shifts in understandings of civil protection back to more ‘military’ understandings of civil protection and defence, especially in Sweden. Future research needs to trace these debates about EU- and national level debates about civil protection and security and how these are informed by changing contexts and conflicts among different professions within bureaucracies.
3. Developing Understanding of Institutions of EU transboundary crisis management

This section builds on findings of TransCrisis research and explores some of the key questions that emerge from these findings. More generally, this section also highlights how the study of transboundary crisis management can contribute to the wider theoretical discussion on European Integration and EU policy-making.

What is a European transboundary crisis? One of the central questions emerging from TransCrisis research is under what conditions a particular issue attracts the attention of policymakers so as to be defined as transboundary crisis on the one hand, and as a transboundary crisis deserving a European response on the other. TransCrisis has highlighted that such processes are not necessarily the result of incidents that trigger subsequent action, they are also not the response to particular expressions of European-wide public attention, the presence of particular types of interest groups or the result of dominant groups of experts. Apart from the rise in crisis tools and architectures, TransCrisis also established the diversity of modes of governing transboundary crises across the European Union.

Given this diversity of patterns, it is important to develop further our understanding as to why we observe the growing ‘call’ and ‘supply’ for EU-level transboundary crisis management arrangements in some domains rather than in others. To some extent, the financial crisis is a case in point. Prior to 2008, there was only limited acceptance for introducing more than light-touch coordination among national regulatory authorities. The experience of the financial crisis has led to dramatic changes. However, TransCrisis also observed the rise of EU-level crisis management regimes in the absence of such crises, and it observed European-wide crisis management infrastructures outside of the institutions of the EU. Such patterns in part challenge traditional neo-functionalist arguments that would suggest that market integration creates spillover effects that encourage further integration. In part, these patterns invite research into ‘agenda setting’ to explore whether the emergence of EU-level transboundary crisis management capacities follows a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ pattern.

The diffusion of formal instruments of transboundary crisis management. TransCrisis research has noted the increasing presence of formal ‘early warning’ mechanisms and systems. This finding establishes the basis for a range of further research questions: Why are we
witnessing this rise in systems? Is this a simple response, that early warning systems emerge as a response to the experience of an actual crisis? For example, the response 2010 Ash Cloud incident and the 2009 ‘Red Sludge’ chemical spill in Hungary triggered more intensive monitoring of volcanoes and residual chemical storage facilities respectively. Similarly, growing resources have been placed on monitoring migration flows. Are we observing a process of policy diffusion in which seemingly legitimate and successful models are being transferred across different DGs and other EU-level organisations? This research would also need to account for the role of the Joint Research Centre which provides the technological platform for most systems, linking to questions about policy entrepreneurship and the spread of particular professional understandings as to how ‘early warning’ systems should be constituted and what their performative effects might be.

However, beyond the mapping of early detection mechanisms, it is also critical to explore how such early warning systems are linked to wider decision-making. For example, DG Mare’s detection systems diagnosed (in summer 2016) the arrival of deadly ‘Lionfish’ in the Mediterranean. This prompted extensive inter-service consultation on whether and how to respond, especially as the legal basis of such a response was, at best, ambiguous. This example as well as TransCrisis research that pointed to the role of different actors, such as European agencies, that operated in legally ambiguous waters in dealing with crisis offers scope for further study, especially in terms of whether these agencies actively expand their jurisdiction in times of crises, especially in order to maintain or establish their reputation.

The rise of ‘crisis’ frameworks is, however, not just reserved to the world of early warning systems and crisis rooms across most DGs. There is also a growth in formal crisis mechanisms in other EU-level policy domains as well. Most prominently, this has been the case in the area of banking regulation, which has seen the emergence of a Single Supervisory Mechanism and a Single Resolution Mechanism. In other domains (such electricity), crisis mechanisms are dispersed and debates exist as to not just the appropriate mechanisms to prevent and mitigate crises, but also at what level such crisis management provisions should be situated. Furthermore, TransCrisis has highlighted the importance of considering the administrative and political pre-requisites of different modes of governance in transboundary crisis management and further research could seek to untangle the ‘bureaumetrics’ of different transboundary
crisis management regimes, by tracing staffing, legal and financial resources across member states.

The practice of transboundary crisis management. TransCrisis research has offered new insights into the rise of formal mechanisms of transboundary crisis management, their development and application. However, there is further scope for studying how these frameworks operate in practice and are coupled to other organisational day-to-day processes. Similarly, it raises questions as to what is understood as a ‘crisis’ in different policy domains. TransCrisis established that some domains had well-established understandings of what constituted a crisis to the system (such as in electricity). In other domains, such understandings were more contested, and the consequences of crisis arguably less visible and acute. This raises the research question as to what constitutes a ‘European state of emergency’ across different policy domains and whether there is an emerging ‘community’ of security and crisis officials that shape the agenda.

