D2.2 Final Codebook

Authors: Arjen Boin, Lavinia Cadar, Maureen Donnelley (Crisisplan BV)
Delivery date: September 2016, Version 2.0
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Section A: Introduction

Project objectives

The financial crisis represents an ongoing and deep crisis to the European Union (EU). The TransCrisis project is committed to explore the EU’s capacity to address transboundary crises, reflecting in particular how the financial crisis has impacted on crisis management capacity across policy domains. TransCrisis is interested in responses to the financial crisis, as well as the impact of the financial crisis on crisis management capacity more generally. TransCrisis focuses on transboundary crisis management capacity and leadership at the EU level, the interaction between multi-level governance, and the national level.

The TransCrisis Consortium aims to develop a solid understanding of transboundary crisis management in the context of the European Union (Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2013; 2014). One central and unifying interest of TransCrisis is the identification of political-administrative requirements for an effective response to this type of crisis and the factors that make transboundary crisis management effective and legitimate. To this effect, TransCrisis analyses the role of leadership in managing transboundary crises (Ansell, Boin and Keller, 2010), as well as the formal and informal crisis management capacities of specific European Union institutions across different policy domains (Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2013). Finally, the TransCrisis project studies the impact of responses to transboundary crises on the legitimacy of EU institutions, leaders and policies (Sedelmeier, 2014; Plattner and Diamond, 2007; Dawson and Hanley, 2016).

Project partners

Table 1 presents the project’s division per WP, as well as the name and country of the responsible partners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WP</th>
<th>Participant organisation name</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding transboundary crisis management (WP2)</td>
<td>Crisisplan B.V. (CPLAN)</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying political leaders in the financial crisis (WP3)</td>
<td>Universiteit Utrecht (UU)</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Crisis management capacity in the European Commission, European Council and the Council of the European Union (WP4.1) | Stockholms Universitet (SU) | SE
---|---|---
Crisis leadership in the European Parliament (WP4.2) | Think Tank EUROPA (ThinkEuropa) | DK
Political leadership in EU agencies (WP4.3) | Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) | ES
Political leadership and crisis management regimes (WP5.1) | London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) | UK
Managing the immigration crisis: Inter-institutional cooperation and external relations (WP5.2) | Universita Degli Studi Di Catania (UNICT) | IT
Political leadership, national politics and transboundary crisis management (WP6) | Kozep-Europai Egyetem – Central European University (CEU CPS) | HU
Political leadership in the EU and the New Normal (WP7) | Crisisplan B.V. (CPLAN) | NL

**The codebook**

TransCrisis seeks to develop a comprehensive understanding of transboundary crisis management and leadership in the EU. It is particularly interested in the effect of the financial crisis on transboundary crisis management, and how the context of the 'new normal' (involving the ongoing economic crisis, political legitimacy crisis, geopolitical tensions, refugee crisis) is impacting on the EU’s transboundary crisis management capacity and leadership.

WP2 and WP7 provide for the unifying core of the research work conducted in the other WPs. WP2 sets out the framework and codebook to guide other WPs in providing information for the work conducted under WP7. This document (the codebook) should be read as an extension of the theoretical framework (D2.1), which explains the core analytical concepts. WP2 plays an integrative role in the TransCrisis project, in that it facilitates a shared understanding of key factors in the study of transboundary crisis management as well as an integrated way of performing the required research that will feed into WP7. The core analytical concepts defined in D2.1 will be consistently used throughout the Consortium and this enables the integration of the findings of individual sub-projects, building the foundation for a sound and comprehensive analysis of EU transboundary crisis
management capacity in the contemporary context. The aim of this codebook therefore is threefold: a) it provides for a unifying set of questions and concerns to deliver research outcomes across all TransCrisis WPs that go beyond the findings of each WP, b) to deliver a theoretically-informed framework for research that will facilitate integrated research-related publications and c) to deliver a platform to enhance knowledge exchange and dissemination. The latter two functions are the particular objectives of WP7.

This codebook therefore guides the research work of the other WPs. Given the diverse research methodologies and research areas, this codebook provides guidance on the kind of information required to allow for the collective work on WP7. Therefore, this is not a codebook in the sense in which particular codes are associated with the presence or absence of particular conditions or factors. Instead, this codebook offers guidance to the other WPs in terms of the kind of information that is required. The different WPs will therefore provide information under the different headings used in this codebook and this information will be based on the indicative questions contained in this document (i.e. the questions are not intended to be strictly responded to according to a specific coding procedure). The information provided by the WPs can be both of a quantitative and qualitative nature. Once this information is collected in view of the findings of the different WPs, TransCrisis will have a consistent and comprehensive platform for the discussion of transboundary crisis management capacity in the EU that advances both the worlds of research and practice. This codebook sets out the different dimensions and definitions to guide research across the different WPs and to ensure that conclusions can be drawn from across the different WPs for the work in WP7. In Annex 1, the different WPs account for the ways in which the codebook informs their individual WPs. Annex 2 summarises the questions set out in subsequent sections of this Codebook. It is expected that all TransCrisis research will provide for findings that will inform discussions across the different aspects (as noted in Appendix 1). ¹

The eventual aim (WP7) is to offer qualitative judgements and recommendations about key tasks in crisis management and how they relate to different aspects of EU multi-level governance. These findings will therefore directly influence TransCrisis output directed at the worlds of research and practice.

¹ The framework builds on the wider crisis management literature, including the ANVIL project that was funded under FP7.
Development of codebook

The codebook is the outcome of a collective, deliberative process involving consortium members, the advisory board and external advisors. As crisis, crisis management and political leadership are multi-interpretative and often contested concepts, and the relations between these concepts are open to competing definitions, WP2 aimed to develop a shared TransCrisis consortium-wide understanding of aims, definitions and methods.

Versions of the TransCrisis codebook were considered at different stages and venues. A first draft was presented at the project meeting hosted by CPLAN in Leiden, in September 2015. One of the most important goals of the meeting was to validate the codebook. As such, the first day was dedicated to discussing the codebook with project partners. The following day, the codebook was presented to a group of practitioners consisting of members of the advisory board and practitioners from the EU and Dutch public institutions. Both partners and practitioners offered valuable feedback, which was then incorporated in a second draft.

After the meeting, CPLAN prepared an internal document in the form of a questionnaire to invite project partners to reflect on the impact of the aforementioned feedback on their research plans. These comments were taken into account in writing the second draft.

Finally, we benefitted from the input of two external monitors at the end of the project’s first year (June 2016). The chief concerns were to strengthen the academic research-basis of the codebook, to highlight the ‘value added’ provided by WP2 and this codebook in guiding individual WP’s work, and to highlight more closely the link between this codebook and the original call. The revised version of this codebook has addressed these concerns by:

a) strengthening the academic grounding of this codebook;

b) adding commentary to highlight how this codebook supports and shapes the other TransCrisis WPs;

c) acknowledging more explicitly the importance of the post-2008 context for EU transboundary crisis management.
Section B: Operationalisation of key factors

What is a crisis?

The term crisis is widely used in the media and day-to-day conversations. It is also associated with a range of phenomena. In the context of EU governance, a variety of crises can be identified, such as natural disasters, infectious diseases, transport incidences, critical infrastructure failures, large industrial incidents, terrorist attacks, social crises, economic and financial crises and political crises (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997; Gundel, 2005).

The financial crisis has had considerable effects on the transboundary management capacity of the EU. New capacities have been created and governance arrangements established, even though the effectiveness of the EU in offering a timely and appropriate response has been contested. However, the ongoing political crises have questioned the EU's legitimacy at large. Furthermore, the governing context post-2008 has arguably also reduced the capacity and legitimacy of actors at all levels of government to deal with transboundary crises.

The TransCrisis project therefore focuses on a range of domains to focus on the EU's transboundary crisis management capacity. These involve the financial crisis itself, but also other domains (constitutional rights, environment, immigration, infrastructure, social policy) so as to explore how these sectors have changed in their transboundary crisis management capacity since the onset of the full-blown financial crisis in 2008. Table 1 provides an overview of the crisis domains addressed in TransCrisis, their relationship to the financial crisis, as well as the crisis management capacity in focus.

Table 2: Crisis domains and their relationship to the financial crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis domain</th>
<th>WP(s)</th>
<th>Relationship to the financial crisis</th>
<th>Crisis management capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial crisis</td>
<td>WP3, 4.2, 5.1</td>
<td>Financial crisis as transboundary crisis requiring responses by leaders and institutions in terms of offering meaning-making, holding to account/engage in decision-making and in developing policy responses.</td>
<td>How do leaders and institutions engage with the financial crisis?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>WP4.1, 5.1</td>
<td>Has financial crisis affected resources for dealing with transboundary problems in this domain?</td>
<td>What capacities exist for handling transboundary crisis at EU and in multi-level governance system?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The crisis concept allows us to compare these very different domains with their acute and salient features; they all have a common denominator: a threat that must be addressed swiftly in order to avert or minimize damage. A crisis is here defined as “a perceived threat to the core values or life-sustaining systems of a society that must be urgently addressed under conditions of deep uncertainty” (Rosenthal, Charles and ‘t Hart, 1989; Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort, 2001; Boin et al., 2013: 6).

Such a definition implies that a crisis is to a considerable degree subjectively constructed (Thomas and Thomas, 1928; ‘t Hart, 1993). Our concept of crisis is a subjective one in the sense that we speak of a crisis when a considerable number of people (including politico-administrative elites) agree that a certain situation constitutes a disruption of normalcy, a threat that requires an urgent response. In our understanding of the concept, we accept that the extent of a crisis cannot be identified by measures such as fatalities, material damage, social consequences or resource commitments alone. Perceptions, institutional processes and cascading effects will shape crisis management responses.

The subjective nature applies to each of the three core characteristics of crisis: threat, urgency and uncertainty.

The threat element refers to potential disruption of fundamental values (e.g. security, health or integrity) or the functioning of life-sustaining systems that are undermined as a result of some form of adversity. It is important to note that a crisis does not necessarily imply physical damage, casualty or financial loses; an attack on highly valued symbols or institutions can have an equally strong impact on a society. There is an objective dimension to threat assessments (the number of people
affected, the potential damage of a threat) as well as a subjective dimension to threat (the fear of terrorism, the ‘irrational’ fear of some threats over others).

