D2.2 Final Codebook

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Section A: Introduction

Project objectives

TransCrisis aims to develop a solid understanding of transboundary crises. In particular, it seeks to identify the political-administrative requirements for an effective response to this type of crisis and the factors that make transboundary crisis management effective and legitimate. TransCrisis will analyse the role of political leadership in managing transboundary crises, as well as the formal and informal crisis management capacities of specific European Union (EU) institutions across different policy domains. Finally, the TransCrisis project will study the impact of responses to transboundary crises on the legitimacy of EU institutions, leaders and policies.

Project partners

Table 1 presents the name and country of the organizations/institutions participating in the project.

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<tr>
<th>Participant No.</th>
<th>Participant organisation name</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 (Coordinator)</td>
<td>London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)</td>
<td>UK</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Crisisplan B.V. (CPLAN)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Kozeheupai Egyetem – Central European University (CEU CPS)</td>
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<td>Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI)</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Think Tank EUROPA (ThinkEuropa)</td>
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The role of WP2

WP2 provides the analytical framework and the codebook that will guide project partners in carrying out research activities attached to other WPs. WP2 will thus play an integrative role, in that it will facilitate a shared understanding of concepts fundamental to the study of transboundary crisis management.
**The codebook**

The codebook aims to provide guidance to the researchers involved in TransCrisis on how to study institutional crisis management capacities and actual leadership performance in the EU multi-level system. Drawing on the analytical framework presented in D2.1, the codebook provides key definitions and discusses key variables together with their operationalisation.

Sticking to these core definitions will enable the possibility to integrate the findings of individual sub-projects, building the foundation for a sound and comprehensive analysis of EU transboundary crisis management capacity. Furthermore, the codebook also provides guidelines on how to operationalise the key variables of TransCrisis.

To be sure, the codebook does not provide detailed instructions on how project partners should carry out their research. These specifics stem from decisions informed by individual research skills and preferences, and therefore will be left at the latitude of project partners. By defining key concepts and explaining their operationalisation, the codebook will thus create a common ground that will allow for the connecting WPs.

**The process**

The draft version of the TransCrisis codebook for assessing EU transboundary crisis management capacities (included in D2.1 Analytical framework, draft codebook, and comparative cognitive mapping guidelines) was evaluated in two phases. Firstly, it was presented at the project meeting hosted by CPLAN in Leiden, on September 10th and 11th, 2015. One of the most important goals of the meeting was to validate the codebook. As such, the first day was dedicated to discussing the codebook with project partners. The following day, the codebook was presented to a group of practitioners consisting of members of the advisory board and practitioners from the EU and Dutch public institutions.

Secondly, after the workshop, CPLAN prepared an internal document in the form of a questionnaire meant to invite project partners to reflect on the impact of the aforementioned feedback on their research plans.

The input gathered from these sources was used to update the draft version and prepare the final codebook. A memo summarizing the feedback on the draft codebook can be found in the Annex.
Section B: Operationalisation

This section presents the most important theoretical concepts in the TransCrisis project and provides important guidelines on how researchers can operationalise them.

A depiction of key variables

This section depicts a summary of the theoretical framework underlying the TransCrisis project. Figure 1 constitutes a visual representation of the process in which success factors can overcome challenges in issuing a crisis response. More specifically, it presents the process of transboundary crisis management in which national system characteristics, individual past experiences with crises, and the characteristics of EU institutions affect the performance of crisis management tasks, whose challenge is directly proportional to the diversity of boundaries it crosses.

Figure 1: Key variables
What is a crisis?

The term crisis has enjoyed extensive use in newspapers, the media, and day-to-day conversations, partly because it is a concept for which people have developed different understandings. Yet be it an economic crisis, a personal crisis, a flood or an insurgence, they all have a common denominator: a threat that must be tackled swiftly in order to avert or minimize damage to people, infrastructures and institutions.

In academic discourse, a crisis is defined as “a perceived threat to the core values or life-sustaining systems of a society that must be urgently addressed under conditions of deep uncertainty” (Boin et al., 2013: 6).

A crisis, thus, has three core characteristics, namely threat, urgency and uncertainty. Defining crisis in terms of these three characteristics sets it apart from a disaster (where the threat has, in fact, materialized).

The threat element refers to fundamental values (e.g. security, health or integrity) that are undermined as a result of some form of adversity. It is important to note that a crisis does not necessarily imply physical damage or loss of lives; an attack on highly valued symbols can have an equally strong impact on a society.

