



**T**RANS**C**RISIS

Enhancing the EU's Transboundary  
Crisis Management Capacities

**WP7**

## **Political Leadership in the EU and the New Normal**

**Deliverable D7.1**

**Crisis capital management development:**

**A Survey Tool**

Authors: Arjen Boin, Lavinia Cadar, Maureen Weller (with support  
from other WPs)

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# 1. Introduction: Creating a Transboundary Crisis Management Capital Dashboard

The Transcrisis project has mapped capacities for transboundary crisis management that exist both at the national and the EU level.<sup>1</sup> In this paper (Deliverable D7.1), we introduce an assessment tool that helps to quickly analyse whether and to which extent a particular organization or policy sector is ready to face a transboundary crisis. It is a survey tool that facilitates an evidence-based assessment of transboundary crisis management capacities. This tool can be used for the structural assessment and benchmarking of the EU's crisis management capital. The tool can thus be seen as a way to create input for a *dashboard*. This dashboard offers indicators as to the transboundary crisis management capital in order to allow for an assessment of capacities of multiple organizations and assess their strength.<sup>2</sup>

This tool is intended to serve different users. It offers *officials in EU, national and sub-national institutions* a tool to assess what capacities exist and where (at the EU-level and elsewhere). The tool is also useful to *external observers*, such as academics, think tanks and media representatives, who seek to gauge whether an organization or policy sector is prepared to deal with a transboundary crisis.

The tool offers an efficient way to arrive at a fair assessment of crisis management capacities (both retrospectively and prospectively). The tool is based on the method for the *structured assessment* of transboundary crisis management capacities that we outlined in the Codebook.

The tool can be used to assess *individual organizations* or *policy sectors*. In the EU, crisis management is rarely a matter of one particular organization. Our case studies show that a transboundary crisis is usually managed by a network of EU organizations (agencies, Commission DGs, Council) and member states as well as (private sector) providers. As the capacities of both organizations and sector can be assessed, the tool in effect allows for the assessment of a response *network*.

In summary, the tool can perform three functions:

- 1) Self-assessment: critically analyse and weigh the available transboundary crisis management capital in one's organization.
- 2) External assessment: critically analyse and weigh the available transboundary crisis management capital in a policy sector or organization.
- 3) Structured comparison: create benchmarks and compare the organization's scorecard against that benchmark.

In this document, we describe the core ideas underlying the development of this tool. We explain how the tool should be used and what type of assessment it delivers. We demonstrate the workings of the tool in four cases: backsliding, DG ECHO, electricity and invasive alien species. These cases were selected on their differences (as we intend the tool to be used to assess capacities for any type of transboundary crisis).

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<sup>1</sup> The empirical findings are summarized in Deliverable 7.2 (Summary Report of Key Research Findings and Draft Policy Recommendations), which can be found at <https://www.transcrisis.eu/publications/>.

<sup>2</sup> In our recommendations papers (D7.4 Future Research Recommendations), we offer more detailed suggestions as to how such an index can be used.

The idea of a “dashboard” highlights that we do not claim that transboundary crisis capital in different aspects can simply be aggregated. Rather, a dashboard highlights the importance of focusing on different indicators when considering existing transboundary crisis management arrangements and/or discussing options for future development.

## **2. Core Ideas Underlying the Development of the Survey Tool**

This tool builds on the codebook for the study of crisis cases as used in the various Transcrisis work packages. We began our design process by considering how one could measure the capacities needed to fulfil the strategic crisis management tasks identified in the codebook. These strategic tasks are: early detection, sense-making, decision-making and coordination, meaning-making and communication, and accountability.<sup>3</sup>

The adequate fulfilment of these strategic crisis tasks requires a variety of organizational capacities.<sup>4</sup> Building on the codebook, we developed a set of questions specifically aimed at surveying whether and to what extent an organization or sector has these capacities in place. We started with the analytical questions as originally formulated in the Codebook. We then considered to what extent these questions proved answerable in the case studies (making use of the reflections offered during our joint meetings) and made adjustments where necessary.<sup>5</sup>

We wanted the survey questions to be answerable without extensive study of the organization or sector in question. The idea is that the survey tool is both relatively reliable, but also relatively costless in order to assess the transboundary crisis management capital of national and EU organizations and policy sectors.

An analyst should be able to answer the survey questions by looking at organizational websites, studying official documents or brief interviews. Some individual judgment will always be required, but this individual discretion needs to be as transparent as possible so as to allow for replicability and informed discussion.

### ***The dashboard***

We envision the presentation of the survey results in terms of a *dashboard* displaying three “performance odometers” (to measure how far certain capacities are present):

1. *Preparation for transboundary crisis management*. This first performance category relates to activities that we squarely placed in the leadership domain: what has been done to prepare organizations or actors across policy networks to deal with crises? Moreover, we assume that previous experience with managing crisis will be helpful in managing the next crisis.

2. *Available means to manage transboundary crises* (Does the organization/sector have what it needs?). This second performance category refers to the organizational processes, instruments and resources that are designed, or might be used, to help fulfil the strategic crisis management tasks outlined in the codebook.

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<sup>3</sup> The strategic crisis tasks are derived from Boin et al (2016).

<sup>4</sup>As explained in the codebook, we measure the capacities rather than the actual fulfilment of tasks because many organizations have limited transboundary crisis management experience.

<sup>5</sup> If the extensive case studies in the Transcrisis project could not deliver detailed answers, we formulated more general or, in some cases, new indicators for the capacities under review.

3. *Legitimacy of the actor*. The third performance category relates to what we here call the legitimacy reservoir: Is the organization/sector seen as the proper actor to manage the transboundary crisis in question? Legitimacy refers to the underlying sense of trust and support enabling the management of crises.

### ***Numerical assessments***

In building this tool, we thought it would be helpful to enable the use of numerical assessment. We developed guidelines for these numerical assessments (should analysts want to make use of quantitative performance indicators) in each one of the dashboard indicators.

As an example (further pursued in this paper), we assigned to each category (representing certain capacities) a certain number of total points. In line with the assumptions pronounced in the Codebook, we maintain that the capacities to fulfil strategic tasks are the most important predictor of effective crisis management. Generic preparatory efforts in combination with actual experience add to an organization's capacity to manage a crisis. Enjoying a high level of legitimacy is in our view helpful to sustain a high crisis management capacity (but not a key condition). We allocated each of the three categories the following points:

1. Generic preparation and crisis experience – maximum total of 20
2. Task/organizational means – maximum total of 70
3. The legitimacy reservoir – maximum total of 10

We stress that we do not call for aggregating these three categories. Neither should it be argued that having a higher number of points in one category than in another is an indicator of greater capacity overall. Similarly, a high score in one category is no substitute for a weak score in another.

### 3. How to use the Survey Tool: A three-step method

The Survey Tool consists of three steps. By following these steps, the dashboard is filled with relevant information. By periodically repeating the steps, the dashboard can be refreshed.

Step 1: Select an approach.

The Survey Tool can be used in three different ways:

- a) Take a *crisis*, identify the organizations that play(ed) a role in the response, and score their capacities to deal with that particular crisis.

In Section 5.1, we show how our tool can be applied to assess capacities for a particular crisis. We developed the *crisis survey* based on our case studies. In the Transcrisis project, we studied a range of transboundary crises, including the Ecoli crisis (2011), the Banking crisis (2012), the Ebola threat (2014) and the Refugee crisis (2015). We also looked at emerging crises, such as backsliding in certain member states, the threat of alien species invasions, the potential of critical electricity infrastructure breakdowns, and the lingering youth unemployment crisis. The case studies mapped the response organizations, the legal frameworks in which they operate, and the collective performance vis-a-vis the transboundary crisis management tasks outlined in the Codebook.

As an initial step, the surveyor needs to identify the key characteristics of the crisis and the relevant distribution of legal competences and capacities as these may be split between EU, member states and sector specific organisations. Differences in tools and capacities matter for the application of crisis tools. Table 1 summarises this initial step.

The question here is where the capacities to deal with crises are located (within EU/member states/other external actors)? How do these capacities vary across policy networks and regions? In other words, which actor has the authority to exercise crisis leadership?

Table 1. Overview of crisis management legal competences and capacities

Legal competence	Distribution of capacities		
	<i>EU</i>	<i>Member states</i>	<i>Sector led governance</i>
<i>EU</i>	EU executing agency <i>e.g.: Single resolution mechanism</i>	EU as regulator of crisis management capacities <i>e.g.: banking resolution and recovery directive</i> <i>e.g.: invasive alien species 2014 regulation</i>	EU as shadow of hierarchy <i>e.g.: standards for electricity crisis management (ENTSO-E)</i>
<i>Shared</i>	Delegated EU co-ordinating organisation <i>e.g: DG ECHO</i>	EU co-ordinating organisation <i>e.g.: backsliding</i>	EU networks <i>e.g.: electricity sectors pan-European organisations (CORESO)</i>

<b><i>Member States</i></b>	Information mechanism <i>e.g.: DG ECHO</i>	Multi- or bi-lateralism <i>e.g.: Pentalateralforum (electricity), European Stability Mechanism (banking)</i>	Corporatist arrangements <i>e.g.: national electricity systems</i>
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- b)** Take an *organization* and assess its capacities to deal with a crisis.

In Section 5.2, we show how the Survey Tool can be applied to assess the capacities of an individual organization to deal with a transboundary crisis. We developed the *organizational survey* based on our case studies. In the Transcrisis project, we studied how specific EU agencies dealt with transboundary crises. We looked in particular at the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC), FRONTEX, and the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA).