**Urgency** is an essential element of a crisis. The time dimension is experienced differently depending on the decision-making level: at the strategic level, even though their time availability does become much shorter during crisis, leaders are not put under the same extreme pressure as first responders at the operational level, who sometimes must make decisions on life and death matters within hours, minutes or even seconds. Certain policy problems can have long time horizons (‘creeping crises’) but the time to address them is relatively short (e.g. invasive species or youth unemployment).

A crisis is accompanied by a high degree of **uncertainty**. In crisis times, there is little reliable information about the causes of a threat, its consequences, as well as potential remedies: what is going on? How did it happen? What caused this? What is next? How bad will it be? What can be done?

The process through which people form their perception of the situation is a collective one in which citizens, media and governing elites all have a role to play. Politicization and deep disagreements may well be part of this process (Boin, McConnell and ‘t Hart, 2008; Hood, 2011; Lodge and Wegrich, 2014). There may be acrimonious discussion about the nature of the threat, causes and available time for response. Every WP will offer an argumentation as to why the respective threat constitutes a crisis and is suitable for analysis under our theoretical framework. We ask each WP to answer the following questions:

- **Identify the key characteristics of the crisis under discussion (key dates; key actors; key events)**
- **What constitutes the threat element in your case? What is being threatened?**
- **What makes the specific threat urgent? To whom?**
- **Is there widespread (political and/or societal) agreement with regard to the nature and scope of the threat?**
- **What are the uncertainties? Who is experiencing them?**
- **Has the threat been labelled a crisis by key authorities?**
What is a transboundary crisis?

This project is particularly focused on transboundary crises under the conditions of the ‘new normal’ (Boin and Rhinard, 2008; Ansel et al., 2010; Kuipers and Boin, 2015). A transboundary crisis is a crisis that plays out across one or many types of boundaries. Boundaries exist on multiple dimensions; they involve geopolitical jurisdictions, organizational spheres of influence, the intergovernmental allocation of legal competencies and financial and organizational resources, as well as conceptual boundaries. A transboundary crisis thus affects multiple sectors, groups or countries, it leads to conflict over competencies and jurisdictions, and is characterised by contestation over sources of expertise. The more complex the boundary constellation in any particular case, the harder it is to manage a transboundary crisis (Ansell, Boin and Keller, 2010). As noted, TransCrisis deals with important cases of transboundary crisis management in the context of the financial crisis. Other well-known examples include the Icelandic ash crisis (Kuipers and Boin, 2015) or pandemics.

For each WP, it is important to describe the boundaries that are key to the transboundary crisis under study.

- What are the affected countries and sectors?
- What types of boundaries are being crossed (geographical, policy sector, legal etc.)?

The theoretical framework underlying the TransCrisis project identified key factors, constraints and relations between the factors (see Figure 1 for a visual representation). The most important relation is between the execution of a set of strategic tasks and the outcome of a transboundary crisis.
Transboundary crisis management

Crisis management involves the presence of distinct resources, structures and/or standard operating procedures that are devoted to addressing situations that have been identified as a crisis. We define transboundary crisis management as the implementation of a set of strategic activities that are thought to be effective in responding to crises. They can therefore be expected to be applied in order to limit the impact of crisis. The underlying assumption is that task accomplishment furthers the chances of effective and legitimate crisis management (Boin et al., 2005). The performance of these tasks is a function of national crisis management system characteristics (Kuipers et al., 2015), individual skills of crisis managers (Flin, 1996) and the characteristics of relevant EU, national and sub-national institutions (Boin and Rhinard, 2008; Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2013). At the same time, the fundamental challenge for this task accomplishment is to address the complex constellation of boundaries.

Figure 1: Key factors
The crisis management literature identifies the following activities that are thought to enable an effective and legitimate response:

- **Detection**: the timely recognition of an emerging threat.
- **Sense-making**: the collecting, analysing and sharing of critical information needed for a shared picture of the situation.
- **Decision-making**: the selection, making and implementation of strategic decisions that relate to the immediate crisis response and its aftermath.
- **Coordination**: identifying key partners in the response and facilitating collaboration between these partners.
- **Meaning-making**: formulating a key message that offers a convincing explanation of the threat, actionable advice to citizens, and a sense that leaders are in control of the situation.
- **Communication**: effective delivery of the core message to selected audiences (e.g. victims, citizens, stakeholders, voters, media representatives, etc.).
- **Accountability**: rendering an explanation in a public forum of relevant decisions and strategies that were initiated before, during and after the crisis.

The TransCrisis project aims to develop insights into how crisis leadership and management at different levels of the EU multi-level governance system can be exercised legitimately and effectively.

**Leadership and leaders**

We are interested to see how individual and institutional leadership affects the capacity to perform crisis leadership. We define leadership in terms of a relation between officials with the authority to act and people who are willing to take their directions (‘t Hart, 2014). Leadership can best be studied as the execution of a set of tasks (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1957; Boin, 2001). Leaders are those individuals who reside at the top of a political or institutional hierarchy, ultimately bearing responsibility for the decisions and actions of the country or institution they represent.

It is not always clear who these authorities are as a transboundary crisis by definition involves multiple domains. It is therefore not always clear who “owns” the crisis and should deal with it (Boin et al., 2013: 9). The following questions will help to establish who the key actors are:

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2 An extensive treatment can be found in Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, Sundelius (2005). For a summary, see Boin, Kuipers and Overdijk (2013).
What is/are the authority/authorities that is/are formally responsible for dealing with the specific crisis/threat?

Which actor is assumed to be responsible for particular aspects of and/or for overall transboundary crisis management?

What EU competences are involved (Union-exclusive, shared competences or state-exclusive competences)?

Crisis leadership consists of creating and using capacities to manage a crisis. We study crisis leadership in terms of the joint efforts that facilitate the effective and legitimate performance of crisis detection: detection, sense-making, decision-making, coordination, meaning-making, communication and accountability (Boin et al., 2005).

In studying crisis leadership, researchers can look at whether and to what extent individuals and/or organisations facilitate the fulfilment of strategic crisis management tasks. This will help us to uncover success factors that determine the effectiveness and legitimacy of transboundary crisis management.

Questions about the use of crisis management capacities – and how they may have changed since 2008:

**Detection:**

- Is there institutional attention towards ensuring that there is continuous institutional attention and vigilance?
- Are there briefing sessions on the latest risk assessments?
- Do organisations meet with experts to discuss threats? At which level do these exchanges occur?
- Are they aware of existing risks?
- Are they willing to acknowledge errors?

**Sense-making:**

- Do leaders consult experts to find out more about and understand what is going on?
- Do they share the information with partners?
- Do they ask for and use their feedback?
- Do they analyse potential consequences?
- Do they identify additional information needs?

**Decision-making:**

- Do leaders encourage deliberation on the course of action? Do they engage relevant actors in the decision-making process?
Do leaders recognize and respect the division between operational and strategic decision-making? Do they refrain from interfering with the operational level? Do they support the principle of subsidiarity?

**Coordination:**
- Do leaders engage in persuading and/or commanding organisations or relevant actors to cooperate in effort to manage the crisis?
- Do leaders monitor vertical and horizontal forms of cooperation?
- Do leaders meet regularly with counterparts?
- Do leaders intervene when coordination is lacking or dysfunctional?
- Are leaders willing to integrate community’s self-organising efforts into the official crisis response?
- Are there difficulties in working with organisations from other sectors?
- Are there difficulties in working with organisations from the private domain?
- Are there difficulties in working with international organisations?

**Meaning-making:**
- Do leaders manage to put forward a message that resonates with key audiences?
- Do leaders formulate a clear interpretation of the crisis?
- Is there one consistent message or multiple messages?
- Do leaders explain how they plan to lead their communities out of crisis?
- Do leaders take into account contesting frames of the same crisis?
- Is there evidence that the message is being accepted by other dominant stakeholders? Or are there different ‘schools of thought’ vying for attention and dominance?

**Communication:**
- Do leaders work with communication professionals?
- Do leaders disseminate information to both citizens and other actors/organisations involved in crisis management?
- Do leaders engage in two-way communication in which they not only push information but also gather it? Do they respond to real information needs?
- Are leaders present on social media?
- Do leaders dispel rumours? Do they acknowledge errors and correct misinformation?
- Do leaders provide actionable advice, that is, what should be done and by whom?

**Accountability:**
- Do leaders participate in and cooperate with political inquiries where they render account for their actions before and during a crisis?
Do leaders take responsibility for their actions or are they engaged in blame games?

Are democratically legitimized principals informed about the conduct of executive actors, and about the social consequences of that conduct?

Do the debates between accountability forum and actors focus on whether the behaviour of the latter accords with the democratically legitimized principals’ standards and preferences?

Transboundary crisis management capacity

The TransCrisis project focuses on EU’s transboundary crisis management capacity. We refer here to the preparedness of state and/or EU institutions to perform strategic crisis management tasks. Preparedness is defined here as the presence of organizational response capacities (legal authority, financial, communicative and staff resources) and standard operating procedures dedicated to crisis management tasks. Put differently, institutions need to have ‘policies, organizational structures, and resources […] in place to deal with emerging breakdowns’ (Comfort, Boin and Demchak, 2010).

In assessing this capacity, individual WPs will analyse how institutions at different levels prepare for the effective and legitimate exercise of crisis management capacities. It is of paramount importance for the coherence of the project that each WP identifies and explains the crisis management tasks it seeks to research.

To facilitate the study of crisis management capacities, the following questions should be considered – especially also in the context of what may have changed in the domain since 2008:

Detection:

- What prerequisites are required to facilitate early detection?
- Are there resources, mechanisms, procedures and software in place to detect emerging threats?
- Are there regularly performed threat analyses and risk assessments?
- Are there indications of a shared awareness that something can happen at any given moment?

Sense-making:

- Are there efforts to improve sense-making?
- Are there simulations or opportunities to rehearse sense-making?
- Are there plans or procedures for processing information once a threat has been identified?
- Is there a specific venue where this takes place (e.g. a crisis room) – at what levels of government?
- Are there formal rules with regard to the sharing of information?
- Are there instructions on how to create a picture of the situation that everybody will understand? (e.g. Is technical data translated into information that can be widely understood?)
☐ Are these procedures well-rehearsed?