Urgency is an essential element of a crisis. The time dimension is experienced differently depending on the decision-making level: at the strategic level, even though their time availability does become much shorter during crisis, leaders are not put under the same extreme pressure as first responders at the operational level, who sometimes must make decisions on life and death matters within hours, minutes or even seconds. When there is a societal problem (e.g. climate change or pension deficits) but not many people share the sense that the threat must be addressed very soon, it does not fall within our crisis definition and thus does not qualify for study in our project.

A crisis is always accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty. In crisis times, there is little reliable information about the causes of a threat, its consequences, as well as potential remedies: what is going on? How did it happen? What caused this? What is next? How bad will it be? What can be done?

The concept of crisis is a subjective one in the sense that we speak of a crisis when a considerable number of people (including politico-administrative elites) agree that a certain situation constitutes a disruption of normalcy, a threat that requires an urgent response. A crisis is therefore to a considerable degree subjectively construed.
This implies that the process through which people form their perception of the situation may not be a smooth or linear one. It is often marred by politicization and deep disagreements with regard to the nature of the threat and the effectiveness or costs of proposed solutions.

Every case study should be supported by solid argumentation of why the respective threat constitutes a crisis and is suitable for analysis under our theoretical framework. Guiding questions are:

- Will you study a specific crisis or crisis management capacities in general?
- What constitutes the threat element in your case? What is being threatened?
- What makes the specific threat urgent? To whom? Is there widespread agreement with regard to the nature and scope of the threat?
- What are the uncertainties?
- Has the threat been labelled a crisis by key authorities? Is there political disagreement on the assessment of key authorities?

Categories of crises

The academic literature distinguishes between many types of crises depending on their causes. For instance, we can speak of:

- **natural disasters**, such as floods, heat waves, wild fires, earthquakes, tsunamis, tornados, volcanic eruptions, or droughts. Example: In 2012, northern Italy was hit by a magnitude-6.0 earthquake and later by a magnitude-5.1 aftershock. It claimed the lives of around 24 people and caused serious damage to the cultural heritage of Emilia Romagna region.

- **infectious diseases**, such as H1N1 swine flu, E.coli infection, Ebola, or the mad cow disease. An Ebola outbreak in West Africa started in 2014. The disease heavily affected Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The disease killed thousands of people, overloaded local health systems and flat lined the local economy. The countries received aid from all over the world, including the World Health Organization, in order to gain control over the disease.

- **industrial disasters**, which are disasters caused by industrial companies, either by accident, negligence or incompetence, such as chemical plant disasters, industrial explosions or industrial building collapses. Example: In 1986 there was an explosion at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine (then part of the former Soviet Union). Huge amounts of
radioactive particles spread through Europe and the USSR, rendering the land around the power plan unusable, damaging the environment, killing 31 people instantly, and affecting the health of many.

- **transportation accidents**, such as plane crashes, train wrecks, boat accidents or vehicle collisions. Example: In 2002, an aircraft with 69 people on board and a cargo jet with a crew of two collided mid-air in southern Germany. All passengers on board of the two planes died. The official investigation by German authorities identified as the main cause of the collision a number of shortcomings on the part of the Swiss air traffic control service in charge of the sector involved, as well as ambiguities in the procedures regarding the use of the on-board traffic collision avoidance system.

- **critical infrastructure failures**, which are functional impairments of vital systems of a society, such as power blackouts or telecommunications breakdown. Example: On November 4th 2006, over 15 million clients of the European Network of Transmission System Operators lost electricity for two hours. The blackout extended throughout Europe.

- **terrorist attacks**, such as bombings, hostage taking, or shootings. Example: In November 2015, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks took place in Paris: three suicide bombings near the national stadium, and suicide bombings and mass shootings at a number of cafes, restaurants and music venues in central Paris. The attacks were planned by ISIS in Syria, organized in Belgium and carried out by French citizens.

- **financial crises**, which are downturns in the activity of economic institutions, affecting one or multiple sectors of the economy. Example: In 2009, several EU countries had accumulated overwhelming amounts of sovereign debt relative to the size of their economies, which they were thus not able to pay. The consequences included high unemployment rates, housing bubbles, and massive losses in the bank sector.

In the TransCrisis framework of analysis, the origin of the threat is irrelevant. At the core of the TransCrisis project is a typology based on the **effects** of crisis, which can be localized or transboundary. We are particularly focuses on crises with transboundary effects.