An interest in the practice of transboundary crisis management relates also to questions of how crises are formally escalated within governance architectures. On the one hand, such an interest requires further (modelling) research in the ways in which transboundary crises may escalate and cascade, and, on the other hand, how the presence and absence of particular transboundary crisis management arrangements affect the trajectories of crises. An interest in the practices of transboundary crisis management needs to explore in more detail the interaction between ‘normal’ and ‘emergency’ (crisis) decision-making frameworks: to what extent, for example, does ‘crisis’ loom in the day-to-day decision-making or are such emergencies side-lined and loosely-connected to the decision-making in a particular domain? How do the presence and the emergence of a transboundary crisis management framework change the ‘normal’ decision-making patterns in a given domain? How does the rise of crisis and crisisification lead to an overall ‘securitisation’ of the state? Are notions of crisisification related to ideas about ‘securitisation’ (the adoption of extraordinary means used in the name of security)?

In addition, exploring the practice of transboundary crisis management also raises questions as to how different domains ‘exercise’ or ‘simulate’ crisis in order to assess their preparedness. A range of studies has been interested in simulations in the past, however, that work has been
focused on single sectors and has been interested in the simulation itself (and frequently suggesting that such simulations offer little else than rituals of verification) without considering their (lack of) integration in the wider crisis management system. More generally, this line of research focuses on broader questions of ‘learning’: what are the lessons drawn from simulated or actual crises? Do they lead to a reaffirmation of existing approaches or do they lead to fundamental questioning of key assumptions?

Moreover, an important future research avenue is to focus on the ‘real’ frontlines of transboundary crisis management. Beyond focusing on the ‘street-level’, this avenue raises questions about the role of non-state actors, such as corporate actors (especially in the area of critical infrastructures), voluntary organisations (for example, in environmental areas) and private citizens. Transboundary crisis management at the frontline of the crisis raises questions about professional and moral understandings, the importance of communication, the existence of responsive information collection capacities, and the problems of aligning local, regional, national and EU interests.

**Resilience at member state level.** One of the widespread claims in the recent literature is the rise of ‘resilience’, the idea that individuals cannot rely on their respective nation state to protect from or immediately respond to crisis. Instead, individuals are to be enabled to be resourceful. Future research needs to consider how far ideas about ‘resilience’ have spread across EU member states, what kind of assumptions are made about types of crises and their cascading effects, and what assumptions are made about individuals’ capacity and motivation to prepare to be resilient. Starting from this focus on local and national resilience, the question arises about transboundary considerations of such resilience frameworks and how resilience frameworks vary across levels of government and between them.

**Focusing on distinct transboundary crisis management tasks.** TransCrisis identified seven critical tasks for effective and legitimate transboundary crisis management. Concentrating on particular tasks or strategic functions also raises a range of further research avenues.

*Detection:* As noted, the key focus here would be on the type of threats that existing detection mechanisms focus on and what their overall effect is on transboundary crisis management, especially in terms of ‘rude surprises’ and emerging risks and threats. What kind of learning exists to inform detection? What instruments are used to ‘detect’ and how reliable is the
information, given in particular the limited interest by member states in supplying ‘bespoke’
information to EU institutions?

*Decision-making and Coordination.* TransCrisis research has not just highlighted the dispersed
character of decision-making during moments of crisis, but also illustrated that this dispersion
applies both in a horizontal and vertical sense. Research needs to therefore explore in more
detail the distinct co-ordination challenges that emerge in the context of complex crisis
management decision-making arrangements (e.g., resolution mechanisms). Some agencies, for
example, have risk management as part of their central missions, in other cases, agencies did
not perceive to be involved in transboundary crisis management at all. How different agencies
develop their ‘core competency’ around understandings of transboundary crisis management
(or not) forms a further promising avenue for future research.

*Accountability.* TransCrisis research was particularly interested in the ways in which the
European Parliament sought to hold national executive actors to account as part of economic
crisis regimes that have emerged since the financial crisis. The research highlighted the limited
practice of account-holding and -giving. In terms of studying political accountability, therefore,
future research needs to consider further how committees and plenary sessions hold executives
to account and what might motivate extensive account-giving. TransCrisis research also
highlighted the multiple venues in which accountability plays a central role in transboundary
crisis management. It did so by studying the speeches of European leaders, by looking at
backsliding and by focusing on EU-member state interactions. Regarding the latter, TransCrisis
highlighted the importance of national and local accountability. This aspect calls for a wider
interest in accountability and how different actors dealing with transboundary crisis
management are encouraged to give account to diverse fora (and not just political ones). In
addition, recent security incidents (such as the Berlin Christmas market attack) have
highlighted that accountability cannot be merely framed in terms of official account-giving and
-holding, or through the holding of inquiries into administrative processes. Instead,
accountability has to involve affected parties (victims) of transboundary crises and further
research is required how those affected most by transboundary crises are receiving attention in
the aftermath of a particular acute crisis.