**Decision-making:**

☐ Are there plans or formal procedures in place that establish how decisions will be made and by whom?

☐ To what extent and how do these procedures distinguish between the strategic and operational levels?

**Coordination:**

☐ Are there networks that enable effective coordination?

☐ Are there rules/procedures for vertical and horizontal coordination?

☐ Are there rules for orchestrating coordination? Is there a shared understanding as to who coordinates and how??

☐ Is there a history of coordination between the institutions involved in crisis management activities?

**Meaning-making:**

☐ Are there rules or procedures for formulating an understandable and convincing narrative?

**Communication:**

☐ Is there a strategy regarding communication towards citizens and with the partner institutions?

☐ Are there contingency plans for breakdowns in communication?

☐ Is the institution active on social media?

**Accountability:**

☐ Are there procedures in place for rendering account on what has been done before and during the crisis and why?

☐ What are the accountability forums’ investigative powers and information-processing capacities to evaluate executive behaviour, particularly regarding conformity of executive action with laws, regulations and norms?

☐ Does the accountability forum have incentives to engage executive actors in questioning and debate, and is their interaction focused on conformity of actions with laws and norms (for example, compliance with the ‘impartiality principle’)?

☐ Do the ‘accountability forums’ (Bovens, 2005) possess credible sanctions to punish and deter executive misbehaviour?

☐ Is there evidence that account-holding facilitates processes of feedback, stakeholder dialogue and learning?

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3 The forum, or the accountee, can be a specific person or agency, but can also be a more virtual entity, such as the general public (Bovens, 2005).
Effectiveness and legitimacy of transboundary crisis management

The TransCrisis project studies the effects of transboundary crisis management.

We define **effectiveness** as the degree to which an action produces the desired results. In terms of crisis, we assume that democratically elected leaders will seek to minimize the impact of a crisis. The effectiveness of crisis management does, of course, bear some relationship to the perspective and priorities of the person or entity making the assessment (De Londras and Doody, 2014). It is hard to objectively measure the effectiveness of crisis management, if only because there are so many intervening variables (Kuipers et al., 2015).

Researchers in the WPs are therefore required to identify the point of view from which the effectiveness of a response is assessed. This is even more important in the context of transboundary crises, where different organisations are supposed to work together.

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**The following aspects may guide researchers in assessing effectiveness:**

- Are authorities perceived to have prevented a worsening of the situation?
- Were authorities said to have initiated a timely response?
- Have there been calls for external assistance (to other member states or international organisations)? Has the Solidarity Clause been upheld?
- How do political inquiry committees assess the effectiveness of management efforts?

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We also inquire into the legitimacy of the response. We adopt the following definition of **legitimacy**: “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). A transboundary crisis response is therefore legitimate when the official efforts correspond with what is generally expected. To assess legitimacy, researchers will evaluate the extent to which crisis management enjoys political, legal and popular support.

**In assessing legitimacy, the following questions provide guidance. Consider also in the context of change since 2008.**

**Political support:**

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4 This operationalization of effectiveness has been applied before in comparing the civil security systems of 22 European countries within the ANVIL project (http://anvil-project.net/).
Have there been significant political debates or major controversies with regard to crisis responses?

Have there been significant conflicts among member states or between member states and the European institutions about the legitimacy of the crisis response?

Have there been major post-crisis reforms aimed at reforming crisis management capacities?

Has the crisis led to the collapse of governments and/or resignation of ministers?

Legal support:

Have citizens, victims or other parties initiated legal action against crisis management-involved actors?

Have courts dealt with legal actions against crisis management-involved actors?

Administrative and professional support:

Do crisis responses meet with acceptance by national and sub-national public administration and other units tasked with executing the crisis response? (e.g., fit with dominant norms and standard operating procedures)?

Do crisis response create tension with dominant norms in affected policy communities (e.g. is there evidence of ‘coping strategies’ at the level of the ‘street-level bureaucracy’)

Popular support:

How do citizens feel about or engage in crisis management efforts? (Large-scale surveys such as the Eurobarometer may be useful.)

Is the crisis response related to electoral results?

Limiting the crisis management concept

The practice of crisis management is often described as a cycle that consists of different managerial processes. The crisis management cycle (Figure 3) does not start when the (threat of) damage becomes real. Rather, it begins long before, with measures to prevent threats from turning into full-fledged crises.

The prevention phase includes risk analysis and assessment that inform the adoption of long-term strategies and activities for reducing the specific risks. Preparedness consists of more concrete efforts,
mechanisms, or procedures to alter people’s behaviour in order to nurture some sort of familiarity with the experience of crisis, and to develop effective patterns of response to known threats. More specifically, preparedness includes crisis contingency planning, simulations, training and education. The response phase includes efforts and activities aimed at minimizing the effects of the crisis, carried out in the immediate aftermath. Finally, the recovery phase consists of aspects such as restoring routine modes of operation, reconstruction of buildings, and learning.

The TransCrisis project focuses on preparedness and response. Prevention and recovery are not in line with the TransCrisis project which seeks to identify what makes the response to a transboundary crisis effective and legitimate, and to what extent the EU can fulfil those requirements.

Research plans

TransCrisis develops understanding of the complexities involved in EU transboundary crisis management. The WPs deal with different sets of crises, across different levels of government and different boundaries. Efforts at transboundary crisis management across domains have been fundamentally affected by the financial crisis. As explained in the introduction, the codebook guides the other work packages in performing their specific research into distinct areas of transboundary crisis management. This codebook acts as a guide to the research efforts of the different WPs which look at distinct aspects of EU transboundary crisis management. The following Tables summarise the different foci of the various WPs and how they offer insights into the different tasks identified in this Codebook. Table 4 illustrates how the different WPs overlap which points to areas of collaboration. In Appendix 1, each WP presents its research agenda and illustrates how its specific research agenda is motivated by questions introduced in this codebook. Addressing the questions in this codebook will therefore offer the basis for developing WP7.
### Table 3: Synthetic presentation of TransCrisis studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WP</th>
<th>Case(s)</th>
<th>Type(s) of crisis</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Institutions studied</th>
<th>Transboundary elements</th>
<th>Tasks studied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crisis management capacity in the European Commission, European Council and the Council of the European Union (WP4.1)</td>
<td>Energy; Transport; Health; Migration; Cyber; Civil protection; Terrorism; Cross-cutting tools.</td>
<td>Generic crisis management capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>European Commission; European Council; Council of the European Union.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Detection; Sense-making; Decision-making; Coordination; Meaning-making; Communication; Accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying political leaders in the financial crisis (WP3)</td>
<td>43 leaders divided as follows: □ 35 governmental leaders and presidents of central banks from ten countries, namely Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Spain, the UK, Hungary, Slovenia and Denmark; □ 8 leaders who currently hold or have held the function of President of the European Commission, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, or President of the European Central Bank.</td>
<td>Financial crisis</td>
<td>October 2009 - 31 December 2014</td>
<td>National institutions; European Commission; Council of the European Union; European Central Bank.</td>
<td>National; Administrative/organisational; Political; Economic; Legal; Conceptual.</td>
<td>Meaning-making; Decision-making.</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>Case(s)</td>
<td>Type(s) of crisis</td>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>Institutions studied</td>
<td>Transboundary elements</td>
<td>Tasks studied</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political leadership in EU agencies</td>
<td>European Central Bank; European Food Safety Authority; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.</td>
<td>Euro-currency crisis in 2012; Cucumber crisis in 2011; Ebola outbreak in Africa in 2014.</td>
<td>2011-2014</td>
<td>EU agencies; European Central Bank.</td>
<td>The case selection was made based on the agencies’ transboundary mission.</td>
<td>Decision-making; Coordination; Meaning making.</td>
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<td>(WP4.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political leadership and crisis</td>
<td>Environmental policy; Social policy; Energy policy; Financial policy.</td>
<td>Invasive alien species; Youth unemployment; Energy infrastructure; Banking resolution.</td>
<td>2000-2015</td>
<td>EU/national and subnational governments and non-state actors</td>
<td>The four policy domains are of transboundary nature and require coordination between and across national and EU-levels.</td>
<td>Detection; Sense-making; Decision-making; Coordination; Meaning-making; Communication; Accountability.</td>
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<td>management regimes (WP5.1)</td>
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<td>Managing the immigration crisis</td>
<td>Conventional response (2011 – 2013); Mare Nostrum (Oct. 2013 - Oct. 2014); EU-Turn (Nov. 2014–Sept. 2015); Fencing the EU (Oct. 2015 – on).</td>
<td>Immigration crisis</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>European Commission; European Council; Council of the European Union; EU agencies.</td>
<td>National; Administrative/organisational; Economic; Legal.</td>
<td>Detection; Sense-making; Decision-making; Coordination; Meaning-making; Communication; Accountability.</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>Case(s)</td>
<td>Type(s) of crisis</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Political leadership, national politics and transboundary crisis management (WP6)</strong></td>
<td>Rule of law; Corruption; Equality.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional crisis (backsliding)</td>
<td>National; Administrative/organisational; Political; Economic; Legal; Conceptual.</td>
<td>Detection; Sense-making; Decision-making; Coordination; Meaning-making; Communication; Accountability.</td>
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<td>2006 - present</td>
<td>National institutions</td>
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<td><strong>Crisis leadership in the European Parliament (WP4.2)</strong></td>
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<td>European Parliament; European Commission; ECOFIN Council; Eurogroup.</td>
<td>Sense-making; Communication; Accountability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Research methods and opportunities for collaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
<th>Opportunities for collaboration</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The transboundary crisis management capacity of EU institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Internal, with WP5.2 (research on the migration crisis).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis management capacity in the European Commission, European Council and the Council of the European Union (WP4.1)</td>
<td>Interview with officials from the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union; Document analysis.</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>Internal, with WP5.2 (research on the migration crisis).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Studies of transboundary crisis management</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Studying political leaders in the financial crisis (WP3)</td>
<td>Survey on perceptions of the Euro crisis (the target group is European citizens); Cognitive mapping (based on speeches of 43 leaders divided as follows (designed as a case study on the financial crisis)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Internal, with WP4.1 (research on the European Commission and the Council of the European Union), WP4.3 (research on the European Central Bank), WP6 (research on backsliding).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leadership in EU agencies (WP4.3)</td>
<td>Survey on crisis management capabilities of EU agencies (the target group is members of agencies’ managing boards); Interviews with members of the agencies’ managing boards, officials from the European Commission, and academics; Case study (the European Central Bank in the Euro crisis in 2012, the European Food Safety Authority in the cucumber crisis in 2011, and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control in the Ebola outbreak in 2014); Process-tracing.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Internal, with WP4.1 and WP4.2 (research on EU institutions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political leadership and crisis management regimes (WP5.1)</strong></td>
<td>Interviews. (designed as a comparative case study: financial regulation, environmental regulation, social policy, and energy policy)</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Internal, with WP4.1 (research on the European Commission), WP4.2 (research on the European Parliament), WP4.3 (research on EU agencies), and WP6 (research on backsliding).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Managing the immigration crisis: Inter-institutional cooperation and external relations (WP5.2)</strong></td>
<td>Process-tracing; Document analysis; Decision analysis; Survey analysis. (designed as a case study on migration)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A study of transboundary crisis management effects</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political leadership, national politics and transboundary crisis management (WP6)</strong></td>
<td>Interviews.</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A study of accountability</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis leadership in the European Parliament (WP4.2)</strong></td>
<td>Coding; Document analysis; Interviews with policy makers from EU institutions and members of the European Parliament. (designed as a case studies on EU institutions, but focusing on the European Parliament and following the financial crisis, youth unemployment, the NSA surveillance diplomatic crisis, and the energy security crisis).</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>External, with Dr. Christel Koop from King’s College London, on holding the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the European Council accountable in EU economic governance. Internal, within WP4.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 1: The codebook applied