**What is a transboundary crisis?**

A transboundary crisis is a crisis that plays out across one or many types of boundaries (such as geographic, political, or legal boundaries). Therefore, in order for us to speak of a transboundary
In a transboundary crisis, in addition to the generic characteristics of crisis (threat, urgency and uncertainty), the effects of a perceived threat must affect multiple sectors, groups or countries.

It may be difficult to identify a precise starting point of such threats. Furthermore, they expand in severity and transform as they incorporate other sectors or infrastructures that themselves constitute complex systems. The more boundaries involved, the harder it is to manage a transboundary crisis. Figure 2 presents two hypothetical examples of transboundary crises.

**Figure 2: Transboundary crises - hypothetical examples**

Imagine the explosion of a nuclear power plant in France (for example, the one in Cattenom). Due to its proximity to Luxembourg, Germany and Belgium, multiple countries would be affected at once. It would destroy the land around the power plant, polluting the environment and killing people. Perhaps the explosion is caused by a terrorist attack. Inhabitants of at least the surrounding area would have to stay indoors to lessen the amount of nuclear material they get in contact with, shutting down life right after the explosion. Hospitals around the disaster site would be flooded with patients. People from outside Europe would not want to travel in, harming the economy. Agriculture and trade would also be affected due to concerns over contaminated food and soil.

Consider a hack that brings down air control communication at major airports in Europe. Such a hack would not only affect the transportation sector, but all sectors dependent on it. Furthermore, air traffic would cease until re-establishing communication. Travellers would no longer be able to reach their destinations, and business and industry would be affected due to immobility. Apart from the cancellation and rescheduling of flights, airlines might also experience a loss of clientele if customers lose trust in flying. In a globalized world, different sectors would be affected in different countries.

In studying a particular crisis, researchers in this project should identify the transboundary dimension of the threat (that is, which boundaries it crosses).

The following questions are useful in researching the types of boundaries that we expect to be of interest in this study:

- What is the authority that is formally responsible for dealing with the specific crisis/threat?
- Which actor claims responsibility?
- What are the affected sectors, countries?
- What types of boundaries are being crossed (geographical, policy sector, legal etc.)?
- Are there many types of authorities involved in addressing the crisis?
- What EU competences are involved (Union-exclusive, shared competences or state-exclusive...?
competences)?

**National boundaries** (which relate to matters of state-interest):
- Is a state willing to share information?
- Is a state willing to pool resources and deploy them to external areas?
- Is a state willing to submit to decisions made by other states or international institutions?
- Is a state willing to render account in international fora?

**Administrative/organisational** (which relate to the internal characteristics or procedures of a specific domain/organisation):
- What is the relationship with other organisations and policy sectors? Are there difficulties in working with organisations from other sectors?
- Are there difficulties in working with organisations from the private domain?
- Are there difficulties in working with international organisations?

**Political boundaries** (which relate to political systems affecting the way decisions are made, establishing priorities, and distributing resources):
- Are there any political controversies being carried out at the same time with crisis management efforts?
- Are there political tensions with respect to crisis management efforts?

**Economic boundaries** (which relate to economic prosperity having an impact on resource availability, to economic wellbeing and to industry at large):
- Are there economic differences between the crisis management parties?
- Do parties to crisis management efforts dispose of the required resources?

**Legal boundaries** (which relate to formal procedures, rules, and laws that regulate authority in times of crisis):
- Are there laws that regulate crisis management?
- Are there laws drawn for specific threats that place authority in specific hands?
- Are there any legal issues that hamper the collaboration between sectors or organisations?
- What is the legal perspective on unforeseen (unplanned for) events?
- Does the law allow for any exceptions?

**Conceptual boundaries** (which relate to mind-sets that frame a certain crisis and affect the course of action):
- Are there differences in crisis perceptions? Are there different accounts or understandings of what is going on, what caused it, what should be done and who should act as such?
The TransCrisis project is led by the question of how political leaders in the EU multi-level governance system can exercise legitimate and effective crisis leadership in the face of transboundary threats. Analyses should not remain limited to the national or EU level, but should also address the interaction across levels.