- c)** Take a *policy sector*, identify potential risks, identify the organizations that play a role in the response, and score their capacities to deal with crises that may flow from those risks.

In Section 5.3, we show how the Survey Tool can be applied to assess the capacities of an entire policy sector. We developed the *sector survey* based on our case studies. In the Transcrisis project, we studied how two policy sectors dealt with a transboundary crisis. We studied how the EU is organising security of electricity supply, responding to the threat of invasive alien species, dealt with the banking crisis and how the immigration sector responded to the refugee crisis.

Step 2: Determine the weight of the three categories and assign “points to be earned” to each question. Before the assessment begins, the assessor should clarify which standards are considered important in making any judgments about crisis management capacities. As we noted above, the weights may vary (but should be explicitly stated).

Step 3: Fill in the Survey.

We developed a survey instrument that can guide the collection of relevant information and the assessment of crisis management capacities. The survey is explained below in Section 4.

## 4. Survey Questions

To provide an initial validation of this tool, we did three things. First, we analysed the case studies and the analysis of Commission capacities to see if we could find convincing examples of surveyed capacities that fit the three categories of our Dashboard. We have included examples in the explanation of the survey instrument below.

Second, we asked all participants in the Transcrisis consortium to rate (score) the various capacities of the organizations involved in their particular case studies. Consortium members had no problem identifying and describing the capacities we describe in this document. But they initially did not find it easy to score the capacities. We then provided more specific guidance as to how to rate capacities.

Third, we used the survey tool to provide three examples:

- A crisis-based study (backsliding in corruption, WP6);
- An organization-based study (DG ECHO, WP4.1);
- Two sector-based studies (electricity and invasive alien species, WP5.1). These examples were chosen to display areas where there is no full EU competence, but reliance on crisis management capacity in other institutions.

For each example, the same survey was used. The survey consists of questions to gauge generic preparation and crisis experience; strategic management tasks; and legitimacy and trust. For each survey question, we identified one or more examples from our empirical findings. We use the word ‘organization’ here to simplify the discussion, but is also used in the survey of the two sectors in the sense of ‘sector’.

### ***Part I: Surveying generic preparation and crisis experience***

We seek to assess whether the organization has initiated preparatory efforts for crisis management. We also look if an organization has experienced a crisis. We assume that recent experiences with crises will have nurtured a sense of awareness in that organization.

Part I consists of three questions:

- Does the organization have a crisis plan in place?

The assumption here is that a crisis plan, which lays out tasks and responsibilities, furthers the chance of an effective performance. The surveyor should be able to establish that a crisis plan exists. What a plan consists of intrinsically depends on how crisis management is organised within the EU and who has the leadership and the capacities to perform crisis management: if the EU is directly responsible for crisis management, its organisations may draw up plans; if the competency is shared and member states possess crisis management capacities, the EU may adopt legislative acts to encourage consistent responses among member states.

*Example: The European Central Bank has detailed plans for financial crises.*

- Does the organization regularly engage in crisis exercises?

Having a plan is good, but plans should be exercised. The surveyor should establish that the organization in question participates in exercises (preferably at least once a year).

*Examples: DG ECHO regularly organizes and partakes in civil protection exercises (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 49). The Transmission System Operators (TSOs) in electricity regularly conduct crisis exercises.*

- Has the organization recently (e.g. within the last 5 years) experienced a crisis?

We assume that crisis experience focuses the organizational mind. It will create awareness. The surveyor should establish that the organization played a role in a transboundary crisis. It is the perception of organizational members that matters here. The surveyor should look for evidence in the organization (on the website, in reports, speeches, etc.) that a crisis has been experienced.

*Example: The ECDC documents, on its website, the monitoring efforts the agency pursued in the Ebola outbreak (2013-2016). In addition to surveillance maps, bi-monthly risk assessments and epidemiological updates, the ECDC provides information on its involvement in this crisis, including strategies to address the crisis as well as response missions (ECDC, 2017).*

## **Part 2: Means for implementing strategic crisis management tasks**

In this section, we survey the organizational means that are available to implement the strategic crisis management tasks outlined in the Codebook (see also Boin et al., 2016). We look at available means but also at proven abilities (actual performance).

### **a) Early detection: Is the organization capable of detecting an emerging crisis?**

We are trying to establish whether the organization is capable of detecting emerging threats that have a potential to escalate into the domain of the organization.

The organizational capacity to detect crises has two dimensions. One dimension refers to the *collection and interpretation of information* about (potential) threats or incidents with escalation potential. One might say that this is a purely analytical task. But there is also a second, more political dimension: the *labelling of crisis*.

In the Codebook, we noted that there are no clear-cut criteria for establishing whether an event or development qualifies as a crisis. Labelling something a crisis, which presumably requires certain courses of action, is ultimately an outcome of a political process.

An organization needs both: the capacity to detect threatening events, but also the capacity to raise those events to the political agenda (e.g. gaining attention and recognition from relevant political actors). To assess both capacities, we formulated a set of questions.

- Does the organization have in place resources, mechanisms, procedures and/or software to detect emerging threats?

A large range of detection systems exist within the EU (and the list keeps growing, see the report by Boin et al. [2014]). The surveyor can use the list in the Appendix to inquire whether the organization has such a system.

*Example: EU agencies such as ECDC and EFSA are connected to early warning systems that experts use to share information about impending health threats. Europol makes use of systems such as the traveller alert lists, the database European Foreign Terrorist Fighters and the Internet Referral Unit. DG ECHO is plugged into the various systems (EFAS, EFFIS, GDACS).*

- Is it clear who (national authorities, other EU actors and/or citizens) should be warned about an impending crisis?

It is one thing to detect a warning, quite another to disseminate that warning. We cannot predict if an organization will effectively disseminate a warning. We can try to assess if there is a clear structure and/or process (who should the organization warn and how?).

*Example: The ECDC and the European Banking Agency both have a clear position in the information flow. Their task is clearly defined, so we may expect warnings to come forth from these agencies.*

- [Actual performance] Has the organization actually detected crises in an early phase of crisis development?

If an organization has a track record of detecting crises, we assume it is more likely to do so in the future (there is, of course, no guarantee). The surveyor should look for evidence of the organization having flagged – publicly, in internal communications or through entering a warning in one of the early warning systems – an impending crisis.

*Example: The ECDC warned the Commission on Ebola (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

*Counter-example: The Commission was slow in recognizing corruption as a systemic crisis problem in Eastern European countries (Batory, 2017).*

#### **b) Does the organization have the means for joint sense-making?**

We are trying to assess whether the organization has trained people, established procedures and/or effective technologies to collect and analyse information about an unfolding crisis. We want to know whether its crisis team can produce an accurate picture of the crisis situation.

- Is the organization connected to one or more of the sense-making systems identified in the report by Boin et al. (2014) (see the Appendix)?

*Examples: DG ECHO makes use of the Common Emergency Communication and Information System, the Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination System (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 45), Copernicus Rapid Mapping (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 47), European Forest Fire Information System (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 46), Vademecum webpage (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 51). The External Action Service makes use of the COoL website.*

- Does the organization have a crisis room?

We assume that a dedicated crisis room makes it easier to facilitate sense-making processes in an organization.

*Examples: The EU has at least 8 crisis rooms (Rhinard, 2017: 4). DG ECHO probably has the most sophisticated crisis room in the EU (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 48-9). But these rooms are also found at the Incident and Threat Information Sharing EU Centre for the Energy Sector IT IS-EUC (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 83), the Health Emergency Operations Facility (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 120), Frontex Situation Center (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 127), the EU Situation Room of the European External Action Service (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 139-40). The ECDC has a risk assessment room (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

- Does the organization have a crisis team that can manage the information gathering and analysis during a crisis?

The Surveyor should look for evidence of specialization in information management.

*Examples: The Computer Emergency Response Team of the EU institutions and agencies (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 57); the Crisis Response Planning and Operations division of EEAS (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 138-9); the European Center of Disease Prevention and Control.*

- Does the organization have (a network of) experts that can be accessed to help analyse crisis information?

Crises by definition come with high uncertainty with regard to causes, solutions and/or consequences. It is often useful to have access to experts who can help address uncertainties.

*Examples: The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), the EU Bomb Data System (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 39-40); the Energy Expert Cyber Security Platform Expert Group (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 59); and the European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 87).*

- [Actual performance] Has the organization made use of a sense-making system listed in the Appendix?

*Example: In 2011, during the E.coli outbreak, the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) was mandated by the European Commission to form a task force to investigate the source of the outbreak. EFSA made use of the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), which allowed the agency to access the latest information (from member-states and other international organizations) and share updates on the trace of the outbreak (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

- [Actual performance] Has the organization involved experts during a crisis?

*Example: The ECDC used experts to understand the Ebola threat (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

- [Actual performance] Has the organization adequately performed its sense-making task during an actual crisis?

The Surveyor should look for external assessments or evaluations and see whether the sense-making performance is viewed as at least passable (so there should be no surprises).

*Example: EFSA did well in response to the E.coli threat (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

### **c) Does the organization have the means to facilitate joint decision-making (making critical decisions across borders)?**

We are trying to assess whether the organization has prepared (e.g., by creating procedures, teams and facilities) to make decisions that should be made during a crisis. If the organization does not have formal decision-making responsibilities, we are interested to learn whether the organization can facilitate joint decision-making (through network governance).

To assess decision-making capacity, we look at the formal framework (to assess whether that provides clarity to decision-makers) and the actual performance of crisis decision-makers.