WP3: Studying political leaders in the financial crisis (UU)

This section indicates how WP3 relates to the Codebook (D2.2). We first discuss what crisis we are studying using the definition given in the codebook. Next we will indicate which transboundary dimensions are present in this crisis. Thirdly we specify which crisis management tasks we focus on. Finally, we discuss how our research relates to the concepts: leadership, effectiveness and legitimacy as defined in the codebook.

The Euro crisis

WP3 will be studying the Euro crisis. In our study, Greece’s acknowledgement of its excessive deficits in October 2009 will be seen as the beginning of the crisis. The disclosure by the new Greek government triggered a large scale loss in confidence in the solvability of the Greek and other states. Ultimately this sparked a European-wide public debate on whether the Euro would survive and whether certain countries would exit the Eurozone (either by choice or by being forced out) (Nelson et al., 2011).

In the codebook, a crisis is defined as ‘a perceived threat to the core values of life-sustaining systems of a society that must be urgently addressed under conditions of deep uncertainty.’ In our view, the Euro crisis fits this definition well, firstly because it was wildly perceived as a threat by stakeholders and observers of the crisis. Moreover, it has become clear that the very existence of the European Economic and Monetary Union with its single currency was also objectively threatened more than once during the crisis. The collapse of the Euro or exit of one of its members, would have posed a threat to the European common market and severely affect the economies of all EU member states. Whilst a complete collapse of EMU has been avoided, the crisis resulted in, amongst others, an immense increase in unemployment and loss of economic development, especially in the Southern states.

Secondly, the Euro crisis was also characterised by a sense of urgency. There were multiple deadlines for rescue packages and loans that needed to be dealt with by political leaders in a timely manner. Despite the fact that this constituted an urgent threat, the Euro crisis lingered on for many years. Although it is not yet clear whether the crisis has ended, our study will cover the crisis until after the third bail-out agreement on Greece. We will take 30 August 2015 as our end-date. Our data will therefore span 6 years.
Finally, the Euro crisis brought along a lot of uncertainty. The crisis created much uncertainty about the future of the Euro and contributed to the emergence of deeply divided discussions about the nature and future of the European project in general. Also the economic future of many member states as well as the social welfare of their people was put in jeopardy. The precise effects of the crisis remain uncertain. Furthermore, as indicated above, it is still unclear whether or not the crisis is over.

The transboundary dimensions of the crisis

The codebook specifies several dimensions of transboundary crises. These indicate what boundaries are being crossed by the crisis under investigation. The Euro crisis crosses several of the boundaries identified in the codebook.

National boundaries

The countries in the Euro zone are most directly involved in the Euro crisis, but its effects were felt by all countries in the EU. The Euro crisis is a prime example of the interdependence of EU member states, it showed without a doubt that problems incurred in one state may have grave transboundary consequences. Finally, the problems of especially Spain and Ireland – which suffered from a banking rather than a sovereign debt crisis - were a direct consequence of the financial crisis that started in the US and spread to Europe.

Administrative / Organisational boundaries

Firstly, many different organisations and administrations are involved in managing the Euro crisis, amongst them are a host of EU institutions, the national administrations of the Euro zone states but also the IMF and international financial institutions. In addition, the causes and effects of the Euro crisis go far beyond the public sector. The financial sector specifically, but, more broadly, the private sector is affected by the crisis and has had a part in its causes (Chang and Leblond, 2015).

Political boundaries

The Euro crisis led to a large-scale political debate on Euro- and European Union membership. It fueled both EU-scepticism and calls for further federalisation, respectively arguing for abandoning the EU and searching for a centralised solution. In addition, the Euro crisis seems to have awoken the left-right political dimension that was previously largely absent from the debates on European integration.
**Economic boundaries**

As the Euro crisis spread throughout Europe it crossed the boundaries of the different national economic systems and cultures. More importantly, however, amongst the Euro zone countries different ‘varieties of capitalism’ are present (Hall and Soskice, 2001). This existence of several varieties of capitalism within the strict confines of the EMU has been identified as one of the causes of the euro crisis (Hall, 2012).

**Legal boundaries**

During the Euro crisis new legislation and treaties were agreed upon that at times infringed on existing national laws. At the same time a national judicial institute like the German Constitutional Court was a powerful player in interpreting the new rules and practices that were instated at the EU level. It thereby also affected and limited the scope of EU legislation that in turn affected other member states.

**Conceptual boundaries**

The crisis has been framed in many different ways. Some say it proves that the Euro specifically and the EU in general is a failed project, others stated that handling this crisis would not have been possible without European cooperation. On top of this, several different causes and effects have been attributed to the Euro crisis and many different solutions have been proposed. Different national, ideological and cultural narratives clashed in the efforts to make meaning of the evolving events (Van Esch, 2014).

**Crisis management tasks**

The codebook defines several crisis management tasks. WP3 will focus on two of these; meaning making and decision making.

Meaning making is the central topic WP3 will be working on. This may be defined as the phase of crisis management in which leaders formulate a key message that offers an explanation of the threat, actionable advice, and a sense that they are in control of the situation. The aim of this is twofold: first, to insure that leaders ‘get a firm grasp on what is going on’, and second for leaders to develop a clear idea of ‘what might happen next’ (Boin et al., 2005: 140). Our study will focus on how leaders present the crisis by analysing public speeches, how the expert and public discourse about the crisis evolved by looking at media sources and what ideas citizens have about the Euro crisis by conducting a survey. We will map how the crisis is framed and presented by the different parties involved, what causes and effects are attributed to the crisis and what solutions are
proposed. The meaning-making efforts by the different parties will be compared to one another to see if there are differences in how the Euro crisis is perceived. We further analyse this by relating meaning-making efforts to key decisions taken in the course of the Euro crisis. This should indicate how certain decisions came about and whether these caused a change in meaning-making by political leaders and experts or in public discourse. By also looking at decision-making, our results are put into context.

**Legitimate and effective meaning making**

Meaning making is a difficult task, but collective meaning making in case of highly complex, transboundary crises like the Euro crisis is even more difficult. The threat, complexity and calls for urgent and decisive action that accompany such crises may tempt leaders to skip crucial parts of the sense making effort and quickly jump to discussing possible solutions. Adding to these difficulties is the fact that leaders should marry the available expertise and the preferences of the people in order to design effective and efficient solutions and maintain democratic legitimacy. In case of transboundary crises, meaning making should in part also occur across boundaries so a mutual understanding of the situation amongst different stakeholders may develop, or differences in view are revealed. WP3 will explore this challenge and study if meaning making efforts are effective and legitimate.

WP3 starts from a relational and democratic perspective on legitimate leadership. This means it presupposes that the authority to lead is ultimately bestowed on leaders by their followers. This implies that whether leadership is seen as legitimate is ultimately dependent on the perception of the people. Although a high level of congruence between the policy preferences of leaders, citizens and public discourses are often assumed to guarantee political leaders’ legitimacy in the eyes of the people, recent developments in the EU raises doubts about the empirical validity of this assumption (Van Esch, 2016). Legitimate leadership is ‘not only about reflecting the will of the people. It is also about taking the lead and guiding your followers into directions unknown’ (Van Esch, Joosen & Van Zuydam, 2016: 65). Legitimate meaning making therefore goes beyond effective meaning making. In our research we operationalize the legitimacy of leaders’ meaning making by studying how leaders are perceived by citizens. Effective meaning making is measured by establishing the congruence in policy preferences between different stakeholders (Van Esch, Joosen and Van Zuydam, 2016: 65).

To establish the relationship between the meaning making dynamics and the perception of leaders’ legitimacy, a survey will be held to uncover how legitimate different leaders are in the eyes of the European people. In addition to including several questions on peoples’ trust in, and perceptions and valuation of leaders, the survey aims to uncover the rationale underlying their judgement and
relate this to the nature, congruence and dynamics of leaders’ sense making efforts. To do this, WP3 will rely on the model of legitimate leadership developed by van Esch (2016). Based on the literature on the EU’s legitimacy deficit and leadership studies, this model distinguishes four vectors of legitimate leadership: technocratic, electoral, ideological and social identification. The technocratic vector relies on a leader’s expertise or competence and the associated promise to deliver more effective or efficient results (Lord and Magnette, 2004: 185). The second vector of legitimacy rests upon the democratic practice of elections. Politicians are bestowed a leadership position by followers on the ground that they will deliver policies and outcomes that reflect voters’ preferences. The third vector rests upon the ideological connection between leaders and followers for leadership to be seen as legitimate. Ideology has great mobilizing power and relies on the mutual identification with certain values, a common cause or utopia (Bennister et al., 2015; Burns 1978). The final vector of legitimation is rooted in social identification and proposes leadership may be legitimised by a mutual belonging of leader and follower to a particular social group (Haslam et al., 2011).