**Crisis management cycle**

In general, crisis management can be described as a process comprised of efforts to mitigate the impact of threats. The crisis management cycle (Figure 3) does not start when the (threat of) damage becomes real. Rather, it begins long before, with measures to prevent threats from turning into full-fledged crises. The **prevention** phase includes risk analysis and assessment that inform the adoption of long-term strategies and activities for reducing the specific risks. **Preparedness** consists of more concrete efforts, mechanisms, or procedures to alter people’s behaviour in order to nurture some sort of familiarity with the experience of crisis, and to develop effective patterns of response to known threats. More specifically, preparedness includes crisis contingency planning, simulations, training and education. The **response** phase includes efforts and activities aimed at minimizing the effects of the crisis, carried out in the immediate aftermath. Finally, the **recovery** phase consists of aspects such as restoring routine modes of operation, reconstruction of buildings, and learning.

The TransCrisis project focuses only on two phases of the crisis management cycle, namely **preparedness** and **response**. Prevention and recovery are not in line with the TransCrisis project which seeks to identify what makes the response to a transboundary crisis effective and
legitimate, and to what extent the EU can fulfil those requirements. Therefore, the EU’s prevention and long-term recovery efforts are irrelevant to our study.

**Transboundary crisis management**

We define transboundary crisis management as a set of tasks that are known to be effective in responding to threats and that therefore are expected to be applied by the authorities in charge in order to limit the impact of crisis and re-establish a sense of normalcy. It may not be clear who these authorities are as a transboundary crisis by definition involves multiple domains. It is therefore not always clear who “owns” the crisis and should deal with it (Boin et al., 2013: 9).

The crisis management literature identifies the following tasks that generate an effective and legitimate response:

- **Detection**: the timely recognition of an emerging threat.
- **Sense-making**: the collecting, analysing and sharing of critical information that helps to generate a shared picture of the situation.
- **Decision-making**: the selection of strategic decisions, joint decision-making, and formulating an effective strategy to implement the key decisions.
- **Coordination**: identifying key partners in the response and facilitating collaboration between these partners.
- **Meaning-making**: formulating a key message that offers an explanation of the threat, actionable advice, and a sense that leaders are in control of the situation.
- **Communication**: effective delivery of the core message to selected audiences (e.g. victims, citizens, stakeholders, voters, media representatives, etc.).
- **Accountability**: rendering an explanation in a public forum of relevant decisions and strategies that were initiated before, during and after the crisis.

The TransCrisis project focuses on EU’s transboundary crisis management capacity. In assessing this capacity, individual studies will analyse some or all of the seven crisis management tasks, depending on the cases selected. Nonetheless, taking into consideration the leading question of TransCrisis, it is crucial that each study will address at least the following three tasks: decision-

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1 These tasks are drawn from Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, Sundelius (2005). For a summary, see Boin, Kuipers and Overdijk (2013).
making, coordination, and meaning-making. Finally, it is of paramount importance for the coherence of the project that each WP identifies and explains the crisis management tasks it seeks to research.

As explained in the theoretical framework, the seven tasks mentioned above can be employed to assess both preparedness for and actual performance of managing a crisis. The fact that a certain institution can be assessed as having good transboundary crisis management capacity (thus as prepared) does not mean it will automatically employ that capacity in an actual crisis. In other words, capacity does not guarantee performance. The distinction between the two should therefore be clear in the individual studies.

Both preparedness for and performance of the identified strategic crisis management tasks are under focus in TransCrisis. For each task, researchers will study whether the institution in question has prepared to properly perform that task and, if possible, how it has performed each task in the event of an actual crisis. The following questions may provide guidance.

- What is the level of analysis? (At which level is crisis management performed? National? International?)
- Which actors/institutions are being researched?
- Which capacities are being studied? (Detection, sense-making, decision-making, coordination, meaning-making, communication, or accountability?)

For each crisis management task, the following questions may be helpful:

**Detection:**
- Are there mechanisms, procedures, software, etc. in place to detect emerging threats?
- Are there regularly performed threat analyses and risk assessments?
- Are there indications of a shared awareness that something can happen at any given moment?
- Does the institution have experience with crisis management? And with this type of crisis?

**Sense-making:**
- Are there plans or procedures for processing information once a threat has been identified?
- Is there a specific venue where this takes place (e.g. a crisis room)?
- Are there formal rules on whom to share information with?
- Are there instructions on how to create a picture of the situation that everybody will understand? (e.g. Is technical data translated into information that can be widely understood?)
Are these procedures well-rehearsed?