- Is there a legal framework that clearly defines key actors and their decision-making competencies for crisis situations?

*Examples: A range of legislative texts set out the competencies of actors in the European civil protection sector (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 43). SANCO's public health management system is also clearly defined (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 110-2).*

*Counter-example: in electricity, the legislative framework does not provide clarity as to whom is politically responsible and who should be contacted in case of crisis.*

- [Actual performance] Has the organization actually made strategic decisions in a transboundary crisis before?

*Example: The European Central Bank has made critical decisions during the financial crisis.*

- [Actual performance] In hindsight, has the organization made the right decisions in a timely manner?

*Example: EFSA acted fast in response to E.coli crisis (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

*Counter-example: ECDC was slow to send experts to Africa (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

#### **d) Does the organization have the means to enable transboundary coordination?**

We are trying to assess whether the organization has legal authorities, budgetary means, procedures or any other toolset to facilitate and enable collaboration between response organizations dealing with a transboundary crisis. The underlying assumption is that critical decisions must be implemented to be effective.

- Does the organization have specific coordination tasks and capacities to fulfil that task?

The Surveyor can look for specific references to coordination tasks and evidence for capacities.

*Examples: DG ECHO has the task to coordinate the contributions of member states in response to requests from a state overwhelmed by disaster. ENISA has created The Cooperation Group (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 62, 64).*

- Does the organization participate in a network that enables a coordinated response?

*Examples: The European Counter Terrorism Centre is a platform that aims to increase operational cooperation and information sharing among Member States. Other examples: the EU Internet Forum (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 36-7); the EU Member States' Financial Intelligence Units, FIU.net (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 33); EU Exchange of Experts Programme (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 50); Eurocontrol/EACCC (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 103); Air Traffic Management Network Manager (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 105); EMSA Permanent Cooperation Framework (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 108); HSC (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 121).*

- [Actual performance] Did the organization collaborate with other international organizations?

*Example: In the 2014 Ebola crisis, ECDC worked with Medecins Sans Frontiers, the World Health Organization and the American CDC (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

- [Actual performance] Did the organization collaborate with member state authorities?

*Examples: In the Ebola crisis, the ECDC communicated with Member States; EFSA did the same in the case of the 2011 E.coli crisis (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

#### **e) Means to foster joint meaning-making**

We are trying to assess whether the organization is capable of 1) formulating a message that explains what the organization is doing in response to the crisis, and why; 2) communicating that message to the public at large.

- Does the organization have the capacity to communicate information on the crisis through social media?

We assume that every organization has a communications department. As a proxy for effective communications preparation in times of crisis, we suggest the Surveyor take a look at the presence of that organization in the social media.

*Examples: ENISA's cyber incident website shares information about major cyber incidents (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 67); EU Health Security Committee's Communicators' Network was set up to provide reliable and coherent messages to the citizens during a public health crisis (Rhinard and Backman, 2017: 122); the European Parliament, EEAS and DG Migration and Home affairs are active on Twitter (Rhinard and Backman, 2017:135). The Commission has the Communication and Narratives Working Group.*

- Is the leader of the organization active on social media?

*Example: Markku Mylly, director of the European Maritime Safety Agency; Rob Wainwright, director of Europol; Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, Dimitris Avramopoulos.*

- [Actual performance] Has the organization produced a crisis frame?

*Example: During the Ebola outbreak, the ECDC communicated the message that there was not a real threat against the European public (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

- [Actual performance] Did the organization manage to get that frame widely accepted by key audiences?

*Example: The ECDC's crisis frame was widely accepted (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

*Counter-example: The ECB's crisis frame has encountered resistance in some member states.*

- [Actual performance] Did the organization communicate to dispel rumours or misinformation?

*Examples: In the E.coli case, the EFSA countered incorrect information when Hamburg authorities blamed Spanish vegetables for the outbreak. During the refugee crisis, Frontex has tried to warn/inform potential migrants about the dangers of their mission (WP4.3 preliminary results).*

#### **f) Means that enable crisis accountability**

We are trying to assess whether the organization is prepared to render account of its actions before, during and immediately after a crisis.

- Are there procedures in place for rendering account on what has been done before and during the crisis?

The Surveyor should look for procedures, mechanisms or instruments that record critical events (often can be found with references to learning).

*Example: The ECDC has software in place for individual compliance (WP4.3 preliminary findings).*

- [Actual performance] Has the organization rendered account of its (non-)actions during a crisis?

The Surveyor can look for organizational reports that have been made public or testimonies in the European Parliament.

*Example: In response to the high levels of youth unemployment, the European Commission established the Youth Guarantee scheme in June 2013. Since then, the Commission has published factsheets and reports that inform on the impact of the Youth Guarantee. In 2015, the European Court of Auditors published a report of its investigation into the support the Commission had provided to Member States for setting up their Youth Guarantee schemes.*

- [Actual performance] Did the leader(s) of that organization seek to *publicly* explain its crisis performance?

The Surveyor can look for media reports in which the formal leader of an organization explains what has been done to manage a crisis.

*Example: Marianne Thyssen, the Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility, has explained the Commission's efforts to deal with youth unemployment in many instances (e.g. before the European Parliament, before the European Court of Auditors, and in the media).*

### **Part 3: Legitimacy and trust**

We are trying to assess whether the organization has a “legitimacy reservoir” that will facilitate the crisis response. We are building on the research finding that organizations with a high level of legitimacy usually find it easier to perform well during a crisis. Measuring legitimacy is notoriously difficult. Key in this approach is the recognition that legitimacy derives from various sources (political, public and legal).

Political support:

- Have there been significant political debates or major controversies with regard to the crisis management performance of the organization?

*Examples: Significant debates were held during the financial crisis and the refugee crisis (particularly with regard to the quota system).*

- Have there been calls for major post-crisis reforms of the organization's crisis management capacities?

*Example: In case of the refugee crisis, many argued for a uniform European Asylum system (WP4.3 preliminary findings).*

Legal support:

- Have citizens, victims or other parties initiated legal action after a crisis against this organization?

*Example: In the 2011 E.coli crisis, Spanish farmers and European vegetable carriers initiated legal action (WP4.3 preliminary findings).*

Popular support:

- How do citizens assess the crisis management efforts of this organization?

*Example: Eurobarometer data shows that EU citizens grew increasingly concerned when political leaders were struggling to form a response to the immigration crisis (WP5.3 preliminary findings).*

## 5. Demonstrating the Survey Tool: Four Examples

To demonstrate how our Survey Tool might be used, we used it in three approaches (crisis-based, organization-based, sector-based). For demonstration purposes only, we assigned weights to the three parts and then assigned “points to be earned” to each survey question. We then “scored” the capacities as well as we could, based on the available material.

*Disclaimer: Our scores are based on a secondary analysis of empirical work conducted in this project in collaboration with the overall consortium. They do not amount to a definite assessment of transboundary crisis management capacities. They are intended to demonstrate how the Survey Tool can be used.*

### 5.1 Surveying crisis-based capacities: Backsliding in corruption<sup>6</sup>

We begin by demonstrating how our Survey Tool can be helpful in assessing crisis management capacities for a particular transboundary crisis. In the TransCrisis project, we studied “backsliding” as a crisis. In what follows, we demonstrate how the Survey Tool can be employed to evaluate EU’s capacity to address the “backsliding” crisis.

Backsliding is defined in our project in terms of “unilateral and systematic acts by a member state government that violate the laws and/or the norms of the EU” (Sitter et al., 2016: 8). A distinction is made between hard and soft backsliding. *Hard backsliding* occurs when acts or policies violate the fundamental norms and values of the EU linked to liberal democratic governance *and* also directly violate EU primary or secondary law (the *acquis*). We speak of *soft backsliding* when member states’ acts or policies involve violation of their major commitments to the EU without directly violating the *acquis*, or at least the relevant part of the *acquis* (Sitter et al., 2016: 9).

Hard backsliding can be operationalized as a rise in levels of corruption or the (deliberate) weakening of existing anti-corruption policies and instruments. Soft backsliding is most likely manifested in relaxing efforts to combat corruption and/or deliberately undermining existing anti-corruption and transparency instruments.

After 1999, when the Santer Commission resigned in the wake of a corruption scandal, the EU adopted a series of anti-corruption reforms. The key actors whose response actions must be assessed in order to see how the EU dealt with backsliding in corruption are: the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Council.

To assess the EU’s capacity to deal with backsliding, we used the following scoring scheme for this case:

1. Generic preparation and crisis experience - maximum score of 20
2. Task/organizational means – maximum score of 70
3. The legitimacy reservoir – maximum score of 10

	Max. score	Case score
<b>Generic preparation and crisis experience</b>	<b>20</b>	
Does the organization have a crisis plan in place?	10	0

<sup>6</sup> We have made use of the findings as presented in WP6. Agnes Batory wrote much of the text used here.