**WP4.1: Crisis management capacity in the European Commission, European Council and the Council of the European Union (SU)**

WP4.1 (a) maps the EU’s crisis management capacities in eight policy sectors in line with the analytical dimensions set out in the codebook. It also (b) builds a framework for measuring crisis management legitimacy, based on guidance from the codebook, and aims to apply this to each of the three EU institutions. A final report will (c) integrate these two sets of empirics, while considering leadership capacities as part of the EU’s general crisis management capacities.

**Background:** In a world of boundary-spanning crises, the European Union plays a key crisis management role but we lack a full understanding of what crisis capacities its institutions bring to the table. This sub-work package investigates three central institutions in any crisis management exercise: the Commission, which holds many of the tools and resources; the Council of the European Union, which plays a strong role in overall decision-taking; and, the European Council, which over the past decade is assuming a larger leadership role. Institutional capacities need to be better measured in terms of how they can contribute to preparation, response, and recovery efforts. The leadership potential intrinsic to each institution, and the leadership landscape between the three, require further investigation. And the various sources of legitimacy of supranational crisis management must be assessed, to understand how capacities and leadership serve to underpin, or to detract from, the EU’s legitimacy in serving citizens under extreme events.

**Codebook Adaptation:** WP4.1 uses the codebook established by WP2 to investigate the EU’s crisis management capacities in three institutions. The codebook is adapted slightly to facilitate
investigation across a large number of sectors. The existing categories in the codebook are consolidated into four broad categories: sense-making, response (including meaning-making and decision-making) and accountability. These categories are entirely consistent with the codebook, and have been further operationalized to facilitate empirical research. We also use these categories to assess potential leadership capacities in each sector (since the presence of crisis management capacities are closely linked to leadership capacities, as noted in WP2’s codebook).

**Sectors:** We apply the codebook to seven sectors of crisis management activity in the EU. These are: energy, transport, health, migration, cyber, civil protection, terrorism and cross-cutting tools (e.g. EPCIP, ARGUS, etc.).

**Legitimacy:** We draw from the codebook to assess the legitimacy of the EU’s crisis management activities. We note the moral, technocratic and entrepreneurial sources of legitimacy and seek to measure them via a legitimacy framework focused on the input-, throughput- and output-based forms of legitimacy that can accrue to the EU. We complement these with measures with insights from crisis management literature (again, consistent with the codebook) to build a generic analytical framework for measuring crisis management legitimacy across the EU’s institutions.

**Methods:** To investigate the crisis and legitimacy capacities discussed above, both primary and secondary sources will be used. Primary sources include EU official texts (discussion papers, green papers, white papers, Communications and legal instruments) along with interviews (we will conduct quality-control interviews once text analysis is completed). Secondary sources include working papers, academic articles, and book chapters by sector-experts in the field. These sources are used to verify comprehensiveness of our primary sources investigation.

**WP4.2: Crisis leadership in the European Parliament (ThinkEuropa)**

This work package focuses on the activities carried out in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis to render account for response activities. It falls into three categories of the tasks that generate an effective and legitimate response, in order of importance:

- **Accountability:** Rendering an explanation in a public forum (the European Parliament) of relevant decisions and strategies that were initiated before, during and after the crisis (EU crisis management and its effect).
- **Communication:** Effective delivery of the core message to selected audiences (voters) to hold account-givers accountable to the European Parliament (the account-holder) and to communicate to the public why certain decisions were taken.
- **Sense-making:** The collecting, analysing and sharing of critical information that helps
to generate a shared picture of the situation. The exchange of views with finance ministers from countries with fiscal and macro-economic imbalances to provide them with a public forum, where they can explain themselves and make sense of their decisions taken.

This work package mainly focuses on political accountability towards the European Parliament in economic governance. This includes account rendered by finance ministers of countries with fiscal and macro-economic imbalances (breaching EU rules), European Commissioners, the head of the ECOFIN Council (the rotating presidencies), and the president of the informal Eurogroup. The account-giving facilitates *communication* to a wider audience (all the hearings are web-streamed and publically available) and *sense-making*, allowing account-givers to render explanation to the account-holder (the European Parliament).

This WP focuses on the EU’s economic governance, i.e. the economic and financial crisis. This is studied from various vantage points:

- **Formal parliamentary accountability**: The first paper examines the form of, and variation in, the *de jure* provisions for accountability towards the European Parliament in all the EU’s economic and financial legislation introduced in the seventh parliamentary term (2009-2014). This includes 100 pieces of legislation, which were proposed by the European Commission in the seventh parliamentary term and finalised (i.e., appearing in the Official Journal of the EU) in either the seventh or eighth term. This study is important because we know little about the form that these accountability provisions take and the variation in the presence of the provisions. How do the implementing bodies render account to the EP? Are accountability provisions primarily introduced on files responding to the financial and economic crisis, or is the variation driven by other factors? The paper provides an overview of the formal accountability mechanisms in place towards the European Parliament in economic and financial legislation.

- **De facto accountability of member states towards the European Parliament**: This paper examines the content of the exchange of views/economic dialogue between the European Parliament’s economic and financial committee (ECON) and finance ministers of countries breaching EU rules, either because their budget deficit and debt go beyond the required levels in the Stability and Growth Pact or because they suffer from macro-economic imbalances. The paper analyses to what extent the public hearings of finance ministers are just a play to the gallery (MEPs are seen to
be doing something), or constitute tough scrutiny of member states. I will develop a typology of the types of questions asked by MEPs to the relevant finance ministers to hold them account of their economic and financial decision-making and examine the various roles, MEPs play during the public hearings.

**De facto accountability of EU executives towards the European Parliament:** This paper focuses on the economic dialogue between Parliament’s ECON’s committee and the Commission and Eurogroup. I analyse the nature and content of the dialogue.

Overall, this work package examines both *de jure* and *de facto* accountability of various institutions towards the European Parliament. This is important to study because the economic and financial crisis has also resulted in a new type of economic decision-making, which combines intergovernmental decision-making with supranational implementation and supervision. Unlike the ‘pure’ intergovernmental and community methods, the post-crisis decision-making mode is not linked to 'traditional' parliamentary and legal accountability structures and do not introduce new models of accountability in their place. Critics warn that the EU’s economic governance erodes its democratic legitimacy, as the ‘power of the purse’, usually resting with parliaments, has shifted to executive institutions at both national and EU-levels. The EP has not, however, been an idle bystander to its dwindling powers as it has been successful in introducing a range of provisions in EU acts to hold implementing bodies to account, such as the so-called economic dialogue.

**WP4.3: Political leadership in EU agencies (IBEI)**

This WP frames the aforementioned objective under a study of the political leadership in European Union agencies. Specifically, we focus on the role of EU agencies as part of the transboundary crisis management of the EU.

EU agencies are specialized, decentralized, non-majoritarian institutions with informative and regulatory tasks in specific policy sectors (Kelemen, 2005: 175-6; Kelemen & Tarrant, 2011: 929). Therefore, EU agencies can be understood to be part of the management of transboundary crises by affecting the capacity of the EU to perform crisis leadership. We understand political leadership as the capacity to carry out in an efficient manner “the set of tasks that crisis management is comprised” (Boin and Cadar, 2016: 14). The definition allows us to operationalize the study of EU agencies along relevant tasks or dimensions that are part of the management of crises (Boin et al., 2015: 9-10). We particularly focus on three tasks: decision-making, coordination and meaning making
In order to operationalize the understanding of the political leadership in EU agencies vis-à-vis transboundary crisis management, we plan to develop a two-tier strategy: first tier, we will develop a biographical and survey-based databases to enhance our understanding as to ‘who governs’ EU agencies. We particularly focus on the agencies’ decision-making bodies: the management boards and their members and the views they have on transboundary crisis management. Second tier, we will conduct an in-depth case-study research of the crisis management capacities of the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX).

Databases and cases-selection

The methodology of this study follows a two-tier strategy where we will employ quantitative and qualitative methods to understand the role of EU agencies in the management of transboundary crises (TBCs). In the first tier, we will carry out a biographical and survey-based databases and in the second tier, we will do case-study research of four cases in the years 2011-2014. Both tiers draw on the concepts and framework developed for the project. They are theoretically grounded on the literature on crisis management (Boin and Rhinard, 2008, Boin et al., 2013).

First tier: self-perceptions on EU agencies and their role in TBCs

For the first tier, we will focus on 33 decentralized EU agencies. The guiding logic in the selection is that these agencies must clearly be endowed with tasks that allow them to cope with crises that cross different boundaries (i.e. national, administrative, political, economic, legal and conceptual). In this sense, the identification of this criterion has been done by checking the mission and tasks of the agencies in the different Webpages they have and in the literature on EU agencies.

While the biographical database seeks to obtain general information on the agencies’ board members; the survey is clearly framed within the management of transboundary crises. For this part of the study, the survey is divided in four sections related to the perception board members have on the role of their agency when facing TBCs. The sections are: decision-making, coordination, communication and overall response to the TBC.

Second tier: a qualitative approach to EU agencies and the management of TBCs

We will develop an in-depth case study research where we will compare the responses implemented by the EBA, EFSA, ECDC and FRONTEX to different crises in their policy sectors. We will look at three selected tasks mentioned in the section below. In the case of the EBA, we look at the role of the agency during the 2012-15 period. In the case of EFSA, we will look at the 2011 cucumber
crisis when Spanish vegetables were blamed of producing an *E.coli* outbreak in several European countries. In the case of the ECDC, we will study their role during the last Ebola outbreak in Africa in 2014 and the potential response to the presence of the virus in the EU. Finally, in the case of FRONTEX, we focus on the recent refugee crisis in the second half of 2015 in particular.

**Crisis tasks and their operationalization**

A TBC needs a comprehensive and efficient response that identifies the origin, manages the required actions, and deals with the potential consequences, while informs relevant actors and the general public of the whole process. Thus, EUAs emerge as a technical mechanism that may contribute to the management of crises and the coordination of the actors in charge of offering responses at the ground level (Heims, 2015: 2). According to Boin et al. (2015), building capacities for TBC management involve the identification of different forms of vertical and horizontal action. It includes the ability to intervene in situations where the cooperation is non-existent or problematic by using the institutions’ own resources (expertise, information, linkages, etc.) in the process of defining the response to the TBC. We are particularly interested in the formal and informal capacities agencies have to exert crisis leadership in an efficient and timely manner.