**Decision-making:**
- Are there plans or formal procedures in place that establish how decisions will be made and by whom?
- Who is making the decisions? Is it clear?
- To what extent and how do these procedures distinguish between the strategic and operational levels?
- Does the actual crisis management process adhere to these plans/procedures?

**Coordination:**
- How many actors are involved in the response network? How do they relate to each other?
- Are there rules/procedures for vertical and horizontal coordination?
- Are there rules for orchestrating the two types of coordination? Is it clear who is the coordinator?
- Is there a history of coordination between the institution under study and others involved in crisis management activities?

**Meaning-making:**
- Are there rules or procedures for formulating an understandable and convincing narrative?
- Are there multiple sources of meaning-making?
- Is there one consistent message or multiple messages?
- Do these messages/narratives clearly explain the causes and responses to the crisis?
- Is there evidence that the message is being accepted by other dominant stakeholders? Or are there different ‘schools of thought’ vying for attention and dominance?

**Communication:**
- Is there a strategy regarding communication between the institution and citizens, and between the institution and other organisations for crisis situations?
- Are there plans for breakdowns in communication?
- Is the institution active on social media?
- Does the institution have in place and use communication channels to explain the crisis?
- Does it clearly explain the consequences of the crisis?
- Does it clearly explain what is being done to tackle the crisis?
- Does it offer actionable advice on who should do what and why?

**Accountability:**
- Are there procedures in place for rendering account on what had happened before and during the crisis and why? (e.g. political inquiries)
Are there planned occasions to explain what worked and what not during the crisis?

Are democratically legitimized principals informed about the conduct of executive actors, and about the social consequences of that conduct? ²

Do the debates between accountability forum and actors focus on whether the behaviour of the latter accords with the democratically legitimized principals’ standards and preferences?

Does the accountability arrangement provide sufficiently significant incentives for executive actors to commit themselves to the agenda of their democratically legitimized principals?

Does the accountability forum have enough investigative powers and information-processing capacity to credibly evaluate executive behaviour, particularly regarding conformity of executive action with laws, regulations and norms?

Does the accountability forum have incentives to engage executive actors in relevant questioning and debate, and is their interaction focused on conformity of actions with laws and norms?

Does the accountability forum possess credible sanctions to punish and deter executive misbehaviour?

Does the accountability arrangement yield both actors and clients and key external stakeholders an accurate, timely and clear diagnosis of important performance dimensions?

Does the accountability arrangement provide a setting and a set of interaction routines which induces ongoing, consequential dialogue among executive actors and key stakeholders about performance feedback?

Is the accountability forum sufficiently strong to make accountors anticipate, yet sufficiently 'safe' to minimize defensive routines so that accountors adopt the lessons learned from performance feedback and stakeholder dialogue?

Leadership and leaders

We are interested to see how political and agency leaders affect the capacity to perform crisis leadership. We define leadership as the execution of the set of tasks that crisis management is comprised of. As such, efforts that pertain to the way detection, sense-making, decision-making, coordination, meaning-making, communication and accountability are carried out at the appropriate level of authority inform on the quality of crisis leadership. Leaders are those individuals who reside at the top of a political or institutional hierarchy, ultimately bearing responsibility for the decisions and actions of the country or institution they represent.

² This and the remainder of the questions on accountability are quoted from the study of Bovens et al. (2008).
In studying crisis leadership, researchers can look at whether and to what extent leaders facilitate the fulfilment of strategic crisis management tasks. This will help us to uncover success factors that determine the effectiveness and legitimacy of transboundary crisis management.

Questions that may help researchers explore the relation between leaders and crisis leadership are:

**Detection:**
- Do leaders’ actions display continuous vigilance?
- Are there briefing sessions on the latest risk assessments?
- Do leaders meet with experts to discuss threats?
- Are they aware of existing risks?
- Are they willing to act quickly even with the risk of false alarms?
- Are they willing to acknowledge errors?
- Do leaders create the conditions that facilitate early detection?

**Sense-making:**
- Do leaders consult experts to find out more about and understand what is going on?
- Do they share the information with the right people/institutions?
- Do they ask for and use their feedback?
- Do they analyse potential consequences?
- Do they identify additional information needs?
- Are leaders preoccupied with improving sense-making?
- Do leaders rehearse sense-making? Do they participate in simulations?