Not for this particular threat.		
Does the organization regularly engage in crisis exercises? Not for this particular threat.	5	0
Has the organization recently (e.g. within the last 5 years) experienced a crisis? Not with regard to this particular threat.	5	0
<b>Task/Organisational means</b>	<b>70</b>	
<b>Early detection: Is the organization capable of detecting an emerging crisis?</b>	<b>10</b>	
Does the organization have in place resources, mechanisms, procedures and/or software to detect emerging threats? Yes, but not for this particular threat	3	0
Is it clear who (national authorities, other EU actors and/or citizens) should be warned about an impending crisis? Yes	2	2
[Actual performance] Has the organization actually detected crises in an early phase of its development?  European Commission: Corruption as a problem appeared on the policy agenda first with the scandal around the Santer Commission, and stayed on the agenda throughout the protracted process of Eastern enlargement, with the then member states and EU institutions highly concerned that the CEE countries joining would mean importing high levels of corruption into the Union – hence anti-corruption as a highly salient part of pre-accession conditionality.  European Parliament: An independent expert committee appointed by the European Parliament uncovered evidence of wide-spread corrupt practices in the Commission. In the Anticorruption Report, the European Commission warned in 2014 that up to a quarter of the value of public contracts in EU Member States may be lost to corrupt practices. The anticorruption report was taken up by other EU actors especially the European Parliament.  European Council: In 2010, the Council called on the Commission to ‘develop indicators, on the basis of existing systems and common criteria, to measure efforts in the fight against corruption, in particular in the areas of the acquis (public procurement, financial control, etc.) and to develop a comprehensive anti-corruption policy, in close cooperation with the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)’ (European Council, 2010). This essentially treated corruption as a form of serious cross-border crime – which constitutes a transboundary threat.	5	4
<b>Does the organization have the means for joint sense-making?</b>	<b>20</b>	

Is the organization connected to one or more of the sense-making systems identified in the report by Boin et al. (2014) (see the Appendix)? No	4	0
Does the organization have a crisis room? Not for this threat	2	0
Does the organization have a crisis team that can manage the information gathering and analysis during a crisis? Not for this threat	5	0
Does the organization have (a network of) experts that can be accessed to help analyse crisis information? Yes	3	3
[Actual performance] Has the organization made use of a sense-making system listed in the Appendix?  In addition to the Anticorruption Report (European Commissions, 2014a), the EU institutions have accumulated vast amounts of data on corruption, such as dedicated Eurobarometer polls (e.g. European Commission, 2014b) or qualitative studies (e.g. the Rand study commissioned by the European Parliament).  The Commission launched a framework for a reporting mechanism for periodic assessment in 2011 and published what was intended to be the first round of Anti-corruption Reports in 2014. The reports, one on each member state, assessed the given country's strengths and weaknesses in the area and provided recommendations.  The Commission Justice Scoreboard has also been used to gather data on corruption.	2	1.5
[Actual performance] Has the organization involved experts during a crisis? The Commission reports drew on existing expert data.	2	1
[Actual performance] Has the organization adequately performed its sense-making task during an actual crisis? Yes, there was a clear picture of what was going on	2	2
<b>Does the organization have the means to facilitate joint decision-making?</b>	<b>10</b>	
Is there a legal framework that clearly defines key actors and their decision-making competencies for crisis situations? No	4	0
[Actual performance] Has the organization actually made strategic decisions in a transboundary crisis before? EU law on combating corruption remains patchy and legal enforcement	4	1

<p>in specific cases not consistent (and reliant on cooperation of national authorities).</p> <p>The Commission and the European Parliament pushed for the creation of a European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), as a LIBE committee report in Parliament put it, 'as soon as possible, with the participation of as many Member States as possible, of an EPPO that is efficient and independent from national governments and the EU institutions, and protected from political influence and pressure' (EP LIBE, 2016). The EPPO was seen as crucial for making EU action possible, given the unreliability of follow-up from national authorities in individual cases. A number of member states – including, unsurprisingly, Hungary and Poland – sought to block the initiative in the Council but in early 2017 a larger group has decided to push on with the creation of the EPPO under enhanced cooperation.</p>		
<p>[Actual performance] In hindsight, has the organization made the right decisions in a timely manner?</p> <p>Although corruption was initially identified as a problem, the plans created to address it have not materialized. This issue has not made it to the political agenda. Moreover, the Commission appears to push responsibility for anti-corruption to other (not corruption focused) mechanisms and to intergovernmental organisations active in the field.</p>	2	0
<p><b>Does the organization have the means to enable transboundary coordination?</b></p>	<b>10</b>	
<p>Does the organization have specific coordination tasks and capacities to fulfil that task?</p> <p>No</p>	4	0
<p>Does the organization participate in a network that enables a coordinated response?</p> <p>No</p>	2	0
<p>[Actual performance] Did the organization collaborate with other international organizations?</p> <p>No</p>	2	0
<p>[Actual performance] Did the organization collaborate with member state authorities?</p> <p>The Commission attempted to do so, but cooperation with national prosecutors' offices was not always fully effective.</p>	2	0.5
<p><b>Means to foster joint meaning-making</b></p>	<b>10</b>	
<p>Does the organization have the capacity to communicate information on the crisis through social media?</p>	3	

Is the leader of the organization active on social media? Yes	1	1
[Actual performance] Has the organization produced a crisis frame? No. Corruption was detected and framed as a grave problem facing the EU by the Commission but not something that needed very urgent action. The Commission action is mainly about synthesizing existing knowledge and attempting to spur member states into action through benchmarking and recommendations.	2	0.5
[Actual performance] Did the organization manage to get that frame widely accepted by key audiences? No.	2	0
[Actual performance] Did the organization communicate to dispel rumours or misinformation? No data.	2	0
<b>Means that enable crisis accountability</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0</b>
Are there procedures in place for rendering account on what has been done before and during the crisis?	4	0
[Actual performance] Has the organization rendered account of its (non-) actions during a crisis? No.	3	0
[Actual performance] Did the leader(s) of that organization seek to <i>publicly</i> explain its crisis performance? No.	3	0
<b>The legitimacy reservoir</b>	<b>10</b>	
<b>Political support:</b>	<b>4</b>	
Have there been significant political debates or major controversies with regard to the crisis management performance of the organization? To some extent. The European Parliament has questioned why the Commission was not doing more.	2	0
Have there been calls for major post-crisis reforms aimed at reforming the organization's crisis management capacities? Some, on expert and civil society advocacy level (e.g. Transparency International),	2	1
<b>Legal support:</b>	<b>2</b>	
Have citizens, victims or other parties initiated legal action after a crisis against this organization?	2	2

No.		
<b>Popular support:</b>	4	
How do citizens assess the crisis management efforts of this organization?	4	
No data.		
<b>Dashboard:</b> <b>generic preparation: 0/20</b> <b>Task/organizational means 16.5/70</b> <b>Legitimacy reservoir: 3/10</b>		

### *Summary*

The dashboard indicators indicate the key insight that emerges from our research into backsliding and the EU's transboundary crisis capacities. The EU has limited tools available (and some legitimacy), but its tools are neither fully developed nor is there overall preparation.

### ***5.2 An example of the organizational survey: DG ECHO (WP4.1)***<sup>7</sup>

The Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) has two main departments (brought together in 2010): humanitarian aid and civil protection. These are under the responsibility of the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, Christos Stylianides. ECHO has a global network of field offices. Depending on the type of disaster, ECHO works closely with relevant agencies - such as European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in the case of maritime pollution disasters.

The Civil Protection Mechanism currently has 34 members (28 Member States of the EU and 6 associated members: Serbia, Norway, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Montenegro and Iceland). Since disasters are often borderless, the EU-level is, according to the Commission, especially suitable to provide coordination and avoid duplication of efforts during a crisis situation.

In assessing the capacity of DG ECHO to deal with transboundary crises, we maintain that the capacities to fulfil strategic tasks are the most important predictor of positive results. Experience with actual crises and trainings and exercises, as well as high levels of legitimacy, play secondary roles.

1. Generic preparation and crisis experience - total of 20 points
2. Task/organizational means – total of 70 points
3. The legitimacy reservoir – total of 10 points

<sup>7</sup> We have made use of the findings as presented in WP4. Mark Rhinard and Sarah Backman wrote much of the text used here.

	Max. score	Case score
<b>Generic preparation and crisis experience</b>	<b>20</b>	
Does the organization have a crisis plan in place? Yes.	10	10
Does the organization regularly engage in crisis exercises? Yes, most recently in the EDREX exercise.  In addition, ECHO funds various civil protection exercises every year (from modules/table-top to full-scale). Exercises are considered essential in order to enable civil protection teams to perform in a fast and coordinated manner during a crisis and to test or consolidate concepts and procedures of the Civil Protection Mechanism. The Commission releases call for proposals/tenders for exercise management every year. While module or full-scale exercises are considered especially good for improving coordination and testing response capacity, table-tops are considered especially good for providing training and improvement of key people in civil protection contexts. Also, lessons learned from exercises gives valuable feedback for further improvement of civil protection management.	5	5
Has the organization recently (e.g. within the last 5 years) experienced a crisis?  The Civil Protection Mechanism was most recently activated in August 2017, to help Portugal deal with forest fires.	5	5
<b>Task/Organisational means</b>	<b>70</b>	
<b>Early detection: Is the organization capable of detecting an emerging crisis?</b>	<b>10</b>	
Does the organization have in place resources, mechanisms, procedures and/or software to detect emerging threats?  <b>The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)</b> The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) is the operational hub of the Civil Protection Mechanism. Among its tasks are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The (non-stop) monitoring and mapping of emergencies and disasters around the world.</li> <li>• The collection of real time information on disasters.</li> <li>• The enabling of a quick response to both natural and man-made disasters should the Mechanism be activated.</li> </ul> <b>The Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS)</b> is a web-based alert/early warning system, which allows rapid information exchange between ERCC & Member States.  DG ECHO also uses the <b>Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination System (GDACS)</b> , a rapid alert system developed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) which provides access to disaster information systems (and coordination tools) worldwide in order to achieve a faster response in the very first stages of a potential major disaster. It is applied worldwide and	3	3

commonly used by both the UN and the EU. Among the tasks of the GDACS are to:

- Issue rapid alerts in relation to major disasters
- Guideline development for disaster information exchange.
- Provide disaster management coordination platform (Virtual OSOCC)
- Provide disaster maps/satellites.
- Provide weather forecasts (SARWeather) in relation to disaster analysis.