Based on the abovementioned premises, we will study our cases along three crisis management tasks: decision-making, coordination and meaning-making of the response. The formal and informal capacities along the selected tasks will allow us to have a better picture of the responsibilities, the organizational autonomy and political independence of EU agencies to manage transboundary crises. We do not deem the other tasks as less important in the overall management of the crisis; however, we do believe that the role of agencies in deciding upon a response, applying it and creating a message that everything is under control are the most critical moments to contain the political consequences of the crisis.

**A. Decision-making of the response**

In this dimension, we will mainly focus on the capacity of the agency to decide on the best response to a TBC. The decision-making is composed by procedures that may determine who and how a decision is taken and the gap between the rules and the reality to take a decision vis-à-vis a TBC.

**B. Coordination of the response**
The literature of coordination defends that a pre-established, cross-cutting, authority that reacts to a crisis is an efficient move to coordinate different actors (Ansell et al. 2010: 203). The assumption is that a more hierarchical coordinating model gives a more standardized response by resembling a supranational model vis-à-vis the emergence of TBCs. In opposition, another strand of the literature defends that pre-established hierarchies are counterproductive in the coordination of a crisis since it inhibits a flexible and context-based response. In this dimension, we will mainly focus on identifying pre-existing coordinating procedures to offer a response and the existence of informal practices in the absence of these procedures. In this variable, we also seek to identify who are the actors that agencies deem as highly relevant in the coordination of the response.

C. Meaning-making of the response

Political leaders have an important responsibility in assuring the public that the response to a TBC is adequate (Ansell et al., 2010: 200). It is central to the management of a crisis to have a leading voice that makes an account of the situation and the response to this situation (‘t Hart, 1993). Meaning-making implies providing a message that identifies the threat and offers the implementation of a response to this threat by capable leaders. We consider this task as part of the accountability process that agencies must put forward vis-à-vis different audiences. Applied to our study, an EU agency has as mission providing information and steps to tackle the crisis and also helping to coordinate the coherent message that all the actors involved should offer.

WP5.1: Political leadership and crisis management regimes (LSE)

This WP looks at four policy domains that are characterised by different types of crises. All of them are of a transboundary nature in that they span over several countries or the whole EU, they are characterised by multi-level aspects, they cross different government departments, they lead to cross-jurisdictional conflicts and they also are shaped by conflicts between different advocacy coalitions and interest group coalitions. They are also transboundary in that they evolve over time. They are crises in that they all have elements of threat, urgency and uncertainty. The four domains are:

- Invasive alien species as a representative of an environmental policy domain. They represent a crisis case in that any invasion can have considerable economic and social costs, there are disputes over strategies and identification and there are issues of multi-level coordination involved. Invasions are usually a consequence of international migration and trade and might have transboundary consequences.
Youth unemployment is a crisis in terms of legitimacy of both national and EU government in that they are not seen to deal with a significant economic and social problem, there is contestation over the policy responses and the appropriateness of which level of government should bear responsibility. It has transboundary characteristics as causes might be said to be transboundary economic integration, and the effects are similarly transboundary given migration flows.

Energy infrastructure security is a crisis in that cross-national infrastructures need to operate to certain standards to avoid interruptions with considerable economic and social consequences. There are considerable transboundary components here, also involving public and privately owned energy infrastructure providers.

Banking resolution mechanisms and stress tests are part of the new European-wide response to the financial crisis that clearly had transboundary consequences and are to provide for an EU level response to systematic banking failure.

The focus of the analysis of this WP will be on crisis management regimes – and therefore the focus will be on institutional capacities (and leadership) rather than on individuals in particular positions.

We will add, where possible, small case-studies of ways in which there has been EU crisis management capacity in action – and how these cases have worked out. This will provide for some indications as to how actors perceive regime effectiveness overall and what the capacity constraints are.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of crisis</th>
<th>Threat element</th>
<th>Uncertainties</th>
<th>Crisis agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invasive alien species</td>
<td>Acute and general capacities</td>
<td>Ecological systems and economic livelihoods</td>
<td>Detection and identification/disputes about mitigation and long-term management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment</td>
<td>Acute in that patterns ‘peak’, but long-standing features/general capacities</td>
<td>Economic and social decline/migration</td>
<td>Contests about responses to unemployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WP5.1 takes a ‘crisis management regime’ approach. This includes two aspects: firstly, the ‘normal’ risk regulation component in which potential crises (i.e. risks) are being monitored and addressed/prevented (crisis prevention). The other is the level of actual ‘crisis management’, namely the kind of provisions that exist to handle with the actualisation of a risk – which might include emergency powers. A regime perspective focuses on three dimensions: standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification. These three dimensions can be easily married to the wider theoretical framework underpinning TransCrisis. In doing so, WP5.1 provides for further differentiation to understand and explain on potential problems of multi-organisational sub-optimisation in response to and as a result of transboundary crises.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy infrastructure</th>
<th>Potentially acute specific crisis, but also long-standing capacities</th>
<th>Blackouts with economic and social consequences</th>
<th>Perrow-type normal accidents</th>
<th>Yes – universal agreement on undesirability of blackouts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banking resolution</td>
<td>Acute financial crisis and subsequent development of regime with general capacities</td>
<td>Collapse of banking system and lack of capacity to bail out system – economic disaster</td>
<td>Perrow-type normal accidents</td>
<td>Yes – especially after financial crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detection</th>
<th>Capacity to recognise emerging and actual risks and threats</th>
<th>Capacity to understand stakeholder objectives in creating common standards</th>
<th>Capacity to recognise effectiveness of behaviour modification strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sense-making</td>
<td>Capacity to collect and systematically analyse information</td>
<td>Capacity to ensure that objectives are shared and understood</td>
<td>Capacity to understand nature/cause of degree of effectiveness of compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>Capacity to choose information gathering approach (i.e. risk-based strategies)</td>
<td>Capacity to make decisions and establish decision-making rules</td>
<td>Capacity to choose behaviour-modification approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Capacity to bring together different information-gathering organisations</td>
<td>Capacity to bring together different stakeholders to agree on objectives of regime</td>
<td>Capacity to bring into harmony different organisations involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning-making</td>
<td>Capacity to explain nature of emerging risks/crises</td>
<td>Capacity to create narrative to explain desirability of the stated objectives of the regime</td>
<td>Capacity to create narrative to justify choice of intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Capacity to communicate in order to support decision-making to alter state of the world</td>
<td>Capacity to communicate the objectives of the regime</td>
<td>Capacity to communicate to stakeholders the effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Capacity to give account for information-gathering strategies</td>
<td>Capacity to give account about the objectives of the regime</td>
<td>Capacity to give account for behaviour-modification strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the focus on regimes and the capacity to set objectives, to detect and to effect, the main interest is in effectiveness. However, in light of the qualitative nature of some of the fieldwork, we will also be able to generate some findings regarding the legitimacy of crisis management regimes, highlighting in particular the potential for disagreement and contestation.

**WP5.2: Managing the immigration crisis: Inter-institutional cooperation and external relations (UNICT)**

This WP deals with the instruments that are used in this research to contribute to the existing empirical knowledge on the EU leaders’ management of the European migration crisis and assess the effectiveness and legitimacy of the management. These instruments are the concept and analytical framework of the TransCrisis Project that Arjen Boin and associates at the University of Leiden have built, as well as the scenario research methodology.

**The TC analytical framework**

Managing a crisis means accomplishing a set of tasks intended to re-establish normalcy (and the perception of it) in a group (or country) that perceives an event (or a series of events) as threatening normal life conditions. Accordingly, in a transboundary crisis the management tasks have to be made by the policy-makers and leaders of all the affected countries. The TransCrisis Analytical Framework is the framework of concepts and basic research principles that have been adopted for studying the way leaders and policy-makers define a set of tasks that the scientific literature recognizes as important to the management of transboundary crises. The defined set of tasks are as follows:

1. *Detection*, i.e. the timely recognition of an emerging threat.
(2) **Sense-making**, i.e. the collecting, analysing and sharing of critical information that helps to generate a shared picture of the situation.

(3) **Decision-making**, i.e. the selection of strategic decisions, joint decision-making, and the formulation of an effective strategy to implement the key decisions.

(4) **Coordination**, i.e. identifying key partners and facilitating collaboration between these partners.

(5) **Meaning-making**, i.e. formulating a key message that offers an explanation of the threat, actionable advice, and a sense that leaders are in control of the situation.

(6) **Communication**, i.e. effective delivery of the core message to selected audiences (e.g. victims, citizens, stakeholders, voters, media representatives, etc.).

(7) **Accountability**, i.e. rendering an explanation in a public forum of relevant decisions and strategies that were initiated before, during and after the crisis.

The goal of the analysis reported in this WP is not theory building or testing but the deepening of knowledge about the way the EU and MS political leaders went through the seven tasks of the analytical framework to manage the crisis triggered by the massive migrant flows into Europe since 2011. Since policy-making analysis and advice is one of the objectives of the TransCrisis project, the management tasks are analysed in order to investigate whether they have been effective or should be changed to produce the expected results, i.e. minimizing the effects of the crisis that are perceived by the leaders and the citizens. Regarding the political side of the analysis, the management decisions by the political leaders are analysed to discern the legitimacy of the management, i.e. to determine whether the leaders made appropriate use of the available political tools, complied with the existing decision-making rules and procedures, and had the peoples approval for the management and implementation of the responses to the crisis.