More generally, accountability-related research in the context of transboundary crisis
management needs to consider the ‘many hands problem’ of institutional fragmentation and
responsibility dispersion. Affected citizens will hold the ‘frontline’ responsible, and how such
accountability relations impact on the exercise of transboundary crisis management represents a further critical research challenge for the future (especially in the context of the blame-avoidance literature). Therefore, the crisis literature needs to move beyond the existing focus on inquiries and political accountability mechanisms and consider more extensive understandings of account-giving and –holding.

4. Theories of EU integration and politics and transboundary crisis management

While viewing its research through a common framework for the understanding of critical transboundary crisis management activities, TransCrisis did not adopt a unified theoretical framework for the study of transboundary crisis management. TransCrisis overall did not aspire to contribute to a unified theory of European integration. Instead, TransCrisis has treated the European Union as a multi-level governance system. The TransCrisis framework for the study of crisis\(^6\) offered the scope for the application of different theories that have been applied in the study of political science and European studies. Nevertheless, TransCrisis offers a range of theoretical implications that deserve further investigation.

One critical debate is that between supranational, intergovernmental and ‘new intergovernmental’ approaches. Such debates relate in part to the development of transboundary crisis management regimes in the first place (such as the political processes linked to the creation of a ‘banking union’), in part it relates to questions of governance across institutions and agencies tasked with transboundary crisis management, and in part these questions relate to the actual practice of transboundary crisis management. Taking a cross-domain perspective of transboundary crisis management might offer scope for a ‘theory shoot-out’ in the sense of offering contributions as to how the theories’ different causal mechanisms point to distinct aspects of transboundary crisis management. There are also questions as to when actors choose more supranational or intergovernmental venues for transboundary crisis management, or when they choose to call on the ‘Solidarity Clause’ rather than ask for ‘mutual assistance’. Taken together, the field of transboundary crisis management therefore offers an ideal site for theoretical and empirical exploration: it is characterized by integration (the rise in instruments and regimes at the EU level) at a time when there are signs for ‘disintegration’, we

are observing policy development in crisis frameworks at the EU level when in other areas we are observing ‘policy dismantling’, and we also need to understand better processes in which more prescriptive policy at the EU level coincides with depleted and ‘dismantled’ administration at the local/national street-level. Exploring these questions will prove crucial in also addressing broader debates about the nature of the European Union, especially in view of criticisms that the EU has become an ‘emergency Europe’.

More generally, there are questions about the importance of public opinion and understandings of legitimacy and their role in European politics. Traditional theories of European integration have not paid sufficient attention to these factors. In order to develop our theoretical and empirical understanding further, it is necessary to explore questions such as how public opinion influences the feasibility of implementing certain governance arrangements rather than others, whether this relates to questions of transboundary crisis management in particular, or other aspects of EU governance more generally. Indeed, future research needs to also consider feedback-loops: how particular crises are being managed will have an effect on public legitimacy of the EU. Again, this highlights the importance of understanding the interconnectedness of transboundary crises in the EU (as noted above). Furthermore, focusing on legitimacy, public opinion and leadership as critical factors in transboundary crisis management activities offers scope for broader contributions to our theoretical understanding of EU governance.

There are also questions about different research methodologies. Researching the EU has become increasingly risky in some contexts, especially when conducting research on questions of backsliding. Research into crisis decision-making, the emergence of crisis regimes and the administrative cooperation across different actors will always be associated with elite interviews. The analysis of leaders’ speeches offers further scope to explore how particular crises are identified, proposals justified, and support sought. TransCrisis research highlighted the linkages between leadership and public support in the context of the financial crisis, but applying this set of methodologies across different crises and domains would offer further insights into how leadership among European leaders is exercised and how different modes of leadership are associated with public legitimacy. This method holds the promise of identifying which crisis-related instruments are preferred by different stakeholders and could be used to predict the ‘room for compromise’ in future crises.
5. Conclusion

The challenges for a future research agenda in transboundary crisis management are therefore threefold. One is the ‘normal science’ demand for ‘more data’: there is a need for expanding empirical knowledge applying refined methodologies in view of the research findings and experiences during the TransCrisis research process. Indeed, the research agenda illustrated in this document highlights the need for diverse methodologies and theoretical frameworks to be explored in order to do justice to the diverse settings in which transboundary crisis management occurs.

Second, such debates link directly with the wider discussions about the constitutional nature of the European Union in the wake of different types of existential crises (i.e. the financial and refugee crises), it relates to questions about the capacity of member states to adequately prepare for and address transboundary crises even though such activities might affect understandings of core state power, be affected by resource implications and conflict with dominant professional understandings at the street-level.

Finally, research into transboundary crisis management also needs to develop an expansive understanding of critical infrastructures where lessons drawn from existing structures (such as in electricity) need to be carefully developed to deal with threats to other infrastructures, such as ensuring the integrity of electoral processes.

References