**The European Flood Alert System (EFAS)** is a monitoring system fully operational since 2012. It provides early warnings to its national partners as well as the ERCC. EFAS is developed by the Commission's Institute for Environment and Sustainability (IES) and is part of COPERNICUS Initial Operations (which supports the Civil Protection Mechanism). It consists of four main centres (the operational management of them is outsourced to Member State organization):

1. EFAS Computational centre (hosting the EFAS Information System Platform and do forecasts)
2. EFAS Dissemination centre (perform daily analysis, provides information to the ERCC)
3. EFAS Hydrological data collection centre (performs water level data collection)
4. EFAS Meteorological data collection centre (collects meteorological data)

Among the tasks of EFAS are to:

- Provide early warnings in order to give time for preparedness measures.
- Provide information to national services.
- Provide information to the ERCC about upcoming and on-going floods

**The European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS)** Established by the Commission, EFFIS support the fire-disaster management services in the EU. This includes forecasts on hazards, risk-areas and hot-spots. In 2015, EFFIS was incorporated under the umbrella of COPERNICUS Emergency Management Services.

### **Meteoalarm**

Meteoalarm provides early alerts of weather with the potential to cause disasters, such as heavy rain, forest fires, extreme cold, thunderstorms, etc. The service provides updated maps of affected areas and the estimated possible impact of weather as well as expected time-horizons for weather events. It includes both national and regional warnings.

### **COPERNICUS Emergency Management Service**

Copernicus (previously Global Monitoring for Environment and Security - GMES) is an EU programme (implemented by the Commission) aimed at developing European information services based on satellite Earth Observation and in situ (non space) data. Copernicus aims to both

<p>monitor and forecast the environment situation on land, sea and in the air in order to improve safety of EU citizens.</p> <p><b>Copernicus Rapid Mapping</b>  Copernicus maps and monitors all kinds of emergency situations through satellite and open data source information. The information drawn from Copernicus might be used by various disaster management actors and be helpful in crisis decision making processes as well as geospatial analysis. It covers all crisis management phases.</p>		
<p>Is it clear who (national authorities, other EU actors and/or citizens) should be warned about an impending crisis?</p> <p>The main task of the ERCC is to coordinate disaster response efforts. To do so, the ERCC works with Member State civil protection authorities. Pre -positioned civil protection modules from Member States makes it possible for the ERCC to activate and deploy civil protection expert teams and equipment in a short notice.</p>	2	2
<p>[Actual performance] Has the organization actually detected crises in an early phase of crisis development?</p> <p>During the Ash Cloud crisis, DG ECHO received early notice of the event, and managed to send out warnings to a broader number of relevant actors (e.g. national governments).</p>	5	5
<p><b>Does the organization have the means for joint sense-making?</b></p>	<b>20</b>	
<p>Is the organization connected to one or more of the sense-making systems identified in the report by Boin et al. (2014) (see the Appendix)?</p> <p><b>European Flood Alert System (EFAS)</b>  The Flood Alert System (EFAS) is a monitoring system fully operational since 2012. It provides early warnings to its national partners as well as the ERCC. EFAS is developed by the Commission's Institute for Environment and Sustainability (IES) and is part of COPERNICUS Initial Operations (which supports the Civil Protection Mechanism). It consists of four main centres (the operational management of them is outsourced to Member State organization):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. EFAS Computational centre (hosting the EFAS Information System Platform and do forecasts)</li> <li>2. EFAS Dissemination centre (perform daily analysis, provides information to the ERCC)</li> <li>3. EFAS Hydrological data collection centre (performs water level data collection)</li> <li>4. EFAS Meteorological data collection centre (collects meteorological data)</li> </ol> <p>Among the tasks of EFAS are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide information to national services.</li> <li>• Provide information to the ERCC about upcoming and on-going floods.</li> </ul> <p><b>European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS)</b></p>	4	4

<p>Established by the Commission, EFFIS support the fire-disaster management services in the EU and updates the Commission and European Parliament with common situational pictures on wildland fires in Europe. This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Current situation (forecasts, hazards, risk-areas and hot-spots).</li> <li>• Fire news (media reports on wildland fires).</li> <li>• Mobile app EFFIS.</li> </ul> <p>In 2015, EFFIS was incorporated under the umbrella of COPERNICUS Emergency Management Services. EFFIS has a network of experts called “The Expert Group on Forest Fires”, including experts from 43 countries. During the initial phase of a fire, EFFIS performs rapid damage assessments, which is shared through the “Current situation” viewer.</p> <p><b>The Civil Protection Mechanism</b>  Within the Mechanism, Member States share their national risk assessment and share information about their risk management capabilities. The Commission supports and gives guidance to Member States individually and coordinates good practices exchange as well as voluntary peer reviews of national risk management plans. In relation the Mechanism, the EU is funding transport and logistics of assistance.</p> <p><b>The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)</b>  The ERCC is the operational centre of the Civil Protection Mechanism with a constant preparedness to coordinate an EU response to disasters.</p>		
<p>Does the organization have a crisis room?</p> <p>Yes, the <b>Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)</b>. The ERCC was created in 2014, replacing/merging the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) as well as the ECHO crisis room. As the operational hub of the Civil Protection Mechanism, the ERCC provides around-the-clock, continuous emergency management, and has the capacity to manage several on-going emergencies in different time zones at the same time. The ERCC is equipped with several workstations for specialized staff, and provides 24/7 crisis rooms.</p>	2	2
<p>Does the organization have a crisis team that can manage the information gathering and analysis during a crisis?</p> <p>Yes.</p>	5	5
<p>Does the organization have (a network of) experts that can be accessed to help analyse crisis information?</p> <p>In January 2016, 150 international humanitarian experts and 315 local staff members were in place in 48 field offices located in more than 40 countries. When it comes to civil protection, the ERCC pulls information from different sources, each having dedicated experts.</p>	3	3
<p>[Actual performance] Has the organization made use of a sense-making system listed in the Appendix?</p>	2	2

The ERCC is part of all sense-making systems related to civil protection, and can gain access to most others.		
[Actual performance] Has the organization involved experts during a crisis?  The ERCC relies on ‘national experts’ for many – if not most – of its tasks such as early damage assessment, the deployment of certain modules, etc. It does not, however, have a standing group of national experts who serve the sole purpose of providing advice in a crisis.	2	1
[Actual performance] Has the organization adequately performed its sense-making task during an actual crisis?  Yes. The ERCC produced sitreps for IPRC during the migration crisis.	2	2
<b>Does the organization have the means to facilitate joint decision-making?</b>	<b>10</b>	
Is there a legal framework that clearly defines key actors and their decision-making competencies for crisis situations?  The two main, complementary, legislative texts/pillars which regulate European civil protection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast)</li> <li>• Council Decision establishing a Civil Protection Financial Instrument (2007/162/EC, Euratom)</li> </ul> Decision 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and the Council outline how the EU Civil Protection Mechanism works.	4	4
[Actual performance] Has the organization actually made strategic decisions in a transboundary crisis before?  n/a	4	
[Actual performance] In hindsight, has the organization made the right decisions in a timely manner?  DG ECHO enjoys a solid reputation	2	2
<b>Does the organization have the means to enable transboundary coordination?</b>	<b>10</b>	
Does the organization have specific coordination tasks and capacities to fulfil that task?  The ERCC maintains coordination between civil protection and humanitarian aid operations, as well as between the respective authorities in member states and other EU or international organizations involved in the response.	4	4
Does the organization participate in a network that enables a coordinated response?  The Civil Protection mechanism also has an Exchange of Experts	2	2

<p>Programme, aiming to train experts to become more coordinated and improve their disaster response skills. The programme is built so that participating civil protection experts will exchange knowledge, best practices and techniques. The duration of an exchange goes from a few days to two weeks. Experts might apply for the programme or be invited by a host organization to, for example, attend workshops, participate in exercises and attend conferences.</p> <p>As previously mentioned, the ERCC is the operational heart of the Civil Protection Mechanism. The centre plans response activities such as deployment of expert-teams or needed equipment (from the voluntary pool).</p>		
<p>[Actual performance] Did the organization collaborate with other international organizations?</p> <p>In 2014, following the Ebola outbreak in Africa, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism responded to the request from the World Health Organization for rapid, coordinated deployment of emergency supplies and experts.</p>	2	2
<p>[Actual performance] Did the organization collaborate with member state authorities?</p> <p>In the 2014 case when Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were overwhelmed by devastating floods, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism was activated and received offers from 23 participating states. The ERCC coordinated the incoming assistance, such as rescue equipment as well as two Civil Protection teams that helped coordination of relief efforts and assisted rescue operations on site.</p>	2	2
<b>Means to foster joint meaning-making</b>	<b>10</b>	
<p>Does the organization have the capacity to communicate information on the crisis through social media?</p> <p>DG ECHO is active on social media, managing accounts on (among others) Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram. On its website, DG ECHO has sections dedicated to press releases, a blog, and news.</p>	3	3
<p>Is the leader of the organization active on social media?</p> <p>Yes, Christos Stylianides (Director-General ECHO) makes use of social media.</p>	1	1
<p>[Actual performance] Has the organization produced a crisis frame?</p> <p>During a recent scenario-based exercise (simulating a large earthquake followed by a nuclear leak and gas shortages) it was revealed that producing a crisis frame (and getting it out to key audiences) was hampered by the lack of a crisis communication strategy in the Commission (see EDREX exercise in 2017 2017).</p>	2	0.5
<p>[Actual performance] Did the organization manage to get that frame widely accepted by key audiences?</p>	2	