In general terms, the successful, i.e. effective and legitimate, management of the crisis is that course of action, decided on and led by the state authorities, that achieves the goal of minimizing the negative impact of any problem that is perceived as a threat to the normalcy and values of the state. The more the management of the crisis reduces negative impact, the more successful it is deemed to be. More specifically, since global trends and local conditions outside of Europe are the root causes and drivers of current migration flows, and since these flows are perceived by Europeans as a serious threat to their normal living conditions, the assessment of the leaders’ actions and decisions in managing the crisis will be the empirically documented and we will assess the appropriateness of the leaders’ decisions and actions towards the goal of reducing the impact of these factors on the
European region. To achieve this goal, the leaders have a number of options to choose from with regards to their approach, for example, they could launch long-term initiatives in coordination with other international actors in order to contain the impact of the drivers of current migration flows; strengthen border control and cooperation with countries of transit and origin in order to reduce the magnitude of inflows of migrants to Europe; expand the domestic society’s capability to receive and integrate migrant nationals in order to facilitate resilience to the crisis and restore the normalcy of the European states and societies; or change the approach of the citizens towards the threat by communicating clear messages about the importance of developing open and inclusive societies to meet the challenges of the contemporary world.

Another point to make about the theory and methodology of this research is that the analysis has to be open to the possibility that the causes of the crisis and, consequently, the objectives of the management may weaken and even disappear with the passage of time following the effects of external factors that may have an impact on the crisis independent of the actions of the crisis managers. In other words, factors and conditions that were not included in the research project because they were not predictable at the time it was designed, could affect the actions of the crisis managers and either strengthen or oppose them. Examples of external factors that cannot be anticipated are the exhaustion or self-defeating process of the causes of the crisis, and the intended actions of third players, like international organisations and the governments of states not affected by the crisis, that may or may not act outside of coordination with the crisis managers.

The scenario methodology

In this WP, the management tasks that have been fulfilled by the EU leaders to manage the European crisis of Mediterranean migration inflows in the past five years are analysed using the scenario methodology. This tool of analysis is apt to study the management of a crisis that passes through different configurations in successive periods of time. Accordingly, the present research has developed scenarios for the management of the European migration crisis and, most importantly, aims to explain the conditions that have been created by, and the effects that have followed the EU leaders’ management decisions and actions in each scenario.

5 The scenario method was introduced in social science about 60 years ago to generate knowledge about the future conditions of systems, process and phenomena, but it is used also to test hypotheses and develop theories (Ramirez et al., 2015).
In social science research, the term scenario is used in different ways and has variable meanings. In general, a *scenario* is the configuration, in a definite period of time, of the conditions, actors and events of a system that is researched to check the state of a matter of interest.

- The conditions are the structures, processes and trends that are relevant to understand the matter of concern.
- The actors are the agents of the system that participate in the events that affect the matter under study.
- The events are the actions and decisions of the actors as well as any other event that has a significant impact on the matter and the stability or change of the system.

As a tool for the present research for organising knowledge about the management of the crisis, the scenario methodology is the study of a series of scenarios that follow one another in time. The matter of concern are the management actions that have been used by the EU leaders to minimise the crisis that emerged at a time when a large number of Europeans perceived the arrival of irregular migrants as threatening the normalcy of life in the EU countries. The crisis conditions have been presented in the first part of this chapter about the global trends, the local conditions, and the EU’s existing regimes. The actors are the EU leaders and the migrants. The events are the actions and decisions of the EU leaders aimed at managing the crisis, the collective behaviour of the migrants attempting to enter and settle in Europe and, on occasion, the actions of third parties like international organisations and the governments of third countries.

In the present research, the *EU leaders* are the following institutions and individuals in charge of those institutions in a political authority role (1) the European Council and the heads of state and governments of the MSs as members of the European Council as well as the European Council President; (2) the Council of the Union and the ministers of the MSs as members of the Council of the Union that actively participate in the management of the crisis; and (3) the President of the Commission and the members of the Commission that actively participate in the management of the crisis. The relations of the EU leaders with individual and collective actors within the political and social life of the European countries are the objects of the present analysis only as far as they are relevant to shape the scenarios and to explain the EU leaders’ actions and decisions. The same rule applies to the European Parliament as actor of the crisis.

In summary, the first task of WP5.2 research is *system analysis*, i.e. the analysis of the systemic conditions that are relevant towards the examination of the migration phenomenon and build knowledge about the conditions that affect the success of the management of the crisis. The second
and major task of this research is management analysis, i.e. the analysis of the leaders’ decisions and actions to respond to the perceptions of the threat and the disruption of normalcy in the EU and its MSs. The last task is the assessment of the appropriateness of the management actions to the objective of reducing the impact of the crisis on the normal conditions of the states (effectiveness) with the consent and approval of citizens (legitimacy), and the formulation of recommendations and advice in case that the effectiveness and/or the legitimacy of these interventions are called into question. This task will be further developed as the research reaches completion.

**WP6: Political leadership, national politics and transboundary crisis management (CEU CPS)**

WP6 investigates the causal links between transboundary crisis management and backsliding in EU member states, and asks whether this represents a crisis for the EU and what the policy options and tools the EU has for managing backsliding. We employ the concept to refer not just the propensity of member states to challenge the authority of the EU in enforcing the acquis, but also to challenges to particular constitutional safeguards associated with liberal democracy.

Crisis management is normally a matter of acute action to deal with an acute problem. However, over the last few years backsliding has come to represent a new, more chronic, type of crisis for the EU. The challenge for the EU is that some times and in some context crisis management by member states undermine the common institutions. A number of measures designed to cope with crises at the national level – particularly transboundary such as the financial crisis – have prompted criticism that some member states are backsliding on their commitment to the laws and values they signed up to when joining the EU. The result is a new form of institutional crisis that involves the erosion of institutions because of purposeful action.

National responses to crises sometimes involve policy tools and initiatives that are in some way incompatible with the EU’s rules and values. Sometimes, these measures are even a matter of deliberate challenges to the EU regime, brought forward by parties and governments that seek an assertion of sovereignty and an opportunity to stand up against Brussels as a value in and of itself.

WP6 involves three steps, and the codebook is of more importance for the later steps than the earlier ones. The first step centres on defining and mapping backsliding. Here the codebook is of limited relevance. The second step centres on investigation of backsliding in three different sectors. Here the codebook is pertinent to the part of the tasks that involves analysis of how crises are interpreted and acted upon. However, it is the third part of the investigation in WP6 that makes the
fullest use of the codebook, since this investigates precisely the type of issue the codebook is designed to guide the study.

The overall research question for WP6 is in three parts: a) has there been backsliding in the EU in the context of the multiple crises in the last decade (paper 6.1 on mapping); b) has there been backsliding in each of three sectors, and is this linked to the financial crisis (papers 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 on the rule of law, corruption and equality); and c) and does this represent a challenge for the EU, and might this be the makings of an EU-level crisis (paper 6.5)?

Different crises play different roles in the three parts, both as independent variables and as dependent variable.

For paper 6.1 backsliding is considered a crisis, and it is the dependent variable that is conceptualized, defined and mapped. Both in the first section and for papers 6.2-6.4, the financial crisis is one of several possible independent variables that may have caused backsliding directly or indirectly. The starting point for the investigation is therefore 2008, with a focus on whether backsliding has changed since that dates (compared to a few preceding years). Here the relevance of the guidebook is limited to the definition of crises and its core elements.

For papers 6.2-6.4 the dependent variables are backsliding with respect to each of the three themes. Papers 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 are case studies, and each investigates both the occurrence of backsliding and its causes. In line with the overall project, one central question concerns the role that the financial crisis played as an independent variable: is there any evidence that EU-wide crises – particularly the economic crisis – has contributed directly or indirectly to backsliding? This can be either by directly causing backsliding, or by making it easier for governments to engage in backsliding. Here the relevance of the codebook comes in at the latter stages of the research on each of the three cases of backsliding, as and when the question is the extent to which EU institutions have treated backsliding as a potential crisis.

For paper 6.5 another form of crisis is the dependent variable: the question here is whether backsliding has caused/may cause a systemic crisis for the EU? Here the type of backsliding investigated and reported in papers 6.2-6.4 play the role of independent variables, and the question whether and how the EU has detected and handled a systemic crisis. Here the guidance for research on performance of strategic crisis management tasks set out in the codebook shapes and guides the research.

Step 1
The first step in WP6 is to define and map backsliding in the EU. The first of the five papers that WP6 will deliver is a report on backsliding. The central question here is whether backsliding is in fact as widespread as is often alleged in both academia and the media. This requires a definition of backsliding and an effort to draw on openly available resources to ascertain the extent to which backsliding can be found and documented. This aspect of the work of WP6 began in the early days of the project and did not await the first draft of the codebook. The codebook therefore does not inform much of the work in the first step. The work at this stage involves conceptual work that centres on defining backsliding and making the term operational with respect to the rule of law, corruption and equality in the EU; and empirical work that involved investigation of reports of or investigations of backsliding.

In terms of definitions and mapping, the main pertinence of the codebook lies in its definition of crises and identification of the core elements of crises. WP6 was designed with an overall definition of the term crisis in mind: “a perceived threat to the core values or life-sustaining systems of a society that must be urgently addressed under conditions of deep uncertainty”. In the first part of the work the WP6 team will focus on three select themes related to backsliding; the weakening independent institutions (do crisis responses weaken the constitutional safeguards of democracy?), corruption and corruption control (have crisis provided opportunities for more/new forms of corruption?) and human rights, equality and social justice (have national measures weakened human rights, equality and social justice?).

The codebook has this definition of crisis implying three core elements: threat, urgency and uncertainty. Backsliding involves all three elements, and is defined very much with this in mind. Hard Backsliding is defined as involving a violation of core EU norms and a direct violation of EU primary or secondary law (the acquis) and leavening a member state open to intervention by the Commission. This is, by definition, a “threat in to fundamental values”. It is urgent in the sense that some decision-makers see it as a problem that might get much worse unless addressed immediately. It involves uncertainty in the sense that a number of actors both in the member states and the EU institutions disagree substantially about what to do (and indeed whether any action is urgent, or even necessary). Hard Backsliding is defined as involving a violation of core EU norms without a direct violation of the relevant EU primary or secondary law (of course other laws might be violated, as in the case of forced retirement of judges not constituting a breach of law on judicial independence but it still being a violation of rules on age discrimination). All three elements are still
present, albeit with the threat more contentious, the urgency more debatable and the uncertainty all the greater.