**Decision-making:**
- Do leaders encourage deliberation on the course of action? Do they engage relevant actors in the decision-making process?
- Do leaders respect the division between operational and strategic decision-making? Are they willing to leave decisions to be made at the appropriate level? Do they refrain from interfering with the operational level? Do they support the principle of subsidiarity?
- Do leaders reflect adaptability? Do they take into consideration different contingencies and allow the possibility of innovative solutions to unforeseen circumstances?
- Do their actions reinforce core institutional or societal values?

**Coordination:**
- Do leaders engage in persuading and/or commanding organisations or relevant actors to
cooperate in effort to manage the crisis?
☐ Do leaders monitor vertical and horizontal forms of cooperation?
☐ Do leaders meet regularly with counterparts?
☐ Do leaders foster a network that enables effective coordination?
☐ Do leaders intervene when coordination is lacking or dysfunctional?
☐ Are leaders willing to integrate community’s self-organising efforts into the official crisis response?

**Meaning-making:**
☐ Do leaders work to formulate a clear interpretation of the crisis?
☐ Do leaders explain how they plan to lead their communities out of crisis?
☐ Do leaders show attempts to restore hope and confidence?
☐ Do leaders deal well with contesting framings of the same crisis?
☐ Do leaders explain what effects the crisis will have on policy? Do they discuss possible changes?
☐ Do leaders manage to put forward a message that resonates with key audiences?
☐ Do leaders relate the events to the core values of the institution/society?

**Communication:**
☐ Do leaders consult with communication professionals?
☐ Do leaders disseminate information to both citizens and other actors/organisations involved in crisis management?
☐ Do leaders engage in two-way communication in which they not only push information but also gather it? Do they respond to real information needs?
☐ Are leaders present on social media?
☐ Do leaders care to dispel rumours? Do they show interest in sharing accurate information? Do they acknowledge errors and correct misinformation?
☐ Do leaders provide process information, namely describe what is being done to tackle the crisis?
☐ Do leaders provide actionable advice, that is, what should be done and by whom?

**Accountability:**
☐ Do leaders participate in political inquiries where they render account for their actions before and during a crisis?
☐ Do leaders take responsibility for their actions as opposed to engaging in blame games?

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**Effectiveness and legitimacy of transboundary crisis management**

The TransCrisis project will also look into the legitimacy and effectiveness of transboundary crisis management.
We define **effectiveness** as the degree to which an action produces the desired results. The purpose of crisis managers is to minimize the impact of a crisis, that is, the damage to both human life and physical property. Effectiveness can thus be assessed through statistical evaluation. However, the effectiveness of crisis management bears some relationship to the perspective and priorities of the person or entity making the assessment (De Londras and Doody, 2014). This means that in order to be considered effective, a crisis response should meet the objectives laid out in the organization’s crisis management plans and show some degree of attachment to the organization’s mission and modus operandi.

Effectiveness cannot always be measured objectively, in the sense that it means different things to different people/organizations. Researchers are therefore required to identify the point of view from which the effectiveness of a response is assessed. This is even more important in the context of transboundary crises, where different response organizations come to work together.

The following aspects may guide researchers in assessing effectiveness:

- To what extent did response authorities prevent further damage? After the intervention of authorities, were any other lives lost? Was property destroyed?
- Were authorities timely in issuing a response?
- Have there been declarations of State of Emergency?
- Have there been calls for external assistance?
- If so, what were the reasons?
- Has that improved the effectiveness of the crisis response?
- Have there been professional inquiries/evaluations? (These are standard incident-related evaluations that investigate the crisis and the actions taken in response.)
- Have there been political inquiries? (These are performed by legislative or political-executive authorities on demand.)
- How do they assess the effectiveness of management efforts?
- Which persons or organizations do they criticise?
- Which persons or organizations do they praise?
- Which actions are being criticised and which ones are praised?

We adopt the following definition of **legitimacy**: “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). A transboundary crisis response is therefore legitimate when the official efforts correspond to what is generally expected.

Legitimacy can be understood across many different dimensions relating to process (detection, sense-making and meaning-making), content (decision-making) and practice (implementation: coordination, communication, accountability). To assess legitimacy, researchers will evaluate the extent to which crisis management enjoys political, legal and popular support along the three aforementioned dimensions.

In assessing legitimacy, the following questions provide guidance:

**Political support:**
- Do crisis management efforts reflect meaningful consultation with key stakeholders?
- Is there a willingness to or concern for including additional stakeholders?
- Have there been significant political debates or major controversies?
- Has there been major criticism with regard to crisis management?
- Have there been major reforms in the field of crisis management?
- Have there been crises that led to the collapse of governments and/or resignation of ministers in charge with the response?