n/a		
[Actual performance] Did the organization communicate to dispel rumours or misinformation? n/a	2	
<b>Means that enable crisis accountability</b>	<b>10</b>	
Are there procedures in place for rendering account on what has been done before and during the crisis?  Studies of previous crises ('Mad Cow', the Hungarian 'Red Sludge', the Icelandic Ash Cloud) suggest that the European Parliament has taken a strong role in investigating Commission actions post-crisis, demanding Commissioners to appear before committees and issuing demands for change	4	4
[Actual performance] Has the organization rendered account of its (non-)actions during a crisis?  The Commission appears before the European Parliament and conducts internal lesson learning exercises.	3	3
[Actual performance] Did the leader(s) of that organization seek to <i>publicly</i> explain its crisis performance?  Yes	3	2
<b>The legitimacy reservoir</b>	<b>10</b>	
<b>Political support:</b>	<b>4</b>	
Have there been significant political debates or major controversies with regard to the crisis management performance of the organization?  No	2	2
Have there been calls for major post-crisis reforms aimed at reforming the organization's crisis management capacities?  No	2	2
<b>Legal support:</b>	<b>2</b>	
Have citizens, victims or other parties initiated legal action after a crisis against this organization?  No	2	2
<b>Popular support:</b>	<b>4</b>	
How do citizens assess the crisis management efforts of this organization?  Not clear, but citizens do support EU role in disaster management	4	2
<b>Dashboard indicators</b>		
Generic preparation and experience: 20/20		

Task/organizational means: 59.5/70		
Legitimacy reservoir: 8/10		

### *Summary*

DG ECHO scores very high across all three indicators. It reflects its status as the EU's leading crisis agency.

### **5.3 Surveying capacities in two sectors: Electricity and invasive alien species (WP5.1)<sup>8</sup>**

#### **Electricity**

Electricity can now flow almost seamlessly all across Europe thanks to an integrated grid. A growing number of interconnections between networks have made possible the coupling of markets and paved the way to an integrated Energy union. Yet, if interconnections can reinforce solidarity between countries in moments of crisis, they also render the whole system more vulnerable, since crises can more easily escalate through the network. Crises can either result from incidents such as terrorist or cyber attacks, weather related events, faults, poor communication, or long-term imbalances between supply and demand that risk creating tensions on the grid (in winter, when demand increases for example). In either case, risks of brownout or blackout constitute a serious threat to the economy and the provision of essential services across countries. They also may threaten political objectives regarding energy policy.

The EU action regarding electricity has focused on establishing common binding rules ('network codes') related to prevention of crisis, making risk assessments more transparent, developing crisis scenarios and improving coordination between transmission system operators (TSO) and between member states. There are also initiatives among European states that are not part of the EU regime. In the Transcrisis project, we looked into how the multi-level governance of electricity networks deals with security of electricity supply across countries, looking in particular at coordination, information-sharing, distribution of power. The institutional landscape is complex in a sector that relies both on public and private actors: responsibilities are split between the EU (Commission, Agency for the Coordination of Energy Regulators), member states (responsible for ensuring security of supply according to the subsidiarity principle), multi-lateral organisations (such as the Pentalateral Forum) regulators (nationals, as well as the Council for European Energy Regulators) transmission system operators (TSO) and the organisation that represent TSOs at EU level (ENTSO-E) and which is involved in establish network plans and codes.

In assessing the capacities of the health sector to deal with transboundary crises, we maintain the original distribution of weight between the three scoring categories:

1. Generic preparation and crisis experience – total of 20 points
2. Task/organizational means – total of 70 points
3. The legitimacy reservoir – total of 10 points

<sup>8</sup> These studies were conducted by Martin Lodge and Lydie Cabane, under WP5.1.

	Max. score	Case score
<b>Generic preparation and crisis experience</b>	<b>20</b>	
<p>Does the sector have a crisis plan in place?</p> <p>There are no unique crisis plans given how responsibilities are split across actors, but there are various policy measures that seek to organise crisis management. From a political EU point of view, plans are organised accordingly:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Directive 2005/89/EC: requires solidarity between member states but leaves implementation to member states</li> <li>- Regulation 2009/72/EC: requires member states to monitor security of supply and allows them to take safeguard measures in the event of a crisis. Regulation 714/2009 mandated ENTSO-E to draft an Emergency &amp; Restoration Network Code to harmonise procedures and facilitate coordination between TSO during and after crises (validated, waiting entry into force). However, this regulation does not tackle the problem of how to coordinate member states. Hence, crisis management remains a national responsibility; plans are drafted by TSOs for technical aspects, and by ministries for political aspects</li> <li>- In 2016, the Commission drafted a Risk Preparedness Regulation Proposal that would make mandatory national risk preparedness plans and risks assessment using a common methodology.</li> </ul>	10	8
<p>Does the sector regularly engage in crisis exercises?</p> <p>Yes. TSOs have regularly tests of their procedures (even involving joint exercises among TSOs), however, in the case of electricity, real-size tests are difficult to practice. Stress-tests are provided by real life situations (such as the 2015 near total solar eclipse), debriefing and feedback. Crisis exercises may also be organised by states – the UK for example organises such exercises on a regular basis, but this is typically a national exercise. There are no exercises on a European scale.</p>	5	4
<p>Has the sector recently (e.g. within the last 5 years) experienced a crisis?</p> <p>Yes. Examples are: the 2016 cold spell – a crisis as defined by the actors involved and that led to report written by ENTSOE.</p>	5	5
<b>Task/Organisational means</b>	<b>70</b>	
<b>Early detection: Is the sector capable of detecting an emerging crisis?</b>	<b>10</b>	
<p>Does the sector have in place resources, mechanisms, procedures and/or software to detect emerging threats?</p> <p>TSOs are continuously monitoring their networks thanks to control rooms. TSOs follow strict procedures to share information between them that are defined in the Network Codes</p> <p><u>Regional security coordinators (RSC)</u>: these organisations are mandated to facilitate the sharing of information between TSOs. CORESO was the first RSC created in 2008 by Belgium and France, later joined by most</p>	3	3

<p>Western European countries. TSC was also created for Central Europe in 2008. In 2015, a multi-lateral agreement between TSOs under the umbrella of ENTSO-E generalised RSC to the rest of Europe (Nordic RSC, Baltic RSC, SEE Thessaloniki and SCC in Greece and the Balkans), and these were made binding by the System Operations Guideline Network Code adopted as a Regulation by the EU and operational from 2017. However, some concerns about the capacity among different RSCs exist.</p> <p><u>European Awareness System (EAS)</u>: This collaborative tool developed and implemented by ENTSO-E in 2013 ‘allows TSOs to monitor real-time information on the transmission systems across Europe, and react quickly with assistance or system measures if an area appears to be under stress, both in the prevention and resolution of disturbances’. It uses a traffic light system (green, yellow, red) that indicates power conditions at a specific TSO and enables sharing of information across Europe.</p> <p>At the European level, ENTSO-E (n.d.) is tasked with forecasting power conditions at:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– short term: Winter/Summer Outlook (bi-annual analysis of risks to security of supply)</li> <li>– medium term: Mid Term Adequacy Forecast (pan-European probabilistic assessment of adequacy – i.e. the ability of a power system to cover demand in all conditions)</li> <li>– long term: Ten-Years Development Plans (assessment of infrastructure needs to ensure security of supply)</li> </ul>		
<p>Is it clear who (national authorities, other EU actors and/or citizens) should be warned about an impending crisis?</p> <p>No. This is one of the main issues: TSOs know how to respond to crisis, but in case of transboundary crisis, it is not clear who should be called to take political responsibility (other TSO, minister, regulator). In its 2016 regulation proposals, the Commission proposed to create Regional Operational Centres to which TSO should report crisis; member states would also be supposed to report to the Commission; but these proposals are very controversial and as infringing on the subsidiarity principle.</p>	2	1
<p>[Actual performance] Has the sector actually detected crises in an early phase of crisis development?</p> <p>Yes. The sector builds on a century long experience in dealing with complex systems, and so far, has managed to avoid worst-case scenarios thanks to early detection and intervention. For example, the 2016 cold spell was largely anticipated by ENTSO-E in its Winter Outlook (based on TSOs information), and most TSOs were able to implement preventative measures (load shedding in France, limitation of exports in Italy, Greece and Bulgaria, increase of imports in Greece).</p>	5	5
<p><b>Does the sector have the means for joint sense-making?</b></p>	<b>20</b>	
<p>Is the sector connected to one or more of the sense-making systems identified in the report by Boin et al. (2014) (see the Appendix)?</p>	4	4