**Step 2**

D6.2: Production of a policy paper summarising findings with respect to backsliding in terms of constitutional safeguards and independent institutions [April 2017]

D.6.3: Production of a policy paper summarising findings with respect to backsliding in terms of corruption and corruption control [April 2017]

D6.4: Production of a policy paper summarising findings with respect to backsliding in terms of gender equality and minorities [April 2017]

The definition of crisis and the core elements of crises applies to and guides the second step in the same way that it applies to the first step. In addition to asking what backsliding means in each of the three context and how it is to be operationalized, these three reports also address the causes of backsliding and how far it might be a problem for the EU. It is the latter of these questions that merits the most direct use of the codebook. In the first instance, which means in the concluding sections of the three reports, the core questions that call for analysis shaped by the codebook are a) what has happened at the EU level in terms of “detection” and “sense-making”, i.e. does anybody claim that backsliding in the chosen sector is a crisis for the EU; and b) how have EU institutions reacted by way of calling for, debating or putting into effect the tools of “coordination”, “meaning-making” and “communication”, i.e. who in the EU has assumed the job of dealing with this, or of saying it should not be dealt with?

**Step 3**

D6.5: Production of a policy paper on comparative investigation of the political causes of backsliding, with a focus on the responses the crises draw from national leaders; the other policy paper will explore policy options for the management of backsliding June 2017].

The final paper addresses a) whether and in what sense backsliding in the three sectors might represent a challenge for the EU that could be a crisis; b) how the issues are interpreted by the relevant actors in the member states the EU institutions, and by other actors such as the media; and c) about whether our cases are seen as a crisis at the EU level and what policy tools the EU has to deal with them (and how effectively the EU has applied its tools so far). These are questions that concern the performance of strategic crisis management tasks, and the analysis is therefore to be guided by the codebook’s seven elements of strategic crisis management.
Detection: the timely recognition of an emerging threat. For the third part of WP6 this involves an investigation the debates about whether backsliding is important, whether it is a threat and whether the EU (and if so which institution) should address it. Because of the nature of the crisis, it also involves debates about the extent to which new tools is needed. Detection is, in short, a political minefield.

Sense-making: the collecting, analysing and sharing of critical information that helps to generate a shared picture of the situation. For the third part of WP6 this involves analyses of the ways EU institutions have dealt with the suggestion that backsliding is a crisis. As in the case of detection, this is not the kind of technical issue that might be the case for other crises, but a profoundly political process.

Decision-making: the selection of strategic decisions, joint decision-making, and formulating an effective strategy to implement the key decisions. For the third part of WP6 this means an investigation of the extent to which the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have taken decisions or debated whether to put the question of taking decisions on the policy agenda.

Coordination: identifying key partners in the response and facilitating collaboration between these partners. For the third part of WP6 this means coordination between European party groups, governments and the European institutions.

Meaning-making: formulating a key message that offers an explanation of the threat, actionable advice, and a sense that leaders are in control of the situation. For the third part of WP6 this means analyses of the different ways that European party groups, governments and the European institutions present the arguments, rather than technical focus on plans and procedures.

Communication: effective delivery of the core message to selected audiences (e.g. victims, citizens, stakeholders, voters, media representatives, etc.). In the context of Brexit, the forthcoming Hungarian referendum and several populist parties’ promises of further national referendums on EU membership, the central focus here is on possible strategies for communication (rather than the plans for communications breakdown) and the potential backlash.

Accountability: rendering an explanation in a public forum of relevant decisions and strategies that were initiated before, during and after the crisis. For WP6 this is a matter of analyzing the potential consequences of accountability processes playing out in the shape of national parliamentary
decisions and/or referendums, rather than the more technical aspects of accountability and the incentives associated with different forums. Here the codebook’s guidelines on political support and popular support are particularly pertinent.
Annex 2: Overview of guiding questions

Identify the key characteristics of the crisis under discussion (key dates; key actors; key events).
- What constitutes the threat element in your case? What is being threatened?
- What makes the specific threat urgent? To whom?
- Is there widespread (political and/or societal) agreement with regard to the nature and scope of the threat?
- What are the uncertainties? Who is experiencing them?
- Has the threat been labelled a crisis by key authorities?
- What are the affected countries and sectors?
- What types of boundaries are being crossed (geographical, policy sector, legal etc.)?
- What is/are the authority/authorities that is/are formally responsible for dealing with the specific crisis/threat?
- Which actor is assumed to be responsible for particular aspects of and/or for overall transboundary crisis management?
- What EU competences are involved (Union-exclusive, shared competences or state-exclusive competences)?

Questions about the use of crisis management capacities - and how they may have changed since 2008:

**Detection:**
- Is there institutional attention towards ensuring that there is continuous institutional attention and vigilance?
- Are there briefing sessions on the latest risk assessments?
- Do leaders meet with experts to discuss threats?
- Are they aware of existing risks?
- Are they willing to acknowledge errors?

**Sense-making:**
- Do leaders consult experts to find out more about and understand what is going on?
- Do they share the information with partners?
- Do they ask for and use their feedback?
- Do they analyse potential consequences?
- Do they identify additional information needs?

**Decision-making:**
Do leaders encourage deliberation on the course of action? Do they engage relevant actors in the decision-making process?

Do leaders recognize and respect the division between operational and strategic decision-making? Do they refrain from interfering with the operational level? Do they support the principle of subsidiarity?

**Coordination:**

Do leaders engage in persuading and/or commanding organisations or relevant actors to cooperate in effort to manage the crisis?

Do leaders monitor vertical and horizontal forms of cooperation?

Do leaders meet regularly with counterparts?

Do leaders intervene when coordination is lacking or dysfunctional?

Are leaders willing to integrate community’s self-organising efforts into the official crisis response?

Are there difficulties in working with organisations from other sectors?

Are there difficulties in working with organisations from the private domain?

Are there difficulties in working with international organisations?

**Meaning-making:**

Do leaders manage to put forward a message that resonates with key audiences?

Do leaders formulate a clear interpretation of the crisis?

Is there one consistent message or multiple messages?

Do leaders explain how they plan to lead their communities out of crisis?

Do leaders take into account contesting frames of the same crisis?

Is there evidence that the message is being accepted by other dominant stakeholders? Or are there different ‘schools of thought’ vying for attention and dominance?

**Communication:**

Do leaders work with communication professionals?

Do leaders disseminate information to both citizens and other actors/organisations involved in crisis management?

Do leaders engage in two-way communication in which they not only push information but also gather it? Do they respond to real information needs?

Are leaders present on social media?

Do leaders dispel rumours? Do they acknowledge errors and correct misinformation?

Do leaders provide actionable advice, that is, what should be done and by whom?

**Accountability:**
Do leaders participate in and cooperate with political inquiries where they render account for their actions before and during a crisis?

Do leaders take responsibility for their actions or are they engaged in blame games?

Are democratically legitimized principals informed about the conduct of executive actors, and about the social consequences of that conduct?

Do the debates between accountability forum and actors focus on whether the behaviour of the latter accords with the democratically legitimized principals’ standards and preferences?

To facilitate the study of crisis management capacities, the following questions should be considered – especially also in the context of what may have changed in the domain since 2008:

**Detection:**
- What prerequisites are required to facilitate early detection?
- Are there resources, mechanisms, procedures and software in place to detect emerging threats?
- Are there regularly performed threat analyses and risk assessments?
- Are there indications of a shared awareness that something can happen at any given moment?

**Sense-making:**
- Are there efforts to improve sense-making?
- Are there simulations or opportunities to rehearse sense-making?
- Are there plans or procedures for processing information once a threat has been identified?
- Is there a specific venue where this takes place (e.g. a crisis room) – at what levels of government?
- Are there formal rules with regard to the sharing of information?
- Are there instructions on how to create a picture of the situation that everybody will understand? (e.g. Is technical data translated into information that can be widely understood?)
- Are these procedures well-rehearsed?

**Decision-making:**
- Are there plans or formal procedures in place that establish how decisions will be made and by whom?
- To what extent and how do these procedures distinguish between the strategic and operational levels?

**Coordination:**
- Are there networks that enable effective coordination?
- Are there rules/procedures for vertical and horizontal coordination?
Are there rules for orchestrating coordination? Is there a shared understanding as to who coordinates and how?

Is there a history of coordination between the institutions involved in crisis management activities?

**Meaning-making:**
- Are there rules or procedures for formulating an understandable and convincing narrative?

**Communication:**
- Is there a strategy regarding communication towards citizens and with the partner institutions?
- Are there contingency plans for breakdowns in communication?
- Is the institution active on social media?

**Accountability:**
- Are there procedures in place for rendering account on what has been done before and during the crisis and why?
- What are the accountability forums investigative powers and information-processing capacities to evaluate executive behaviour, particularly regarding conformity of executive action with laws, regulations and norms?
- Does the accountability forum have incentives to engage executive actors in questioning and debate, and is their interaction focused on conformity of actions with laws and norms?
- Do the accountability forums possess credible sanctions to punish and deter executive misbehaviour?
- Is there evidence that account-holding facilitates processes of feedback, stakeholder dialogue and learning?

The following aspects may guide researchers in assessing effectiveness:
- Are authorities perceived to have prevented a worsening of the situation?
- Were authorities said to have initiated a timely response?
- Have there been calls for external assistance (to other member states or international organisations)? Has the Solidarity Clause been upheld?
- How do political inquiry committees assess the effectiveness of management efforts?

In assessing legitimacy, the following questions provide guidance. Consider also in the context of change since 2008

**Political support:**
- Have there been significant political debates or major controversies with regard to crisis responses?
- Have there been significant conflicts among member states or between member states and the European institutions about the legitimacy of the crisis response?
- Have there been major post-crisis reforms aimed at reforming crisis management capacities?
- Has the crisis that led to the collapse of governments and/or resignation of ministers i?

Legal support:
- Have citizens, victims or other parties initiated legal action against crisis management-involved actors?
- Have courts dealt with legal actions against crisis management-involved actors?

Administrative and professional support:
- Do crisis responses meet with acceptance by national and sub-national public administration and other units tasked with executing the crisis response? (e.g., fit with dominant norms and standard operating procedures)?
- Do crisis response create tension with dominant norms in affected policy communities (e.g. is there evidence of ‘coping strategies’ at the level of the ‘street-level bureaucracy’)?

Popular support:
- How do citizens feel about or engage in crisis management efforts? (Large-scale surveys such as the Eurobarometer may be useful.)
- Is the crisis response related to electoral results?
References