**Legal support:**
- To what extent are parliaments engaged in crisis management?
- Do parliaments have a strong oversight role?
- Is there a systematic review of crisis management efforts?
- Does the response comply with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity?

**Popular support:**
- Is crisis management transparent? Do citizens have access to information?
- Do interest groups have access to and influence in the decision-making process?
- Is crisis management accountable? Are political actors responsive and can be held responsible for their actions?
- How do citizens feel about crisis management efforts? (Large-scale surveys such as the Eurobarometer may be useful.)
- Have there been cases in which crisis management affected electoral results?
- To what extent do citizens engage in crisis management voluntarily? Are they willing to do so?
Effectiveness and legitimacy are not totally independent variables, in the sense that the effectiveness of a response sometimes brings a certain degree of legitimacy to the issuing leader or organisation. It is important this relationship be addressed by individual studies.

Section C: Research guidelines

The goal of individual (sub-)WPs is to generate empirical data comparable along the main questions of TransCrisis. Towards that goal, this section offers a few practical guidelines.

Researchers are at liberty to structure their studies as they consider appropriate in light of the leading research sub-questions. However, since we seek to integrate all results and produce a complex but comprehensive analysis of EU transboundary crisis management, researchers should ensure the respective structure is compatible with the requirements provided in the previous sections.

The studies will be built on primary and secondary data. For both types of data, researchers must keep a clear record of its source as well as ensure that the use of this data complies not only with research standards, but also with ethical principles (that may defer depending on the institution, country, etc.); if any research or ethical issues arise, they must be discussed before proceeding with the proposed activity. Primary data consist of interviews, official programs, policy documents, regulations, etc. For studies that draw on interviews for instance, researchers will present and, if necessary, explain informed consent forms to respondents. Secondary data, such as findings of previous EU projects or academic literature on the topics of interest, will be archived in either electronic form or in hard copy. It is crucial that researchers reference the information from secondary sources precisely.

Drawing on these types of data, the TransCrisis project will perform both quantitative and qualitative analyses. To facilitate potential collaboration between project partners, Table 2 offers an overview of the proposed research methods of each study and outlines the intentions of collaboration expressed by project partners.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
<th>Opportunities for collaboration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The transboundary crisis management capacity of EU institutions</td>
<td><strong>Crisis management capacity in the European Commission,</strong> European Council and the Council of the European Union (WP4.1)</td>
<td>Interview with officials from the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union; Document analysis.</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>Internal, with WP5.2 (research on the migration crisis).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies of transboundary crisis management</td>
<td><strong>Studying political leaders in the financial crisis (WP3)</strong></td>
<td>Survey on perceptions of the Euro crisis (the target group is European citizens); Cognitive mapping (based on speeches of 43 leaders divided as follows: 35 governmental leaders and presidents of central banks from ten countries, namely Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Spain, the UK, Hungary, Slovenia and Denmark; 8 leaders who currently hold or have held the function of President of the European Commission, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, or President of the European Central Bank). (designed as a case study on the financial crisis)</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>Internal, with WP4.1 (research on the European Commission and the Council of the European Union), WP4.3 (research on the European Central Bank), WP6 (research on backsliding).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leadership in EU agencies (WP4.3)</td>
<td>Survey on crisis management capabilities of EU agencies (the target group is members of agencies’ managing boards); Interviews with members of the agencies’ managing boards, officials from the European Commission, and academics; Case study (the European Central Bank in the Euro crisis in 2012, the European Food Safety Authority in the cucumber crisis in 2011, and the European</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Internal, with WP4.1 and WP4.2 (research on EU institutions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Opportunities for collaboration</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political leadership and crisis management regimes (WP5.1)</strong></td>
<td>Centre for Disease Prevention and Control in the Ebola outbreak in 2014; Process-tracing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internal, with WP4.1 (research on the European Commission), WP4.2 (research on the European Parliament), WP4.3 (research on EU agencies), and WP6 (research on backsliding).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Managing the immigration crisis: Inter-institutional cooperation and external relations (WP5.2)</strong></td>
<td>Interviews. (designed as a comparative case study: financial regulation, environmental regulation, social policy, and energy policy)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A study of transboundary crisis management effects</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political leadership, national politics and transboundary crisis management (WP6)</strong></td>
<td>Interviews.</td>
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<td><strong>A study of accountability</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis leadership in the European Parliament (WP4.2)</strong></td>
<td>Coding; Document analysis; Interviews with policy makers from EU institutions and members of the European Parliament. (designed as a case studies on EU institutions, but focusing on the European Parliament and following the financial crisis, youth unemployment, the NSA surveillance diplomatic crisis, and the energy security crisis).</td>
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<td>External, with Dr. Christel Koop from King’s College London, on holding the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the European Council accountable in EU economic governance. Internal, within WP4.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that each study plays the role of a puzzle piece in relation to the larger TransCrisis project. In other words, each study constitutes a crucial clue in investigating what makes transboundary crisis management effective and legitimate in the EU. Researchers should explain how their studies fit into the overall theoretical framework. Furthermore, each study will present its leading questions and dedicate a section to summarizing the research they have carried out and providing clear answers to the initial questions.