<p>Yes. First, the European Awareness System enables TSOs to have a global view of the power grid situation in Europe. Second, at regional level, RSCs facilitate sharing of information and sense-making of data and potential crises.</p>		
<p>Does the sector have a crisis room?</p> <p>There is no single crisis room since the crisis management responsibility so far rest with member states. However, the RSCs in charge of mutualising information have control rooms. But decisions are still taken by TSOs and member states themselves that have their own crisis rooms.</p>	2	1
<p>Does the sector have a crisis team that can manage the information gathering and analysis during a crisis?</p> <p>There are no single teams, but at regional level, RSCs role is precisely to gather and share information at all times.</p>	5	4
<p>Does the sector have (a network of) experts that can be accessed to help analyse crisis information?</p> <p>Crises are first and foremost managed by TSOs (states need to rely on TSOs), so they are managed by the sector experts themselves. There seems to be a well-established network of experts.</p>	3	3
<p>[Actual performance] Has the sector made use of a sense-making system listed in the Appendix?</p> <p>Yes – the European Alert System was used during the 2016 cold spell.</p>	2	2
<p>[Actual performance] Has the sector involved experts during a crisis?</p> <p>Yes. The 2016 cold spell relied mostly on TSOs. Ministers were informed of the situation, but only in Bulgaria the Minister of Energy took a binding decision to restrict export.</p>	2	2
<p>[Actual performance] Has the sector adequately performed its sense-making task during an actual crisis?</p> <p>Yes. During the 2016 cold spell, TSOs relied on the European Awareness Systems to get a sense of how their neighbours were coping and alert them, when necessary, about their own situation. ENTSO-E 2016 Winter Outlook also proved to have been a useful assessment of the risks.</p>	2	2
<p><b>Does the sector have the means to facilitate joint decision-making?</b></p>	<b>10</b>	
<p>Is there a legal framework that clearly defines key actors and their decision-making competencies for crisis situations?</p> <p>Yes, there is a legal framework, but it does not clearly define responsibilities in case of a transboundary crisis. The current systems contain several contradictions and ambiguities. TSOs have a clear technical competence. But decision-making procedures are not clear: the 2005 directive made solidarity mandatory, but the 2009 regulation leaves up to member states to take unilateral emergency measures. The 2016 aims to clarify this situation and facilitate reporting to EU</p>	4	3

institutions, but still does not clarify who has the ultimate political responsibility during the crisis (it might also be politically difficult to establish uniform responsibility).		
[Actual performance] Has the sector actually made strategic decisions in a transboundary crisis before?  Yes. The 2016 cold spell required strategic decisions. These were mostly taken by TSOs. Except in some cases, Romania and Bulgaria, where Ministers decided to intervene.	4	3
[Actual performance] In hindsight, has the sector made the right decisions in a timely manner?  The management of the 2016 cold spell was assessed to have been rather successful in the sense that any major crisis was avoided thanks to preventative measures that ensure continuous provision of electricity. However, the decision by Bulgaria to close down its network was seen as controversial. And cooperation between TSOs could have been better according to the Commission.	2	1
<b>Does the sector have the means to enable transboundary coordination?</b>	<b>10</b>	
Does the sector have specific coordination tasks and capacities to fulfil that task?  Coordination only happens informally and formally between TSOs. When it comes to crisis management and decision-making there are no clear co-ordination mechanism between countries (exceptions are for example, organizations such as the Pentalateral Forum).	4	1
Does the sector participate in a network that enables a coordinated response?  The sector is made up of TSOs networks that organise coordination with other sectors either through market mechanisms or contracts to organise load-shedding for example. But this is done at national level.	2	3
[Actual performance] Did the sector collaborate with other international organizations?  Yes, with the International Energy Agency.	2	2
[Actual performance] Did the sector collaborate with member state authorities?  The sector relies on member states decision making since the latter are still responsible for crisis management. The main issue is rather how to co-ordinate member states.	2	1
<b>Means to foster joint meaning-making</b>	<b>10</b>	
Does the sector have the capacity to communicate information on the crisis through social media?	3	3

Yes.		
Is/Are the leader/s of the sector active on social media? TSOs are active on social media.	1	0.5
[Actual performance] Has the sector produced a crisis frame? Yes – although how consistent this might be in case of further crises, remains questionable.	2	1
[Actual performance] Did the sector manage to get that frame widely accepted by key audiences? Yes.	2	
[Actual performance] Did the sector communicate to dispel rumours or misinformation? Yes.	2	2
<b>Means that enable crisis accountability</b>	<b>10</b>	
Are there procedures in place for rendering account on what has been done before and during the crisis? So far, there are no required procedures. The 2016 risk preparedness proposal requires that (national) authorities provide within 6 weeks an evaluation of their crisis management.	4	4
[Actual performance] Has the sector rendered account of its (non-)actions during a crisis? Given the potential severity of consequences, each crisis is carefully studied by TSOs to evaluate actions and provide feedbacks. For example, after the 2016 cold spell, ENTSO-E published a report on “Managing critical grid situations: success and challenges.”	3	3
[Actual performance] Did the leader(s) of that sector seek to <i>publicly</i> explain its crisis performance? This sector has a limited publicity since audience is mainly made up of experts.	3	3
<b>The legitimacy reservoir</b>	<b>10</b>	
<b>Political support:</b>	<b>4</b>	
Have there been significant political debates or major controversies with regard to the crisis management performance of the sector? There has been a heated debate after the decision of Ukrainian authorities during the 2016 cold to close down their grid. It contributed to intensify the debate about the shape of the crisis management system in Europe, and the necessity, according to the Commission, to enforce cooperation between TSOs.	2	2
Have there been calls for major post-crisis reforms aimed at reforming the sector’s crisis management capacities?	2	1

The 2016 cold spell supported the Commission proposition to establish Regional Operational Centres to improve co-operation between TSOs. However, it is debatable whether the suggested reforms add capacity.		
<b>Legal support:</b>	<b>2</b>	
Have citizens, victims or other parties initiated legal action after a crisis against this sector? No	2	2
<b>Popular support:</b>	<b>4</b>	
How do citizens assess the crisis management efforts of this sector? Apart from crisis times, citizens do not really look into that sector.	4	2
<b>Dashboard indicators</b> Generic preparation and experience: 17/20 Task/organizational means – 57.5/70 Legitimacy reservoir – 7/10		

### *Summary*

Our Survey Tool highlights the considerable capacities that exist across the three categories of the Dashboard. The critical point about this sector is that capacities for transboundary crisis management lie with TSOs that are shaped by different national and cross-national ownership patterns, their association ENTSOE, the interest of national regulators, ACER, member state governments, different parts of the Commission (DG Energy and DG Competition). The capacity to address transboundary crises is present in agreements and codes; however, whether these codes and the suggested reforms to the crisis management system will enhance the capacity to deal with transboundary crises, remains controversial. The critical issue here is to deal with the regional aspects of a transboundary crisis rather than a uniform EU-wide instrument; a fundamental question that relates to the legitimacy category of the dashboard.

### **Invasive alien species**

The introduction of new species into a specific ecology has been a long-established phenomenon, driven by changing climate patterns, transportation, and increased circulation of goods and humans. The economic and social costs of the introduction of species that are damaging local ecologies and eco-systems however has become an increasing policy concern, starting, at the global level, with the 1992 Rio Convention. Since then, a range of international conventions (Berne convention) have emerged to motivate national states to devote resources to the management, if not eradication of species deemed invasive and alien. In 2014, the EU passed a Regulation that required member states to take appropriate action in the area of invasive alien species, based on the agreement of a list of species of common concern. The Regulation aimed at providing a common framework for preventing invasions in the first place, early rapid responses and long-term management.

In assessing the capacities of the health sector to deal with transboundary crises, we maintain the original distribution of weight between the three scoring categories:

1. Generic preparation and crisis experience - total of 20 points
2. Task/organizational means – total of 70 points
3. The legitimacy reservoir – total of 10 points

	<b>Max. score</b>	<b>Case score</b>
<b>Generic preparation and crisis experience</b>	<b>20</b>	
Does the sector have a crisis plan in place?  The EU Regulation requires member states to develop national strategies. Member states, to varying degree, have national or sub-national strategies in place, even though they can be fragmented between different domains.	10	5
Does the sector regularly engage in crisis exercises?  Invasions happen regularly but there is no systematic exercise to deal with transboundary invasions, not even at member state level.	5	0
Has the sector recently (e.g. within the last 5 years) experienced a crisis?  Invasions occur in particular regions of the EU, some of which transboundary. For example, Europe is currently dealing with an American crayfish invasion (particularly harmful in Sweden), Asian hornet (in France and neighbouring countries), or Asian fruit flies.	5	5
<b>Task/Organisational means</b>	<b>70</b>	
<b>Early detection: Is the sector capable of detecting an emerging crisis?</b>	<b>10</b>	
Does the sector have in place resources, mechanisms, procedures and/or software to detect emerging threats?  Member states rely on local actors to detect emerging threats. Some member states (UK for example) have more sophisticated national alert systems.  Exchange of information between countries rest on informal bureaucrat networks.	3	1
Is it clear who (national authorities, other EU actors and/or citizens) should be warned about an impending crisis?  Increasingly bilateral and multilateral communication flows exist – limited information. No formal contact point at EU level since this is a member states competence.	2	1
[Actual performance] Has the sector actually detected crises in an early phase of crisis development?	5	5