Section D: Conclusion

The final codebook provides important research guidelines that will facilitate an integrated final analysis of transboundary crisis management in the EU. It follows the draft version that was validated by an advisory board and improved with their feedback.

Together with the analytical framework, the final codebook constitutes the skeleton of the TransCrisis project. This means that the recommendations offered by the codebook must be identifiable in all (sub-)WPs (as long as the topic allows it). Yet researchers are encouraged to go beyond the leads suggested in this document. Researchers should delve farther into their topics, keeping in mind the codebook and ultimately the theoretical framework bear a flexible mark – the TransCrisis research should improve them.

In what follows, the final codebook will be employed by project partners in carrying out their studies. Meanwhile, the authors (CPLAN) will remain available to the consortium for any matters concerning the implementation of the codebook and will follow the progress in each WP.
Annex: Feedback on D2.1 Draft Codebook

The rationale behind the process of evaluating the codebook consisted of two phases.

Firstly, CPLAN hosted the second consortium meeting in Leiden, on September 10th and 11th, 2015. It was dedicated to discussing the codebook with project partners as well as with an external group consisting of members of the project’s advisory board and a number of practitioners from EU and Dutch institutions. This workshop gave project partners the opportunity to agree on the understanding of key concepts and their operationalisation. These were then validated by the views and experience of practitioners whose work belongs to the field of crisis management. More specifically, project partners presented their different WPs and the prepared research plans to the group of practitioners, who then discussed the contents thereof and offered advice. Such efforts subscribe to one of the most important goals of the project, namely to enable practical results.

Secondly, CPLAN prepared a questionnaire that invited project partners, after the Leiden workshop, to rethink their research plans in the language of the TransCrisis project. The questionnaire was designed in such a way that responding to the constitutive questions required a short analysis through the lens of the codebook. This facilitated an informed answer to the request for feedback on the draft version of the codebook.

In general, both project partners and advisors were highly positive about the codebook and appreciated its content as very useful in assessing transboundary crisis management capacity. Yet the two phases explained above have been instrumental in improving the codebook. In this sense, the feedback received consisted of the following:

- One request came in relation to distinguishing between crisis and disaster.
- When it comes to the categories of crises that the codebook shortly exemplifies, one required addition was economic or institutional crisis.
- It was suggested that the codebook should leave more room for politics: in addition to the seven crisis management tasks and their operationalisation, the codebook should also provide guidelines on how to analyse the political process surrounding a crisis.
- An important point was made in relation to the dynamics of crises. It was requested that the codebook loosen the proposed structure by addressing the unintended consequences of crisis management.
• When it comes to the crisis management cycle, the TransCrisis project focuses exclusively on preparedness and response. Nevertheless, it was rightly explained by one of the project partners that the codebook must account for the impossibility to separate recovery efforts from response or preparedness.

• It was agreed that WP4.1 studying EU institutional capacity for transboundary crisis management must add the European External Action Service (EEAS) as an object of study alongside the European Commissions, the European Council and the Council of the European Union.

• It was requested that the codebook include more operationalising questions to address the different types of accountability.

The feedback presented above was integrated into the TransCrisis codebook to generate the final version. In addition, the research methods table has been updated with refined information on the topics of each sub-project as well as with possibilities for internal and external collaboration (within TransCrisis and with other projects). The final codebook will be employed by project partners in studying EU transboundary crisis management capacity. Towards the end of the project, the results of individual studies will be used in WP7 to complete a sustainable instrument to assess the capacities of EU governance in the field of transboundary crisis management.
References