Yes.		
<b>Does the sector have the means for joint sense-making?</b>	<b>20</b>	
Is the sector connected to one or more of the sense-making systems identified in the report by Boin et al. (2014) (see the Appendix)?  Yes, the European Alien Species Information Network, based in Italy, functions as an exchange information mechanism about invasive alien species.  In addition, expert working groups (scientific committee assessing risks of invasion) exist.	4	4
Does the sector have a crisis room?  No – but such resources might exist at some national government level.	2	0
Does the sector have a crisis team that can manage the information gathering and analysis during a crisis?  No – but such resources exist at some national government level.	5	2
Does the sector have (a network of) experts that can be accessed to help analyse crisis information?  Yes, established networks of experts exist, mainly for in initial risk assessment. For crisis management, experts would typically be bureaucrats.	3	3
[Actual performance] Has the sector made use of a sense-making system listed in the Appendix?  The EASIN system is not perceived as very useful since member states generally maintain their own list and database. It might provide information to member states that have lower capacities to deal with invasive alien species.	2	0
[Actual performance] Has the sector involved experts during a crisis?  The crisis management is largely at the local level, where experts are involved.	2	2
[Actual performance] Has the sector adequately performed its sense-making task during an actual crisis?  Yes.	2	2
<b>Does the sector have the means to facilitate joint decision-making?</b>	<b>10</b>	
Is there a legal framework that clearly defines key actors and their decision-making competencies for crisis situations?  A Regulation exists that requires the development of national plans – these are in production. However, there are no formal coordination requirements at EU level.	4	2
[Actual performance] Has the sector actually made strategic decisions in a transboundary crisis before?	4	0

Not at the EU level.		
[Actual performance] In hindsight, has the sector made the right decisions in a timely manner? The French government has been criticized for its response on the Asian Hornet.	2	
<b>Does the sector have capacities that enable transboundary coordination?</b>	<b>10</b>	
Does the sector have specific coordination tasks and capacities to fulfil that task? There is reliance on member state coordination plans and information exchange.	4	1
Does the sector participate in a network that enables a coordinated response? Potentially yes. No formal mechanism, but important bilateral cooperation.	2	2
[Actual performance] Did the sector collaborate with other international organizations? It is part of wider international frameworks with overlapping membership (Berne Convention). Also, the European Commission as well as member states collaborate with the EPPO (the European Plant Protection Organisation) to develop common risk assessment methods.	2	2
[Actual performance] Did the sector collaborate with member state authorities? The sector is totally dependent on member state and sub-national government action.	2	1
<b>Means to foster joint meaning-making</b>	<b>10</b>	
Does the sector have the capacity to communicate information on the crisis through social media? Highly diverse – local authorities vary in their use of social media. Some of the management is done explicitly outside the spotlight of the media.	3	1
Is/Are the leader/s of the sector active on social media? No.	1	0
[Actual performance] Has the sector produced a crisis frame? Yes – there is broad agreement as to what a crisis generated by invasive alien species is.	2	1
[Actual performance] Did the sector manage to get that frame widely accepted by key audiences? Somewhat. The frame is sometimes controversial and not made public when it involves killing animals (such as the red squirrel). Some	2	2

member states (Hungary) were also quite protective of their national interests over environmental crises.		
[Actual performance] Did the sector communicate to dispel rumours or misinformation?  Yes: Asian hornet attracted newspapers headlines based on poor scientific information, exaggerating the severity of the threat.	2	2
<b>Means that enable crisis accountability</b>	<b>10</b>	
Are there procedures in place for rendering account on what has been done before and during the crisis?  The reporting on the requirements of the Regulation is on-going. Account-holding will be primarily at the national level for crisis management, some account-holding with European Parliament committee.	4	3
[Actual performance] Has the sector rendered account of its (non-)actions during a crisis?  Not at the EU level (to our knowledge) – but crises are of regional and local character so unlikely to be relevant.	3	1
[Actual performance] Did the leader(s) of that sector seek to <i>publicly</i> explain its crisis performance?  The activities at the local level are usually explained and accounted for in local media, not at the EU level.	3	2
<b>The legitimacy reservoir</b>	<b>10</b>	
<b>Political support:</b>	<b>4</b>	
Have there been significant political debates or major controversies with regard to the crisis management performance of the sector?  Considerable debate about the EU list of common interest and the requirements of the Regulation.	2	2
Have there been calls for major post-crisis reforms aimed at reforming the sector's crisis management capacities?  No. Too early – list is evolving.	2	0
<b>Legal support:</b>	<b>2</b>	
Have citizens, victims or other parties initiated legal action after a crisis against organizations in this sector?  No.	2	0
<b>Popular support:</b>	<b>4</b>	
How do citizens assess the crisis management efforts of this sector?  Only select constituencies – farmers, anglers, gardeners, hunters – are particularly interested in this area. There is broad support for the existence of a regime, but also opposition to the particulars of the	4	2

regime.		
Dashboard indicators		
Generic preparation/experience: 10/20		
Task and organizational means: 40/70		
Legitimacy reservoir: 4/10		

### *Summary*

The dashboard illustrates the relative lack of maturity of the invasive alien species domain in the EU and in some member states. The recent regulatory changes at the EU level have not gone hand-in-hand with the development of extensive administrative capacity-building at the national and local level (as reflected in the category relating to task and organizational means). At the same time, there is also a some reluctance in terms of granting legitimacy to the EU-level regime. The critical point about this sector is that despite the existence of legal authority and joint standards (the EU list of invasive alien species), the actual capacity to undertake transboundary crisis management is solely based at the local level, often involving special interest groups, local citizens (in detection) and local authorities.

## Appendix – Inventory of sense-making tools<sup>9</sup>

Gather Analyse Share Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS) - DG SANCO

Anti-piracy monitoring service (MARSURV-1) - European Maritime Safety Agency  
EMSA

ARGUS - DG SG

CleanSeaNet - EMSA

Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) - DG ECHO

Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) - DG MARE (under development)

Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) - Frontex

Consular On-line Website (CoOL) - EEAS Consular Crisis Management

Copernicus - European Space Agency

Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) - DG HOME

Crop yield forecasting system (AGRI4CAST) - Joint Research Centre JRC, used by DG  
AGRI

Customs Information System (CIS I & III) - OLAF

DG SANCO internal crisis intranet - DG SANCO

Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) - European Centre for Disease Prevention  
and Control ECDC

Early Warning Mechanism - DG ENER

Early Warning System (Joint Report) - DG Justice (EMDDA and EUROPOL)

Early Warning System on Conflict Prevention - EEAS Security Policy and Conflict  
Prevention Unit (not yet rolled out)

ECDC Epidemic Intelligence Unit - ECDC

Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) - DG ECHO

Emergency Response Coordination Portal (ERC Portal) - DG ECHO

ENSEMBLE - JRC

Epidemic Intelligence Information System (EPIS) - ECDC

EU Delegation Reports - EEAS

EU Long Range Identification and Tracking System Cooperative Data Centre (EU LRIT  
CDC) - EMSA

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<sup>9</sup> This list is based on Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard (2014).

EU MS Intelligence - EEAS

EU Special Representatives Reports - EEAS

Europe Media Monitor News Brief (EMM) - JRC

European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) - Frontex

European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE) - JRC

European Coordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS) - JRC (on request by DG MOVE)

European Cybercrime Centre (E3C) - Europol

European Drought Observatory - JRC

European Flood observatory (EUFO) - JRC

European Flooding Awareness System (EFAS) - JRC

European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) - JRC

European Migration Network (EMN) - DG HOME

European Patrol Network - Frontex

European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP) - JRC

European Union Notification System for Plant Health Interceptions (EUROPHYT) - DG SANCO

Europol 24/7 Operational Centre - Europol

Europol Analysis System (EAS) - Europol

Europol Platform for Experts (EPE) - Europol

Fingerprint database (EURODAC) - DG HOME

Frontex One-Stop-Shop (FOSS) - Frontex

Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) - Frontex

Galileo Security Monitoring Centre (GSMC) - European Global Satellite Navigation System Agency GSA

Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) - DG ECHO & UN OCHA

Global flood detection system - JRC

Global Flooding Awareness System (GloFAS) - JRC (experimental)

Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL) - DG RADIO and JRC

Health Emergency & Disease Information System (HEDIS) - DG SANCO

Health Emergency Operations Facility (HEOF) - DG SANCO

Information and Coordination Network (ICONET) - Frontex

Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) Web Platform Council Civil Protection Unit

Integrated Situational Analysis and Awareness (ISAA) - EEAS/COM  
Intelligence Centre (Intcen) - EEAS  
Joint Operations Reporting Application (JORA) - Frontex  
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) - DG ECFIN  
Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre - Narcotics (MAOC (N))  
Maritime Support Services Centre - EMSA  
Marsur - European Defence Agency EDA (emerging)  
Medical Intelligence System (MedISys) - JRC/DG SANCO  
ODIN - EEAS  
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) - DG HOME  
Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats (RAS-BICHAT) -  
DG SANCO  
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) - DG SANCO  
Rapid alert system for non-food dangerous products (RAPEX) - DG SANCO  
Rapid Alerting System for Chemical Health Threats (RAS CHEM) - DG SANCO (not yet  
implemented)  
Risk Management Unit - European Network and Information Security Agency ENISA  
SafeSeaNet - EMSA  
Satellite Centre (Satcen)  
Schengen Information System (SIS I & II) - DG HOME  
Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) - Europol  
Shared Environmental Information System (SEIS) - European Environment Agency, EEA  
Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC)- EEAS MS Intelligence and Intcen  
Situation Room 24/7 - EEAS  
Strategic Analysis and Response Centre (STAR) - DG HOME  
Systemic Model of Banking Originated Losses (SYMBOL) - JRC  
Tarîqa - EEAS Situation Room  
The European Surveillance System (TESSy) - ECDC  
Threat Tracking Tool (TTT) - ECDC  
Water level forecast system (LISFLOOD) - JRC  
Vessel Detection System (VDS) - JRC  
Visa Information System (VIS) - DG HOME

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